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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The present work alms at presenting a thesis on 
the development of nationalism in Egypt during the period
Hjl1870-1914, which begins after the cutting of^Suez Canal and 
ends with the outbreak of the First World War,
This period of forty-five years is important in 
many respects: It is during this period that, after the 
cutting of the Canal, Bgjrpt was involved in international 
politics* It is during this period that Egypt was 
Europeanized in education, administration and culture.
Again, it is during this period that Egypt became indebted 
with huge sums to European creditors, which resulted in 
European intervention and finally ended in British occupatio 
During the period of British Occupation, culminatl;bng in 
a declaration of British Protectorate in 1914, new 
nationalist forces were awakened and the immature national 
consciousness of the pre-Occupation days took a definite 
turn towards Western type of nationalism* Led by the new 
middle class it reached its maturity during this period, 
and although little was achieved towards the goal of 
national independence, the movement at least made the peopl 
politically conscious and, immediately after the end of the 
First World War, gave rise to a new and more powerful
11
movement for the liberation of Egypt. The po3t-War movement, 
resulting in a semi-independent status for Egypt in 1922, 
was the direct outcome, or rather the continuation, of the 
pre»War movement.
Hitherto, the work of analysing or appraising the 
Egyptian national movement has been mainly of two kinds* One 
produced by Western writers, both antagonists and protagonists 
of the movement; secondly, produced by the Egyptians themselv< 
The Western writers, mostly English and French, are, as a 
rule, interested in Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Egyptian 
relations rather than in the Egyptian people or their 
movements .
As for the Egyptian writers, few of them aimed at 
analysing the development of natiomlism in Egypt. Most of 
them rarCfi^ F seem to be interested in persons rather thftn in 
movements, and as such their description of the national 
movement also becomes a narrative of the personal achievemeni 
of a leader. Again, nobody has yet attempted to describe 
the movement as a whole and in its true perspective. Most 
of these works deal with different aspects of the national 
movement, thus giving only a partial picture of the whole.
I have attempted to analyse the causes of the 
development of nationalism in Egypt, and in doing so, I had 
to trace it back from the closing years of the eighteenth 
century whence the history of Modern Egypt starts. It was, 
therefore, necessary to cover the entire period preceding 
the ye ir 1915.
ill
The scope of the present work has been limited 
and ends with the beginning of the First World War, for 
the national movement, by this time, had In a way reached 
a definite stage.
As for the sources of the present work, I have 
mainly depended upon the published materlal^ r. The British, 
French, and the Egyptian archives were out of my reach* But
since some of the writers on Egyptian affairs have gone
Ithrough the archival material, I was able, were necessary, 
to make use of It though only In second-hand.
Apart from the scattered data that I have collected 
from the Egyptian sources which deal with the problems of 
my topic only incidentally, the works of Abd ar-Ra^an 
ar-Rafl'l have been very much helpful to me in so far as he 
has collected all the available data regarding the history 
of nationalism in Egypt, His works I4ck scientific analysis 
and an historical perspective; he lays emphasis on persons 
rather than on movements, and his works seem to be records 
of events and personalities. But Inspite of all limitations 
we find here a great deal of Information, otherwise not 
available from any source ,
European works, manly in English and a few in Frenc 
are usually a narration of diplomacy and war, occupation and 
post-occupation administration. If some of these works deal 
with any aspect of Egyptian peoples* movement, it is some 
particular event or some person significant during the period
Iv
With the exeeption of W* S, Blunts few writers have been 
directly interested in the entire movement of the period. 
However, the account of contemporary observers, travellers, 
and residents have been very helpful in my analysis of the 
facts and the events, It is in the travellers' accounts and 
in the accounts of contemporary observers that we get glimpsej 
of plain truth which throws new light on the actual situation 
as it existed, *niis material had so far remained unexplored, 
and I was fortunate in having access to most of these reports 
and observations written during the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.
Invaluable material is found in contemporary 
periodicals and newspapers, most of which has hitherto 
remained ujntouched. The information contained in this 
category of material is not unquestionably reliable; but 
it may often supplement or at times explain/ certain 
ambiguities. It has thus been used only by way of getting 
some clarification or supplementation,
I have confined myself to using works of contempo 
authors or evidence of a contemporary nature only, as very 
few of the secondary sources seem to deal with the subject 
authoritatively. Wherever inevitable, as a last resort,
I have used such sources but of a more reliable nature.
The scheme of the thesis is as followst 
Chapter I is a historical summary of the peri< 
preceding the year 1870, It deals with the forces that g£
birth to a vague consciousness among the people with a desire 
for a change in their conditions• Beginning with the period 
preceding the French Invasion and describing the general 
political and economic conditions of that period, the chapter 
proceeds on to narrate and analyse the effects of the French 
rule in Egypt. Then follows the period of Muhammad All, 
During this period popular misery reached its apogee and 
culminated in general discontentment and resentment against 
the despotic rule of one man* No trace of an open revolt 
is found diirlng this period, yet such feelings were ripe and 
speedily came into the open in the**post-Canal’period.
Chapter II deals with general social, political, 
educational and economic conditions preval/ent during Khedive 
Isma’il’s period. It begins with the cutting of the Canal 
and deals with an analysis of its aftereffects, and covers 
a discussion on the policy of Isma'il that made European 
intervention inevitable*
Chapter III deals witdi the stormy period of the 
first Egyptian Revolt* Going into the background of the 
militant national movement, it deals with the causes of the 
Revolt, the actual Revolt, its failure, and the causes of 
the failure* Lastly, it deals with the contribution the 
Revolt made towards the national awakening* This chapter 
ends with the British Occupation*
Chapter IV is an account of the period immediately 
following the Occupation* It deals with the trends and 
movements current inside and outside Egypt for the liberatlo 
of the country. It also deals with the effects of the
vl
British Occupation which were obviously a death-blow to the 
national movement*
Chapter V covers an analysis of the development 
of nationalism after the accession of Abbas II* It was 
during this period that the leadership of the moverment 
was taken over by the new middle class, the lawyers and the 
Journalists, and Eg3rptian nationalism took a new turn, that 
of a modern movement organised on European lines. Again,it 
was during this period that the formation of political 
parties took place* But in Egypt, few of the political 
parties had any rigid organisation, or constitution* They 
were,at the most, political groups centred round some 
important figure or some prominent newspaper. That is why^  
no emphasis has been laid on dealing in grea^ t jleal the nature 
and character of these parties.
Chapter VI, the last, is a continuation of the 
preceding chapter and deals with the last phase of the 
development of nationalism in Egypt. Commencing after the 
death of Kamil and the recall of Cromer, it proceeds to 
relate the persons, events, ideas and trends of the period 
immediately preceding the War. This chapter ends with the 
outbreak of the First World War*
C H A P T E R  I
N A T I O N A L I S M
The history of modern Egypt goes back to the 
closing years of the eighteenth century. Nominally under 
the Ottoman sovereignty, Egypt was reigned through a Turkish 
Governor appointed by the Porte, In actual practice, it was 
ruled by the petty Beys, the Memlukes, who had overpowered 
the Turkish Governor, These Beys were not very different 
from their kins, the feudal lords of Europe, There was no 
security of life and property under their rule, ^Greater 
part of the land was in the hands of these Beys, There was 
no right of succession to or inheritence of property. 
Peasants were simple hired labourers, to whom no more was 
left than what barely sufficed to sustain their life. Simple 
bread, with raw onions and water, was their only food , 
throughout the year. Their whole clothing consisted in a 
shirt and a clumsy black cloak. With naked arms, naked 
legs and naked breasts, suffocating with heat and smoke, 
they passed their life amid continual alarms of the robberie 
of the beduins and extortions of the Beys. Closely analogou
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to the conditions of the peasantry stood the townsfolk, who
were in no better circumstances regarding the universal
1misery and wretchedness ,
Amidst the encircling gloom, the people of Egypt 
must have been desiring a change for the better in the 
existing state of affairs. The change came at the close of 
the century.
In Europe, the Industrial Age having already 
dawned, was now reaching its apogee. Capital was overflowing 
and surplus commodities required markets* The search for 
markets began with its inevitable consequence, the race for 
monopolies. Capitalism was reaching its final stage i.e. 
Imperialism. England had set her foot on the Indian soil.
The battle of Plassey had been won over in 1757, whereafter 
the English influence in India was on a rapid increase. As 
a vast promising market, India was equally coveted by England 
and France, and France was ever vigilent to avail any chance. 
The Directory at Paris had found an intelligent, 
ambitious and brave general in Napoleon Bonaparte, a young 
man of twenty nine, who planned to break, through force and
1. Volney, "Travels through Syria and Egypt”, vol.I, pp. 
187-91. The French traveller, M.C, _____ P.Volney,visited 
Egypt about the end of the year 1782, spent seven months 
there, and wrote afterwards an account of his travels in 
two volumes. His travel account was translated from the 
original French into English and was published in 1788; 
see also, Cameront "Egypt in the Ninteenth Century", p,20} 
Gibb and Bowen, "Ottoman Society and the V/est", Vol. I. 
pp, 258-75; Poliak* "Feudalism in Syria, Egypt, Palestine 
and Lebanon", pp. 64,65,68-73; Walsh, in
Egypt", pp. 258-61. Walsh visited Egypt during the 
Napoleonic period of its history. His travel account was 
published in 1800. On Walsh see, Elgood: "Transit of 
Egypt", p. 43, f.n.
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diplomacy, the increasing British influence in Inclia, Egypt 
was a key to the Bast, the nearest route to India passing 
through its mainland, and as such, the possession of Egypt 
meant an easy access to India, With this long-term aim, the 
scheme of an Egyptian campaign was chalked out at Paris*
The decisive battle of^Pyramid was fought on July 
21, 1798, and on 24th, Napoleon entered Cairo as its undisputed 
master^. Being aware of the consequences and future plans of 
the French expeditions, BnglaM hastened to check her rival
at the very outset. Her half-established Indian empire was
2 ' . . _ in Jeopardy , In India, Bonaparte’s would be ally,Tlpu Sulten,
was defeated and slain in May 1799, and in the early days of
the following August, the English admiral, Nelson,destroyed
the French fleet in the Egyptian waters. The landforce that
still remained in Egjrpt, capitulated shortly, and the French
3Occupation came to an end In September 1801 •
This period of more than three years of the French 
ruled did not prove beneficial to the Occupait, But to Egypt 
it proved to be a mixed blessing. It caused azvi accelerated' 
the renaissance that took place in Egypt in the nlnteenth c 
century.
From the very beginning, Ifapoleon had tried to pose 
his campaign, as also his administration, as something in the
1# Shukri, "Abdullah Chide Minou wa khuruj al-Fransiyyin mln 
Misr", p, 90} Elgood, "Bonaparte’s adventure in Egypt",pp. 
120,123| caiorbal, "The beginnings of the Egyptian question 
and the rise of Mehemet All", p, 51
2, Telleyrand, the French Foreign Secretary,,to the Directory, 
writing on July 10, 1798* "L’expedltion assure la destruc­
tion de la Puissance Brltannlque dans la Inde", clt,,
Young, '‘Egypt", p, 28* see also. Cameron, op,clt,. p,25
3. (Siorbal, op.cit,, p, 137; Shukri, op.cit,,pp,539-40;Cameroi 
op,clt,I pp, 28,29* Boustany, "The Press during the French Occupation in Egypt, 1798-18ol", p, 29
Interest of the Egyptians themselves. He declared that he had
come to support the authority of Islam and the Sultan-Callph,
Ho went to the extent of convincing the Egyptian Ulema, that
he and his soldiers had turned Muslims, and as such they were
their brethren^. He created a native Council at Cairo,
comprising of nine grand sheikhs* This Cairo Council was to
assist the Government in legislation and administration. It
could discuss administrative and judicial problems of the countr
could receive complaints of the people and could work out
2economic reforms to be adopted by the Government * !Die council
was also empowered to recommend to the Government the
appointments for the posts of Controllers of the market,
Superintendents of police and Superintendents of the burial
ceremonies* This pattern of popular councils was also adopted
3in the provincial administration •
Although these institutions were meant for advisory 
purposes only, yet the inclusion of the native element in the 
administration of the country was quite a new experji^ ience for 
the fellahin of Egypt, It was beyond their imagination to shar< 
the business of the Sultan or his representative. To impress 
upon the natives the semi-national character of the French 
Gpvernment, the Occupation regime did its best to democratise 
their administration as far as possible,
1, Somerset de Chair (ed.), "Napoleon'a memoirs”,pp. 351-52; 
Elggodi "Bonaparte*s adventure in Egypt,** p,123; Cameron, 
op,clt,,p,37: Rifa*at, "Awakening of modern Egypt”,pp,9-io
2, Shukrii op,cit,, pp. 78-9
3, The Decrees of July 25,and July 27, 1798, clt,, Rafi’i, 
"Tarikh al-harakat al-qaumiyya”, vol. I,pp. 72,77: see also, 
Shukri* op.clt.,pp.262-73; Blunt: ”At-Tarikh as-slrri", 
Arabic Translation of Blunt*s"Secret history of British 
Occupation of Egypt”: translator's Introduction, p,40s Paton 
"A History of the Egyptian Revolution, from the period of 
Mamelukes to the death of Mohammad All", vol. I, p. 114j 
Rifa’at: op.clt., p. 8
• 5
With French army, a number of technicians, scientists
and scholars had also landed in Egypt. Once established, they
busied theaselves in experimental and research work in the
laboratories of the newly-founded Institut d*Egypte^. 'Rie
antiquarians began their exploratory campaigns, and incidentall
they found the famous Rosetta Stone which, when deciphered, in
1822, proved a key to the ancient Egyptian studies and aroused
2a dignified sense of national pride in the educated Egyptians ,
In the field of Press and publication, a printing
press consisting of Greek, French and Arabic type was working
soon after the Occupation, It was the first of its kind in
3
the Muslim world • Several newspapers and periodicals were
published in French, and arrangements were also made even for
the publication of an Arabic newspaper, but the scheme did nol 
4materialize . However, with Italian and French books, books ii
5Turkish also began to appear in Egypt •
All this must have had some lasting impressions on 
the minds of the Egyptian people. For the first time, they 
were being introduced to the blessings of the new dynamic cul 
of the West,
The brief period of French Occupation had brought 1 
Egypt some important elements of Western culture, which were 
responsible for creating a vague feeling of quasi-nationalis] 
among a people who had had been breathing, hitherto, in a pu
1, Hafi'i*op,cit, *pp,89-93j Sh\akri,op,cit, ,pp, 615-18,622-28
2, Rifa*ati op.cit,, p, 15
3, Boxistany, op.cit., pp. 10,12; Rafi*i, op.cit., pp, 89-122 
Shukri, op.cit,. pp, 656-57
4, Boustany: op.cit., p. 27} Shtikri, op.cit., pp. 658-65; 
ad-Dasuqi* "Fll-Adab al-Hadith«, p. 35
5, Boustany, op.cit., pp, 4,14. Boustany has given a partial 
list of these publications, see p. 14
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Oriental atmosphere, Incidentallyi however, it had brought to 
Egypt and Albanian adventurer who was destined to play the role 
of the founder of modern Egypt*
11
Muhammad Ali, a young Albanian of ttiirty and odd yeai
headed the Albanian regiment of Turkish force which was sent t<
fight against the French Occupation in Egypt • In March 1803,
English forces that had come to expel the French and had fough
besides the Turkish army had to leave the country into Turkish
2hands • Amidst the anarchical conditions that followed the
English retirement, Muhammad Ali saw his chance. In a
continuous game of counterpoising, playing the Memluke against
the Turk and the Turk sagainst the Memluke, he weakened both
of his rival groups and rose to the eminence of being the on
3powerful 'man to be reckoned with • He was loved by his sold
4and was popular among the inhabitants of Egypt . In May 1805 
he was chosen and proclaimed by the Sheikhs the pasha of Egyp 
The Suttan, at last, had to give his consent to the popular 
choicef
The sijrfgnal victory over the English expedition,sej 
to Egypt in 1807, gave Muhammad All full command over the laj
eand the people , He, then, consolidated his authority by
7wholesale massacre of the Memluke remnants , by his wars lau
1, Rafl'i, op,clt*, vol. II, pp, 311,313
2, Ibid,, p, 3S1
3, Elgood, op,cit,,p, 46; Ghorbal,op,clt,, pp, 207-27; Gamez 
op,cit, ,pp, 58-67; Rafl*i, op.dt,, pp, 332-66
4, Cameron,op,cit,,p. 63; Rafl’i. ”Asr Muhammad Ali",p.103,1
5, Elgood, op.cit,, p, 46} Rafl’i, "Tarikh al-Harakat al- 
Qaumiyya", vol. II. pp. 369-70; (Shorbal, op.cit., pp. 22' 
228; Cameron, op.cit., pp. 67-8
6, Elgood, op.cit,, p. 47
7, Ibid.,p.48, The date was March 1,1811;Cameron,op,cit.,pp
- 7 -
in the support of the Sultan against the Wahabis and the Greek
1 2 rebels , and by annexing the Sudan Into his pashadom • The
3invasion and annexation of the province of Syria was the last 
act of the drama that Muhammad All ventured to play in the name
4of Arab Empire • His dream was never realised. Towards the
close of the year 1840, the battle of Syria was finally lost,
and after the conclusion of an agreement between Turkey a»3 the
Great European Powers on the one hand, and Muhammad All on the
other, Egyptian forces evacuated the newly-conquered dominion
5of Syria as well as Candia aiw3 Arabia ,
r. Elgood, op.cit., p, 52. Wars with the Wahabis continued from
1811 to 1818
2« Ibid,.p.52. The campaign to annex the Sudan began in the 
twenties
3, In November 1831,the armies of Mehemt All ••• Invaded Syria;
the Turks were defeated on 21st December,1832, and
Constantinople would have been attacked but for the asslstan 
rendered to the Porte by Russia, By the convention signed on 
14th May,1833, it was agreed that Mehemet All should receive 
the Governorship of Egypt,Candia and Syria, and his son, 
Ibrahim the Collectorship of Adana, see Holland: "The Europe 
Concert in the Eastern question", p, 89
4, The British Consul at Alexendria wrote in January 1832 about 
Muhammad All as follows:
"His immediate object is to establish his authority firmly c 
the pashliks of Acre and Damascus; after which to extend his 
dominions to Aleppo and Baghdad, throughout the provinces 
where Arabic is the language of the people, which he calls i 
Arabian part of the Empire," cit, Antonius, "The Arab 
Awakening", p,2S, f,n, Palmeston anticipated the same dang< 
when he observed about Muhammad All as follows: "His real 
design is to establish an Arabian kingdran but as it woi 
imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we would not agree to it 
Besides Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India ; 
an active Arabian sovereign would be", cit, Antonius, op.cl 
p,31 quoting from Sir Henry Bulwar's "Life of Palmerston", 
vol, IIj Evidence goes as far as to prove Muhammad All's 
ambition to proclaim himself the Sultan-Caliph of the Islam 
Empire, see Scott, "Travels through Candia and Egypt", Adde 
No, I.pp,352-56* All's despatch to England and Prance beggl 
them that he was afraid of the increasing Russian influence 
on the Porte, and hence was requested by the Ulema and the 
people of so many Muslim countries to replace himself for 
Sultan Mahmud. Again: "The Moniteur Ottoman spoke of a pic 
of the Pasha to claim the Khilafat in collusion with the 
Shareef of Mecca", see. The Cambridge Modern Hlstory,vol. 1 
p, 549.
5, Holland, op.cit,, pp. 98, 101, 89
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The‘active Arabian sovereign* had lost his Arab 
Empire, but he had acheived at least one thing, that is a 
semi-incependent status for his dominions of Egypt and the 
Sudan, There is ample evidence that Muhammad Ali*s higheset 
ambition, besides creating an Arab Empire, was to make Egypt 
virtually as well as legally an indeperaient state^ . It was 
his sheer misfortune ttiat he could not win over Britain in 
opposition to the Sultan, and he himself was never in a positio; 
to challenge the combined forces of Turkey and Britain, it was 
preferable to maintain a weak frienti, the Sultan, than a powerf 
independent 'Arab* Emperor in possession of the *road to India* 
The entire Eastern Question, in fact, revolved round this 
maxim, and Europe had adopted almost a parallel policy in the 
case of Muhammad Ali* In the end, Muhammad Ali had to be 
content on his acheivement of a semi-independent status, 
exercising with complete administrative autonomy a sovereignty 
limited only by some nominal checks. The Firman of June 1841, 
recognised for him an hereditary right to the pashalik of Egypi 
within its ancient boundaries} the succession was to be in his 
direct line of descent, the eldest male member of the family 
being nominated as the Pasha of Egypt, Muhammad Ali had faile< 
to found an Arab Empire, But Egypt was independent of the 
Turkish control* Its administration was managed separately 
with complete autonomy, a M  this privilege was guaranteed by
1, Dodwell, "The founder of modern Egypt”, pp, 85, 105,116,17 
see alsos Cameron, op«citw, p, 121; de Leon, "The Khedive*s 
Egypt", p, 66,
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"by the consent of the Great European Powers^. He had failed 
in his larger schemes, but he had laid down the founiatlons 
of a modern Egyptian state.
Muhammad All foui^ himself in possession of a countr 
which was economically in a deplorable condition. His 
principal task, therefore, was the financial restoration of 
Egypt, and this he accomplished through his system of state- 
monopoly of trade and agriculture. He was well aware of the 
fact that the basis of the Egyptian economy was the land and 
its output. Hence, in the name of the state, he confiscated 
all the estates of ■Uie landed aristocrary of the country. Hi 
was not an anprecedented step. Even in Memluke peridd, there 
was no personal properly in the real sense of the word. All 
ri^ts were reserved for the Multazim, the cheif Supervisor, 
The peasantry worked in the capacity of mere serfs. That 
tradition of tdie Memluke period was revived with the marked 
difference that the intermediaries, the Multazims, were remo’
1, For full text of the Finnan pi issued on June, 1, 1841, 
see: Holland, op.cit., pp, 110-14, The limitations 
referred to in the text were: the specification of the 
number of the armed forces; some fixed amount of tribute 
to be paid to the Sultanj appointments of higher ranks 
than the colonels to be made with the permission of the 
Sultanj ban on building the vessels of war? sending the 
customary provisions to the Holy cities; and the prevale 
of the Ottomag^law, in principle, in Egypt,
See also, Wilson, " Modern Egypt and Thebea ", p, 511; 
^  Fre^inet, E^ptlan Qu^ siSion’*, 9ST,
. 10 .
anfl the stats Itself became th© cheif Multazla^*
Mahaimnad All, then, proceeded one step forwapd. Ho
had Intiroducod In Egypt the culttroe of Sugar-cane, Indian Indlgi
2Amorlcan cotton plant and opiias « ISie tiller of the soil was, 
hitherto, free to exercise hla will to cultivate whatsoever 
he liked* Now, All forced him to grow whet he liked
and what the state needed* Purttionaore, realising that the 
produce of the country vaa sold at low prices to t^ie foreign 
and local nillionalrea, he oonopolised for the state the trade
3
of the eountr/ as vrell • Besides, several canals were dug in 
order to reclaln the desert, and a vast area of iK?n-arahle
4land was turned into arable one • lSi:a seai^ iisSependent state
i
of Egypt was getting a econoaic fouaSatlon*
In goveminent axid aicininistratioa of the covmtry, 
the Pasha delegated no authority to his agents* !Tis was a 
strong centralised goverment. Egypt was administered 
efficiently* Lasr a«3 order prevailed* There were few crimes, 
murders and robberies* "With an adcirablo tsjlent for 
organisation, he has Managed to introduce into one of the 
nost neglects, disorganised countries In the world the first 
conditions of a clvlllsod state, order and security*, remark®
1* Elgood, op.cit,, p* 48; Shiikrl, ’•Bina’X Daulat-l«4Clsr t 
MtdiananTO All", pp* 3C^1| Caaeron, op*cit*,pp. 85,87*
2* a^ iikrl, op.cit*, pp* 38,39*
3* Caiaeron, op*cit*, p. 125* After a hard struggle, the
foreign dealers were able in the late thirties to get thf
barriers removed* see, Issawii '•Egypt at the mid-centurj 
p. 23, see also, 131gooa, op.cit*, p. 48| f>hukri, op.cit*, 
PP* 58 60*
4* ^ukrl, op*clt*, PP* ^ ,41| Ik»dwell, op.cit*, p* 216*
a eontaraporary obaervor^*
On the o^er hanS, to consolidato as wall as to
eztand his dc»»iny Huftiasead 411 cpganlsod a nav«oAdeI aray on
oEuropoan linos of disclplino, orguiisatloa and control « Agaii 
ho vasy perhaps, Oio only Bastom rulor who rocognlsod Urn 
iaportanee of th« naval powor* na lost his faaous float In 
1827f and t^o roonants woro handed over to &ia Porto \it virtue 
of ^ e  AgT^&mat ooncluded in 1841* dtiU, the credit of a 
pionsor in field of warfare reimins with hits*
Inolinad to ta k e advantage of every blessing of t^ e 
Westy tSie Pasha bepm to install factories after fioropean 
fashion* But here he failed in his experlsMint» the oeasure 
was pro«aturo agS was adopted in haste* Skilled labour was 
laokingf and practlcadLIy nr'nineral rosources were available 
to give these industrial underta^ .lngs a fwtual and strong
b€UliS^ «
Httfiannad Ali*s prograaoe was that of a aany^sided 
refbni* Alaing at the eoonomio restoration of ^e oountryf he 
wanted to ehai^^ his state into a nodem eountry of Suropean 
typa« With a view to aodemise Sgypt axiA to eabazk upon his 
other far reaching plans, he found in Western education a 
stepping stone totmrds the aehlevaeent of mmsf laore refoms 
and his ultinate goal*
1* Ita^nn* ’^ gypt and Meheaet All**, pp« 8^$ see also siaili accotmts by o^ier conteiaporary observers, travellers anS writersi 3eott, **Baables in Bsrpt and Candia"* vol* XI, p. 153; Hurray, short laeaolr of Kuhacinad All**, p* 60i and t Marshall Hamout, **V6yage An Dus fU^ use**, TbM III p« 126, elt. Elgood, op* oit*, p* 49, f*n*
- II -
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Several batches of the sons of the Fellahin were 
sent to Europe, to specialize in various branches of science, 
humanities and techiwjlogy. On their return to Bgjrpt, these 
accomplished scholars must have acted as stimulants to the 
dull and lethargic atmosphere of the country throu^ 
translations of Western learning, original works, and planning 
and organising the native educational, academic and industria] 
institutions^.
Inside Bgypt itself, Muhammad Ali started schools 
of the WesAern tjrpe. Hitherto there existed only mosque scho 
for religious learning. Soon an organised system of modern 
education came into existence* In 1837, the total number of 
students in these schools reached to about 10715, In additi< 
to it, there were 2000 students in private Coptic institutiff 
and 10,000 more in religious schools. Apart from the state 
and native public schools there were several institutions rv 
by the missionaries which were helped in their work by ‘tiie 
state^ .
Practically all of tdie stvidents were Iddged, fed i
3clothed at the expense of the state • The simple tillers o 
the soil were being transformed into an educated Western-mi 
middle class, ahd in this respect a change with far reachir
4results was overtaking Egypt.
1. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 100-101, 108-109,337,565-68} Scot' 
op.cit,, vol. it, p. 238.
2. Shukri,op,cit., pp.637,664,665* Dr. Bowring, English M 
report for the year 1837, who visited Egypt the same y 
For Bowringj see, aiukri,op.cit.-p.362 and Cameron,p.
3. Scott} op.cit., vol. I, pp. 230-47, Elgood, op.cit,, 4 
ShukriL, op.cit., pp. 6^8—39.
4. Scott,op.cit.,vol.II,p.227}see also the remarks of Co\ 
Duhameal of Russia, shukri,op.cit.,pp. 336; "Once th« 
said to me that when he became the ruler of Egypt. th( 
were only two hundred literates, the Copts being an 
exception”.
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Since 1822f the printing press at Bulaq was also at
work^* A Translation Biireau was set up with the help of the
Western educated youths and under the direction of Frenchmen
2and Armenians • Important works on medicine, natural sciences, 
astronomy, geology, geogt^hy, history and mechanics were 
translated into Arabic and Turkish and were printed at Bulaq^. 
Prom 1^8, the official paper al«Waaa*l al-Hjsriwa began to
4appear • It was the first Arabic paper ever Issued from the 
land of the Pharaohs*
To accelerate the speed of modernization, the Pasha 
Invited the Europeans, mostly French, to assist him in 
administration of a backward country* With their help and 
advice, he organised his army, medical and health services, 
and the department of education®*
Borrowing another measure of the West, and to give 
a semi-popular character to his government, he created a 
Council for giving advice to the Government in the admlnlstrati 
of the country”. In September 1829, a large gathering of 157, 
comprising of the civil and military officers, the provincial 
Governors, the Ulema, and a number of village sheikhs, headed 
by Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad All, met for the first 
time and discussed the ways and means of Improving the lot of
!• Shukrl,op«clt*, p«120) Rafi'i, '*Asr-i-Muhammad All”,p»569
2, St, John, '‘Egypt and Muhammad All", vol. I, p,127
3, A list of the publications, or the books still in press, 
upto 1837, is given by Dr.Bowring* see,Shukrl,op,clt.,pp,677 
84j see also.Ta.jlr, ”Harakat at-TarJema bl Misr**,p*15
4, Shxikrl, op.cit., pp. 125,684, The four-pages paper was 
published as a bi-llngual paper, in Arabic as well as in 
Turkish, see Tajin, op.cit., p.39. The Paper remained 
suspended between 1849, the death-year of Muhammad All, and 
1863, the succession-year of Isma’ll; see, Dasuqi, op.cit., 
p. 37
5, Paton, op.cit., pp. 71-80
6, Hamza, op.cit., p. 38; Tajlr,op.cit., p. 41; Dasuqi, op.cit. 
p. 36; Shiikri, op.cit., p. 9
- 14
the people^* Tliis principle of goverraaent-by-consultation was, 
latejjbn, extended to the provisoes as well, and provincial 
Assemblies were established.
There are evidences of these institutions being still 
in existence and In function as late as the early thirties of 
that century* In Cairo, a shadow-parliament was in its sessior 
when St# John, the French travallor, visited Sgypt in the last 
montlia of 1832, A “sierry old Turk*’, presided at the meeting, 
and tha Council Itself comprised of a mimber of individuals, 
public officials aod governiaent servants. Tho Council
?assembled-daily for the despatch of the business"* "It is a 
parliament of e:<tra ordinary kina'*, remarked St* John, '•'^'hen 
the Pasha has anything agreeable to do, he does it himself 
witiiout consulting this wretched council •••; but when appli­
cation is made to him for aon^y or sone favour Is demai^ed 
which it might be inexpedient to grant arid imprudent to refuse 
he suddenly feigns a high authority of his council •••• Saah 
is the parliament of Egypt^ i’ Nothing more, however, could 
be expected at that very stage in a bacicvrard Oriental country, 
Evidence proves that tlie Council was occasionally consulted 
in earnest in matters of wide public concern* One example is 
that of seeking its advice on the commoncement of liie Turco-
4Russian war of 1830»s •
However, these were Ui his phantom creations, good
1* Dodwell, op*cit*,p. 805; Shukri,op.cit*, p* 11} see also 
Rafi*i, op*clt,« p, 608,
2* St, John, dp.cit., vol,I,p, 130; see also Scott,op.cit.* 
vol. IT, pp. 116jll7, vjho mentions Its exlstance in 1837 
at the time of his visit to Egypt that year,
3, St, John, op.cit., p, 130.
4* Hafi’i, op.cit., p. 613; Scott,op* cit*, vol II, pp* 116-
for nothing, But they laid down, at loast, a pattern which 
cnphasised the popular basis of the administration if not of 
the government.
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The social, political and economic changes taking 
place in Egypt during this period r^ arhod the beginnings of a 
r«nalssame in Egypt* However, its effect was deep^ 
and it did not touch the various strata of society. All 
reforms and developments ware introduced at the top level, 
or rather at the state level, only. They did not affect tlie 
Classes or the peasantry as such, Tlie state of Egypt was
e _becoming prosperous, whe?fas the people of ligypt were growing
more miserable. There wore two main causes for the general
misery, firstly, the Pasha's lust for power and his dream of
carving out for himself an Arab Empirej and secondly, his
system of monopolies, and his quasi-communistic attitude
twards the state and the people. Contemporary trevellers
were strxick with worider when they witnessed the prevailing
''general poverty”^  a sharp “contrast between rich and poor
Muiiaxaaiad Ali’s campaigns, which continued from the
beginning of his career as the Pasha of Egypt, right upto the
year 1840, took the lion's share of the juinual btidget of the
state. Bven his system of monopolies of trade and agriculture
was adopted with a vievr to amass wealtli to meet the heavy
expenditia*ft of his vjars and campaigns. Again, his lust for
power forced iiim to get recruits for his army tlirou^
conscription. In the beginning he relied upon the Turks and
^  Lady Cordon. ’Kngllsh woman in Egypt", vol, 1, p, 17* Lett 
fron Alexenaria, dated July, 1842,
2, Ibid,, vol, II, p,12t Letter from Cairo dated April, 1843
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the children of tiie Heialidjoa, In the early 1820»s some forced 
recruitBiont had been possible from the Siidan* But when he 
failed to get sufficient smterlal* from t3ie Sudan, he 
began conscripting the Egyptian peasants. They resonted, but 
their resentment was of no avail* They vore conpell®! to go 
to the battle-fieldSj while t*elr lands and cropM lay deserted 
they maimed theaselves, Jhll!^ed_thol£^ Into
the desert, The accounts of contemporary travellers are full 
of the description of nlaerlos that befell these wretched 
fellahln^.
1. St» John, op*cit«, vol. I. pp. 1?^ -91* ”In €^ .1 the vUli 
we hear exeeratlons pourea forth against the Pasha for tl 
opressive way in lifileh ho resrults his arinles, and the 
practices to which the Follahs resort to elude his despo 
prove at once their intense love of hoae, and tholr aver 
to a military life,#.. However as soon as tiie news reac 
a village Uiat a rocriilting party is abroad, and It spre 
over the country llko wildfire- many men blind 
thc^ aselves with arsenic, others thrust a spear, or some 
other sham instrwnent, into o m  of their eyes, or chop 
the fore-flMgor of the right hand.*.* TTay, raothara, 
forgetting that the Pash’s wars cannot last for ever, h< 
l>een known to blind or malm their own children. And to 
such an extent has this practice been carried, that it 1 
been at lengtJi thoug>it necessary to ifeake it punishable 
An order was issued at Cairo, July 30th, 1832. to each < 
the principal persons in the city cojJHiiandlng to pr 
a certain number of men for the aray under pain of 
forfoiting 700 piastres for every deficiency. The 
consequence, says an eye-witness, was that ttie streets 
presented the desolate a-’>earance observed during the y 
the shops were closed, business was suspended, and woo€ 
wailed as for the deaa; the soldiers and Inap^tora emj 
in seizinf; the raen, soon dlscc’rared thellucurative trie 
of pressing invalids- and other persons unfit for servi 
from !Ben^ »cos and their own fears extorted money f( 
the?jr release, **But even this tyrannic ordor was foun 
be Inauf "‘li^ icnt; for men still eonti»iv'»d, }>y practicin 
theraselves, to elude the grasp of thoir oppressersj an 
length the Pasha, in a nonant of extroKo irritation, 1 
the following circular, dated March ll?th, 1S33, print« 
Tui^ clsh, and addrosaod to the military Oovomors of dl
•♦V/lth respect to the twn vhon we tak& for tl 
service of our victorious arsles and navies ( war dep<
Continued on page 1'
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Nor was this tho erjd of their miseries. They were 
conscripted to die for the causa 66 the Pasha, aix3, at the 
same time, they were heavily taxed in order to pay off the 
expenditure iiKsurred in the wild campaigns in Arabia, Syria, 
Greoce euid the Stidan^  Ilio total number of Ali*s forces as 
given by St.John in 1833, was about 1,20,000^. The
maintenance of tills huge amy vras the source of continuous
drainage from the pockets of the peasantry^. The incessant 
wars, which lasted for more than thirty years, were the main 
cause of people’s misery. Every vrar meant some new conscriptl< 
and more often than not, sojae new tax as veil. The tillers of
the soil perished in thousands at the battle-fields, and tiiere
was no way out.
Continued from page 16.
on tlieir v;ay to us, some drav their teeth, some put out their 
eyes, and others break their arms, or ottiervise Kaini themselve 
thus laying us lUitder the necessity of sending back the greater 
part, and causing the deficiency in the report of -ttie v;ar 
department which I always tserceivo. Make up those deficiencie 
by sending immediately all tl'ie men who are wanting, all
fit for 5>3rvic8, a'nle bodlect, and healthy...... Ana when you
forward them, let them know that tiiey must not main themselves 
bocause I will take from the family of every such offender men 
In his place; and he who has maimed himself shall be sent to 
the galleys for life....”
Paton, who travelled through Egypt in 1839-46, made 
the following observations:
“Even before Mehemet All’s time the fellah was 
degraded and brutifiad, but not so much go as since because 
small landed properties were scattered all over Egypt, ai^  
even under the Mamlulne beys, the Cadis and Tnema were able to 
peotect the proprietors,..." See. Paton.op.cit., vol. II,p.32 
Similar accounts in: Eriggs, ^Heathen am holy lands", p. 220; 
Bartlett, “The Nile Boat’*, pp. 31,32,39.
1. St. John, op.cit., vol. II, p. 474.
2. Ibid., pp. 451-52
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Conscription, as a matter of principle, was also
adopted in the scheme of industrialization^* The majority
of workers in the experimental institutions of the Pasha, were
those ill-fated fellahin who had been forced to let their
lands unsown, and work instead in these factories. It was all
the more regrettable that inspite of ttiese hi^-handed
measvires, the experiment of ttie Pasha failed utterly, and quite
a large amount of money was squandered. At any cost it did
2no good to the people of Egypt •
Oien there was tiie monopoly system of the Pasha.
The Egyptian peasants were ordered to cultivate a particular 
crop, and then at the harvest time the Government forcibly 
purchased, at its own prices, all the produce of the soil, 
even the cereals. In most of the cases, the poor peasants 
had to repurchase at a hi^er rate something to sustain their 
family. Since 1829, the situation became more serious, A 
series of complaints against this policy and desertions of tiie 
villages shocked the Pasha, and he had to reconsider his 
measures^.
The EgyT)t of Huhammad Ali had a population of more
4than two million people , The fellah element comprised
1, The conscripted labourers in these factories numbered about 
forty thousands, according to the estimate of the contempo­
rary British Consul in Egypt, See,ShiJkri.op,cit. ,pp,778,77£
2, they are utterly disroportionate to the wants and means 
of Egypt, hastily got up by foreign rather than native 
energy, at the expense of the hearts blood of the country, 
which has been rapidly depopulating aai utterly draining
of its vital resources, till the unhappy population have 
sunk to the lowest depth of misery”, see Bartlett, op.cit,,gp, 28-9,odwell,op,cit,,p,216j see also St.John,op,cit,,vol.ll|p,78, 
where he alludes to the famine of 1829 as an artificial 
famine caused by the monopolistic policy of the Pasha,
4, aiukri,op,cit, ,p, 789; Elgood, op,cit., p, 51,
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nine-tenth of the entire population* In sharp contrast stood 
the Turks, only 15,000 in number, and still occupying the 
economy and administration of the country. They held high 
posts which were never given to the children of the soil, not 
even to the educated Goptsl Thepower and authority vested in 
this minority group, a small band of foreigbrs^.
The realization of their actual position had 
demoralized the fellahin. They had became utterly desperate 
and consequently submissive and obedient. It was very rare 
for them to possess some money. "Ttie old Egyptians laboured 
slavishly for their kings the fellghs labour for their
3Pasha...,", remarked St. John .
There was bitter antagonism and seperatist feelings 
between the Turks and the fellahin. !Bie native Egyptian was 
always looked down upon by the Turks. **The meanest man 
speaking Turkish was ipso facto considered as belonging to a
4caste high above the indegeneous inhabitants’*, observed Bowring^  
As a result of these conditions a vague class-feeling 
was slowly getting firm grouiii among the fellahin whenever they 
would think of their lot and the causes of their misery.
In Muhammad Ali we have a dual personality to dealjk^
1. Copts are separetly described as distinct from the fellahin, 
because, as a group, they were town dwellers.
2. Shukri, op.cit.,pp. 389-90j Bowring’s report.
3. St.John,op.cit.,p. 270jsee also de Leon’s comment that the 
fellah was treated "as slaved serf , de Leon,op.cit. ,p. 71.
4. cit. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 202.
with. He loved Egypt passionately^* and In the same breath 
treated its people like animals. It is an anamoly to be solved 
with some precaution.
Most of the Western writers have appraised him as a 
despo^ t^ par excellence, who did nothing for Egypt, worth the 
name. Even Egyptian writers are not one on this point. Muhammad 
Abduh has gone to the extent of proving that he was the sole 
cause of all miseries of the Bgjrptian people, and that he
Odid no good to the people •
On the other hand there are several accounts of 
contemporary trevellers and European Consuls, wherein Muhammad 
Ali appears as an examplary ruler^#
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1. '*Know that I will pursue the well being of this land even 
at the cost of my life and the lives of my kindred; I will 
readily sacrifice to the prosperity of my country,even 
one of my own kin set over three million -oaople”. (From a 
circular of Muhammad Ali dated 1259 A.H./1843 A.D.) cit. 
Dodwell, op.cit.,p« 200,
2. »*Did he ever think fot the reform of the Arabic Language;
did he ever make efforts for a systematic training based 
on the Din and the Adab; did it ever occur in the soft corr 
of his heart to give his people a real voice in the 
government,,.! did he ever try to establish an organised 
Constitutional government that could guarantee Shar*a and
*Adl? No, Nothing of these expectations were realised,,,, 
"He sent groups of students to receive education in Europej 
but did he ever give them freedom to study the countries 
where they were getting their education? they
were u^ed never free to exercise their own will.,,, fciey 
were afraid of the school as if they were erwountering an 
army,*,,
•'He encouraged cultivation only to snatch up from the 
cultivators the produce of the soil,,,,
"It is said that he founded factories in Bgypt^tot was it 
in the interest of the people to make them capable to run 
those factories themselves,., ?
"1 do not think anyone would dare to contradict me, 
after going through the history of Muhammad Ali, that this 
man was a profiteering tradesman, a brave soldier, and 
an expert autocrat; he was a calamity for Egypt, a destroy* 
of its rail life; and whatslfever we see today, which might 
be named Life, is the craAtion of others,,,, «
Abduh*s article, in Rashid Heza, **Tarikh 
al-Ustad al-lfmam**, vol. II, pp. 386-89
3. See Scott, op.cit., particularly,p. 110-11; Prince Pucklar 
Muskan, op.cit.; Reports of the Consuls and trevellers in
Shukrijop.cit. ;Murray,op.cit. 5Wallace,**!I!he war in Egypt**p.2!
In fact, he was a military man. His ambition was 
to c€irve out for himself an Sapire, as also to consolidate 
his authority in Egypt* To this end he planned his entire 
policy, ai^ inspiji^ te of his selfish motives, his policy 
unintentionally produced some good results with far reaching 
consequences* !Qiey v;ere to prove significant, in the period 
following the death of the Pasha, in creating some political 
consciousness at least among the towadwellers and the Wester­
nised middle claas intelligensia. At the same time, the 
resentment ai»i disatisfaction spread over the entire population 
of the country nourished among then a vague desire for a 
change and for better state of affairs.
The fact should not however be overlooked that 
under Muhammad All Egypt acheived legally a serai-indeperalent 
status and virtually complete freedom and autonomy* It was 
his personal acheivament, but it was to become a blessing for 
the Egyptian people as well* The following generations of tiie 
Egyptians must have felt a sense of pride over the semi- 
indepenient status of their country, "He created a new era 
for Egypt'*, remarked Murray, the Consul General in 1846* "No 
other Mohammad an country is now so enlightened or so well 
governed", he concluded^*
1* Murray, op.cit,, p, 60t see also American Consul-General’s 
remark j "Augustus boasted that he founcl Rome of briak and 
left it of marble,*,* (Muhammad Ali) found all Egypt a 
chaos, he^eft it a country***• **He created not only an 
Empire but a people,", de Leon, op.cit, pp, 63
and 67,
ill
Muharoinad All died in August, 1843^* His successors 
were devoid of his qualities of head and heart, Ibrahim, who
Ohad succeeded him In his llfe-tlme, coiild not survive him • 
Abbas ( 1S48<-1954 ), the second successor, was a devout Muslim 
having Implacable hatred for the foreigners and Western 
institutions* He dismissed those Europeans who were serving 
in Egypt since long, and closed many a school and academic
3institution, where Western education was Imparted • Muhammad 
All had taken the men and institutions from the West in order 
to serve his ultimate objects. Abbas was not so much far­
sighted or broadminded* But as a ruler he was, to a certain 
extent, a success. He abolished the monopoly system of
4Muhammad All, and introduced titiie system in the land-taxation 
H e so managed the finances of Bgypt as to keep it clear of 
debt. Under his reign, railroad system was inaugurated cheifl 
to meet the wants of the Indian transit®. On the other hand, 
to fill up the deficiency caused by the Turco-Bgyptian wars, 
conscription for army on a large scale was revived under 
Abbas • The people of Egypt, inspite of the change of the 
ruler, could not get a change in their miserable life.
1. Bartlett, op.cit., p. 29.
2. Young, "Egypt”, p. Rafi’i, ”Asr Muhanmiad All",pp.672-7
3. de Leon, op.cit.,p.81; Young, op.cit.,p. 64}Cameron,op.cit 
p. 20S«
4. St. Hlllaire, "Bgypt and the Suez Canal”, p, 84.
5. de Leon, op.cit., pp. 89-90.
6. Bayle, ’•Village life in Egypt", pp. 80-81.
Sa*ld, taie successor of Abbas^ (1854-1863), was
quite the reverse of Abbas regarding his attitude towards the
West. Pond of the Western society, “speaking French like a
Parisian”^ , he went to the farthest extremes in the hostage
of the West, and this ultimately affected even the autonomy
of the country, ”It was Sa’id’*, says Cromer, ”Who first
2Invited European adventurers to^  prey on Egypt* • For the
people of Egypt, comparatively speaking, he was a generous t
ruler and did much for the reform of the people. In 1858, 
he issued a decree which recognised for the peasants the ri^t 
of proprietorship, with full author;City of selling, 
bequething, letting or mortgaging tiieir lands. The measure 
gave a new impetus to agriculture. Sa*id also reduced the 
strength of the army to 9,000^, and consequently the 'time- 
honoured’ conscription for military service ceased to exist. 
No less significant was the attitude of the Pasha regarding 
the high posts and ranks to be given to the natives, and here
4he openly supported them •
However, beside all these reforms, it was in the 
reign of Sa’id that a ruinous step was taken in granting the 
concession for the cutting of the Suez Canal. The after­
effects of "Oie Concession were to be borne by the following 
generation, but even for the people of those days, it was 
no less than a calamity. By virtue of the Concession-Treaty, 
Egyptian Government was made l^iable to supply a fixed number 
of labourers without any compensation on the part of the
1. de Leon, op.cit., p. 85.
2, Cromer, "Modern Egypt**, vol. I, p. 21.
3, Chirol, op.cit., p. 22.
4. Arabi, “Kashf as-Sitar**, vol I, p. I65
p. 
p. 1 | Rafi»i, op.cit.jp.3
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Concesslon-holder, Again, the Egyptian Govenanant had to
purchase about one half of the original shares of the Project •
In order to fulfill these obligations, conscription was resumed
at the beginning of the worft. Besides, taxes ware Increased
In order to buy the shares of the Canal. As a result of these
measures, Sa*ld had to contract a foreign loan once In 1858,
and for the second time in 1861, and again for the third time
2in 1862 • Only his sudden accidental death in 1863 curtailed 
his ruinous loan-making series. Had ha lived more, certainly 
he would have done what his successor did, following his 
footsteps. With such undertakings and depending on limited 
sources of exchequer, only foreign money could have solved 
the problem.
Sa*id died in January 1863, and Isma'il succeeded 
him at the age of thirty-three. Isma‘il was known to his 
people as a shrewd administrator and an enlightened prince.
He had visited Europe several times, and had been living at 
Constantinople before beconing the Pasha of Egypt. Indeed, 
his personal experience of Western culture and society had 
left deep and lasting impressions upon his mind. Determined 
to turn his country into a Europeanized state, he ordered for
1. The Concession Treaty of 1856 provided that four-fifth of 
the labour employed (about 20,000) should be Egyptian.
(Art. 2). This provision was interpreted by the Suez Canal 
Company as an obligation on the part of the Egyptian 
Government to supply It free of charge. For eight years 
this erroneous interpretation remain^ in force. At Ijrfast 
Isma*ll, quarelled on this issue and the problem was solved 
through the arbitration of French Etaperor, The Company 
abondoned its claim against a compensation of thrlty-elght 
million francs. See,Schonfleld, ”The suez Canal in world 
affairs”, pp, 40,151jMohd,Abou Nasr,"The Suez Canal”,p.4
2. Youngjop.cit.,p. 67| see also*Halim,"Egypt and the Sudan", 
The Nlnteenth Century, July 1885, p. 533.
the erection of a number of palaclal buildings. Several 
foreign companies were invited to operate in Egypt. Railways 
and canals were extended• Kie harbour of Alexendria was 
extended, and after the cutting of taie Canal, in 1869, the 
Port of Suez was adapted so as to fulfill its new role. 
Telegraphic lines were extended; postal service was 
nationalized, and sugar ano cottonpills were established in 
large numbers^. Every effort was made to transform Egjrpt 
into a modern Europeanized state#
Though virtually an independent country, legally 
speaking, Egypt was still a part of the Ottoman Einpire,
Isma’il tried to get still more privileged position than had 
been acquired by Muhammad Ali, Here, he used money instead 
pof force • The Caliphal Firmans succeeded one after the other 
until the year 1873, when Egypt had acheived complete 'home
3rule’, and its ruler all but a bare title of suzerain • By 
virtue of the Firman of 1866, the descent to pashalik of 
Egypt was changed from the eldest surviving m<anlwr of the t 
family to the eldest son of the ruling Pasha; the strength of
Athe array was allowed to be raised to 30,000 troops • The 
Firman of 1867 conferred upon the Pasha, a(privileged title 
of the Khedive; he was also authorized to frame laws araS 
regulations and to e6nake arrangements with other countries in 
the nature of conventions for non-political objects®* The
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!• de Leon,op.cit., p. 365; young.op.cit.,p, 82,
2, Cameron, op.cit,, pp. 2M<-55; de Leon, op.cit., p. 80.
3, Text of the Firfcan ini Holland, op.cit,, pp. 121-25; Egypt 
No. 4(1879): Texts of the Firmans 1841-1S73,; see also
de Frecinet, op.cit., pp. 95y97.
4. Holland, op.cit., pt). 114-16,
5. Ibid., pp. 116-18.
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Firman of 1869 forbade the Khedive to raiso loans without a
prior sanction of the Sultan^* But hsuMly three years had
elap^ that a nevr Firman of 1872 revoked the previous one and
authorized the Khedive, with full iiberty, to contract loans
2without seeking ari®^ permission from the Porte •
To create a people befitting a modern state, Isma'il 
devoted himself to the spread of Western Education and 
learning. During his reign came the ^second wave of
3Occidentalism*’ , To the budget of education he added the 
revenue of his personal estates ara?., with this £ 50,000, the
4annual badget for education reached to £ 150,000 • The 
Supreme Bducational Council of Muhammad Ali*s period was 
revived and European experts wore put to the task of educationa 
renaissance^
The campaign of sending students abroad also got a
new momentum. In Eg3rpt, the decree of 1S68 established a
three stage educational system, Numbsr of advanced schools
6reached forty-three • In 1S72, a Normal School, the first 
of its kirrf in the Bast, and a little later, a school for the 
study of foreign languages came into existoxice. Efforts were 
made to dissiminate education and learning among the fellah 
women, and Isma*il*s wife herself opened a Girls* school. The
1, Ibid,, p, 119,
2, Ibid., pp. 119-20.
3, Gibb: "Contempcrary Arabic Literature", Bulletin of Orienta 
and African stcaiies, 1326. p. 748,
4, Rifa’at, op. cit., p. 122.
5, de Leon,op®cit., pp. 271-72, 277? Rifa^at, op,cit,, p,122.
6 , Rifa*at, op.cit,, p. 122.
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old military’ ard naval colleges were given high standard*^ .
The number of students exceeded 100,000 out of a population
of 2,500,000, a proportion far in advance to even some of the
European countries^. In tiie last years of Isma‘il*s reign,
3the total number of schools had reached 5820 • Isma'il also 
extended his patronage to the Western missionary schools, 
and freely donated land and money to Missions'^ * '♦Fully to 
relate all that tlie Khedive has done for education would 
require a voltaae instead of a chapter”, remarked the 
contemporary if/riter, de Leon • 4 National Library and a
National Museum were fourjded, with a view to enhance tlie 
studies in Eg:/pt41ogy, The printiiig press at Bulaq was 
provided vith the latest machines and appliances, and a 
pupor factory was set up near it.Publications on various 
subjects and journals and newspapers began to appear. T3ie 
Government itself published three official papers: military, 
official and academic^.
Irapressad by the parliaraontary iristitutions of the 
West, whom Isma’il had an opportunity to study during his 
tours to European countries, he began a new experiment in 
the history of Egyptian government. In Rovember, 1S66, he 
ilssued a decree for the creation of an Assembly of the 
Delegates (Ka.llis Shura an-Nuwwab), Article 1 of the Statute, 
defining the powers of the Asseiably reads as follows*
” L*Asserablee aiira pour mission de deliberer sur les 
interest interieurs du paysj elle aura egalament a se
1* de Leon,op.cit,,pp. 160-61,277; aifa’at,op*cit., p. 123.
2. de Leon,op.cit.,p.l60; Rifa*at,op.cit., p. 124,
3. Young,op.cit,,p. 77; See also, de Leon,op.cit.,p.l60,
4. Rifa*at,op.cit,, p. 134.
5. de Leon, op.clt,, p.271.
6. nifa'at, op.cit., p. 123«
pronoiKjer sur les pro jets que la gouvernement croire relever 
de ses attributions et au sujet desquels, elle donnera son 
opinion qui sera soiimise a I’approbation de Son Altesse le 
vice-roi.^^
Ihe Assembly was essentially a consultative body, 
and yet It had a popular basis for its inception* With 
indirect ballofc, the popular veto chose the electors, who, 
in turn, elected the delegates for the Assembly* The delegate 
seventy-five in number, were to repr^ ^^ sent the people for a 
term of three years* The Kheaive was au-uhorised to convoke, 
to adjoiirn or to dissolve the Assembly, Secrecy of 
deliberations, nomination of the President and the vice- 
Presfedent of the Assembly, finality of the Khedivial auttiority 
in making the decisions and some other details of rainor 
importance were enumerated in the Statute^*
The first session of the Assembly began on Tfoveraber 
10, 1866^ and continued till January 3ft, 1867. Problems 
concerning taxes ard property, education and public works 
were discussed, !Ehe collection of taxes at the hairvest time 
was suggested as more suitable than that of monthly one. 
Certain limitations as to the powers of the collectors were 
proposed* Finally, in a long report of a sub-committee, the
3creation of some new schools vras recommended •
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1. Douin, "Ristoire du regne du Khedive Ismail", Tome I,p*298 
2* Ibid., pp. 293-301: Rafl»l, »*Asr Israa‘il«, vol. II,pp*93-5
S. rtid., p. 313j Hafi'i,op.cit,,pp. 304-13.
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During tho following eleven years of the life of the 
Assembly, there was little novelty in its discussions* 
g^rlctilture, property and judiciary were the only targets 
of their interest^*
With all its shortcomings, the Assembly was a step 
forward in the direction of demoflrratlzation of the government. 
It is noteworthy that it was not done uMer any external 
pressure or in vievr of any popular dGraand; tt was simpfly the 
the Initiative of the Khedive himself*. However, a keen 
interest was observed on the part of the middle class 
intelliRensia in this nev; experiaant of their ruler. In a 
book appearing in Sgypt in 1869, the following remarks is 
significant in connection with the evaluation of the Asserablyi 
’*Israa*il became dominant over an Umraa of free 
opinion, consulting it about the proper Eieasuros and 
regulations, the introduction of which proposed their benefit,"
Sa'id had loft his successor two legacies which bore 
sorae inherent far-reaching consequences: one was the
3
irjiebtednoss of Sgypt of £ 3,292,000, aM the other was the
Suez Canal Project. Followiiig Sa'ic2*s footsteps, Isma'il 
h^went on bmening Egvpt with huge debts. Money was recklessly 
________ t________________ _ _________________________
1. Rafi*i, op.cit,.pp, 107-108; Liindau, ”Parlianent and 
parties in Kgypt", p. 16.
2. Rifa’a Hafi» , «Manahi3 al-Albab", cit.,Landau,op.cit.,p.l£
3. Royie, "Tho Egyptian caa.paigns,*^  p. 7; Cromer, op.cit., 
vol. I, p. 11.
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spent In erecting palaelal tmlldlngs^. In launching caspalgns 
to extend the dominions of Egypt, in bribing the Sultan for 
obtainli^ B»>re autonomous status for himself^t in princely 
tours of Surope y in layli% hospitality of the Vestemers, and 
not the least of iJJ., in fulflllii^ the promises of his 
predecessor regarding the Canal Concession* This it^ cost 
him too Biuch. Loans were contracted vithout the least care 
for the extra*ordinary high rate of interest, for which the 
discount was always a huge a\a^ • Xt vas beyond the capacity 
of the Egyptian Treasury. As a result, taxes were increased 
and the courbash ( kurbaj ) w€Ui again brou^t Into action* ^  
despair, Isma’ll contracted some new loans to pay off at least 
the Interest of the previous ones, and tiius went on increasing 
the Indebtedness of Bgjrpt. The result was not an un^cpected 
ones Egypt had reached the stage of Insolvency as early as 
1871, when Isaa*ll decreed his famous * loot of Muqabala **, ^Icl 
clearly divulged the weak position of the Egyptian econc^ By^ • 
Finally, when he was forced to leave Egypt in 1879, he left it 
burdendd with a public debt of near about ninety QHllon pounds^  
With foreign capital and foreign indebtedness, foreign liold 
was destined to increase*
Cie Ccmal Issue was In itself a sufficient ptetext 
for cm active political interest of Europe in the affairs of
1* Rafl’i, op*clt*, vol# II* pp* 53-4.2* Cmseron, op.clt*, pp* 250-51, 254->55*3* Sutherland Menzies, **Turkey old and new**, p* 218| Revaant*• Qreat Britain In Egypt "• p* 7*4* Cameron, op*clt«, pp* 250-S25* Rafl*l, op*clt*, vol* II, p* 446* Boyle, op*clt«, p*7| Cromer, op*clt*, vol* t, p* 11
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Egypt. !Bie project to cut a maritime canal through the
Isthmus of Suez, and thiis to Join the two seas arid the three
continents, was cherished since the French sojourn In 1798-180:
France was Interested in the Project in order to destroy the
British power in Indla^ * Bie idea of linking up the
Medltteranean with the Red Sea, present since the dawn of the
Egyptian history^, took a new turn in the Industrial Age,
Now the Project meant an easy means to extend the circle of
Imperialist Influence. Muhammad All, when he was approached
with the request of cutting such a Canal, had refused to
3santlon the scheme . Sa'id was, however, parsuaded by de
4
Lesseps vho was an intimate friend of the Pasha. Thus the 
long-cherished scheme came to realization. Sa*ld was iK>t as 
llprecautlous as his predecessors used to be. In 1854, he
1. On the basis of material provided by the French Consul- 
General in Bgjrpt, Telleyrand informed ttie Directory In 
March 1798i
" Bie event of establishing the French in Egypt will 
bring about a revoulution in European commerce which will 
strike particularly at England. It will destroy her power 
in India, the only basis for her grandeur in Europe. 'Die 
revival of the Suez route will have an effect upon her... 
as fatal as the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope to the 
Genoese and Venetians in the sixteenth century. The 
result of this revolution will be wholly to the advantage 
of the Republic, because it is by its geographical position 
population, genius and activity... the one of all Powers 
which can derive most from it." clt., Schonfleld, op.clt., 
pp. 10-11
2, Schonfleld, op.clt., p. 1
3. Ibid., p. l9
4, "Born at Versailles on November 19.1805, he came of a 
family of diplomats,... Ferdinand ( de Lesseps ) was 
destined for the family career, and after holding various 
Vlce-Consulships and Consulshlps-Qeneral he was appointed 
Minister at Madrid, One of his early posts was the 
Vice-Consulate at Alexendrla.•,. After remaining as Consul 
in Cairo until ia37 he was transposted to Rotterdom, and 
It was mar^ days before he saw Egjrpt again**. See 
Schonfleld, op.clt,, pp. 21-22,
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granted the concession for the cutting of the Suez Canal^ ,
Having f r i e n d ly  relations with Prance, in those
days of Cremean War, England could iK)t oppose the granting
of the Concession so strongly, persistently, and openly as
it would have been possible otherwise. However, the Project
was inimical to her Imperialistic interest, and dimplomatic
efforts continued to get ^  cancelled, postponed or deleyed
the action upon the award of the Concession. The Sultan was
persistently persuaded to withold his sanction, which at last
2he had to give in March 1866 , Palmerston led a campaign in 
the House of Commons against the realization of the Project,
3
as It was totally inimical to British interests •
In the meantime, the digging of t^e Canal had 
began in April, 1859. England had refused to purchase any 
share in the Project. However, inspite of strong opposition, 
de Lesseps* dream was realized with the generous help of 
Sa'id. The Pasha purchased 177,642 shares, about one half 
of the original, andl extended to his friend, de Lesseps, every
1. Originally granted in November 1854, the CoiKsession Treaty 
was replaced by a new Firman issued in January, 1856, It 
was to remain inforce for 99 years from the date of the 
^te pf cutting of the Canal. ( Art, 16 ), The Egjrptia 
Government was to get 15^ of the net profit of the Company 
( Art, 19 ). It was also stipulated that four-fifth of 
the labour employed should be Egyptian. ( Art. 2 ). See 
Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 150-56
2. Haf1^i, op.cit., vox. I, p. IClj Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 
32, 33.
3. In July, 1857, Palmerston, in a speech in the House of 
Commons- described the canal Project as inimical to Britis 
interest, opposed to Britain’s traditional policy and 
planned as a menace to British supremacy in India. See 
Elgood, op.cit., p. 59, f.n,; see also, Schonfield,pp. 31-
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possible help that he required^*
Apart from the actiial material help given In this
2connection, the opening of the Canal proved a permanent loss 
to the Egyptian exchequers The transit that once filled the 
coffers of Its custom-house and gave emplosrment to thousands 
of Egyptians, now completely ceased* Unfortunately, even 
the shares of the Canal could not prove advantageous to 
Egypt, as they were forfeited before long. In this Project, 
Egypt gained noticing and ultimately had to lose even Its own 
entity*
1* Sc^onfleld, op.clt*, pp. 2S-36
2 , Mmiall estimated that the Can&l took about £ 16,700,000 
from the Egyptian treasury. Elgood, op.clt*, p. 58, f.n.{ 
estimate of de Leon Is £ 17,423,178. see de Leon, op.clt., 
p. 417. Appendix, A; see also Rafl*l, op.clt., vol. I, 
p. 106* He gives £ 16,800,000, quoting from ** Hlstolre 
fInanelere de l*Egypte*», a contemporary book published 
In 1898.
C H A P T E R  II
ON THB BVB OF THB RATIONAL
« If Isma*ll Pasha died during 
the first ten years of his 
reigny his record of an Oriental 
Ruler would have been very 
distinguished one* He was a 
man of very wide, if not lofty, 
ambition; and was gifted with 
indefatigable, though misdirected, 
energy."
Dicey
( "England and Egypt",p. 2 )
" ••• it is true that the Canal 
has proved highly remunerative 
to the company which exploits itj 
but Bgjrpt has never obtained the 
smallest advantage; on the 
contrary the Canal has been the 
principal cause of Egypt's 
miseries,"
Abbas II
A few words on 
Anglo-Egyptian Settlement,
p* 33)
The opening of the Suez Canal was a turning point 
in the history of European diplomacy. Now, the centre of
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gravity shifted fron Constantinople to Caipo^. The opening 
of the Canal had also amended tho directive principles of 
British policy, particularly its policy towards Bgypt* It 
took a turn from iMigative to a positive interest, ’•fro® a 
desire to keep other Powsrs off Bgypt to a desix*e to s^ure 
control over Bgypt"^* The ascendency of any other Power 
was a source of peril to Britain as t^» Mistress of India. 
Khedive Issia'il helped Britain, throu^ his extravagance and 
indebtedr^ss, to  adopt a moro definite policy, and ttius paved 
the way for a positive British intervention*
The series of loans tJiat began in the days of Sa*U 
caused the ruin of the Egyptians. Since 1864, the year 
following his accession, Isisa*ll began to contract loans and 
did not stop until he was forced to . Evea as early as 1871, 
the Kgyptian Treasury seoacd to have esptied. It was in 
August that year that the Egyptian Govemaent had to promulgate 
the Law of Muqabala, which revealed the weak and hollow basis 
of the Egyptian TOoncmy* By virtue of this law, the land«owner 
could be rede^ed of one half of t^elr land*tax for ever, 
provided they made extra<>advance payment of six years* dues in 
one sv;aa or in instalments spread over a period not exceeding 
six years^« The Law was of a voluntary nature, but was
1. In his answer to the Acedeniy Speech of d« Lesseps. Henan averred » "The Isthimis cut becomes a strait, a battlefield* A single Bosphorus has hitherto sufficed for the troubles of the worldI You hOTe created a second and nuch more Inportant one.** clt.^^lva, **The I^anslon of Egypt”,p* 32C2, Issawi, "Egypt at mld-Century**, p* 193. aafl*l, "*Asr Isoa'll**, vol* II, pp. 28-9«* detail of loana4, Rafi’i, op.cit., p. 44| Croraer, "Modem Egypt", vol. I,pp. 29*30; de Frecinet, "La question d*Sgypte", p.
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enforced as obligatory and the moiwy was realised throu^
eourbaah^* Several taxes were increased and sosoe new ones
2were introduced • However, the econcwiy of Egypt went on 
deteriorating* The creditors demanded the interest upon 
their isonay which had to be paid somehow* Isna*il had to 
pledge his last asset i*e* his founder’s shares of the Suez 
Canal* The Britain Presaior, Disraill, availed the opportunity 
and purchased all the shares, British policy took a positive 
turn of direct Intervention in the affairs of a country lying 
midway between En^and and her Etepire* This action was 
tantamount to a declaration on the part of Eng?Cland that she 
would permit no othsr Power to intervens in the Egyptian 
affairs so far as that intervention might have a political 
bearing^•
In England, the issue was criticized as an aspiratioc
4to establish a protectorate over Egypt • Moscow Gazette, 
voicing tl^ official Russian viewpoint, made violent attacks 
on the British Govermant for sharing the spoils of ttie Ottomar 
Empire and having changed the policy of guarding the ’sickman 
of Europe*^. Fraixse was bittorly critical of the * sudden chang
1« Hafi*l, op«cit*, p* 45. The Iiaw ceased to be on January 6,1880, when a dcx;reo of the successor of Isma’il canoellsdlt« See Hafl*l, op,cit«, p* 46.2, Cromer, op*elt*, pp* 30, 49, S33* Annaial Register, 1675. pp# llfi, 122*Lord Derby said that the transaction was done in order to prevent •’a larger foreign influence froo preponderating in a matter so imiK>rtant to us",t cit«. Annual Register, 1875, p. 122 4» Xbid*, p* 12S5* It is a "coup do main* veiled uaier a comriercial transactic the Gazette wrote. It further criticized that it was for the first time tiiat a government became a shareholder In a stock, which was all the more regrettable* Annual Register1875, pp. 291-92
in the British policy^.
To Xsna*ll| even sale of the Canal shares sould 
not bring any economic relief* the condition had hecosie too 
desperate to avoid a collapse* Early in 1876^ the British 
Governmenty at the request of Isaa'ily appointed a finance- 
expert. Cave, to inaulre into the financial situation in 
Egypt* What actnally Motivated England to send her special 
mission of IiKtulry is iK>t quite clear* 4s far as the inner 
history and evidences are coocernad. Dicey who W€ts present in 
Cairo at this time nay rlghfully be regarded as an authority 
to sx>eak on the subject^* According to his information, the 
mission was sent out ^Vith tiie vlw of bringing about an 
arrangcnent under t^lch England, on condition of her assuming 
the finixncial liabilities of the Khedlvlal Qovernaient, should 
take upon herself tlie Protectorate of SgjTst** . Isma’il, 
according to Dieey, was eager to get the arrangement finalised, 
and it would have been done but for the opposition of the 
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, whose antipathy. Lord
4Salisbury, the then Prime Kinister, could not neglect • Cave
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I* l^ safle writing in Revue des deux MonSes, !to*l,Dec« ,IB75, said that **the transaction was a pure political one**, and althougl^ i it was riOt in itself a British occupation of Bgypt yet it was tile first step towards tliat goal*** cit*,Hafi*i, op*cit*. p* 652« fidward Dicej^ Imperialist at par and the author of sobm valuable books and articles on Sgypt of the late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries, visited Egypt for the first tine on the occasion of the cutting of Suez Canal* Afterwards, he was a frequent visitor, and was regarded as authority on, modern Egyptian studies* See Prefaces to Dicey’s monogi^phss *• The story of the Khediviate**| and "Iho Bgypt of the future'**3* Dicey, "llhe story of the Khediviate**, p* 135* Dicey*s view edso supported by the Cave*s report itself, where he recomended a control of Egyptian econc^ w  a controller sent by tiie British Government, and that the Khedive should obey that Controller* See Egypt No* 7,(1S76) p*9 4« Dicey, op*cit*, pp* 136*37
vas reeallod In hastd* What h« had iiiquired within a fetf,
ve^s* sojoorny he presontod it bafore the British Priao Minis^
in the fom of a roport^* K® declarad ttiat the economy of
Kgypt was in a dotoriorating condition, but it could be
restored provided its credit was roestablished and its
expenditure curtailed* Suraraing up the situation. Cave
conoluaed that /Sgvpt was sufforin? fron '*tho ignorance and
dishoaostr, vaste aod extravagance of the ISaatf such as have
brought her Suzerain to the vorge of ruin and at the saij»
ti!» froa the vast expense caused by tlie hasty and inconsiderai2endeavours to adopt the civiliaotion of the West* • At aiK>the] 
place he roaarkcds "Tlie Khedive has evidently atteiapted to 
carry out with a limited rovenue in the course of a few years 
works which oujS^ t to be spread over a far loiujor period and
awhich would tax the rssources of snioh richer eiechequors’*#
Concluding his reviav. Cave suggested that only the interventi
of some foreign 'Power in the financial affairs of the country
2could guarntec the econosic restoration of Bgypt •
Cave*s Mission was a positive step tc»#ards an active 
British intervention in Egypt^* His report was quite exposii^ 
a»l as such ti^ barrasing to Xsma*il« In despair, he took an 
arbitrary stepi On April 8, 1876, he suspended the payaent of 
the interest due to the bor^ lhelders, A decrec, issued in Say
1876, consolidated the various debts int^ one unified debt cf 
£ 91,000,000 bearing a rate of interest^.
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X* Annual Register, 1876, p* 9
2, B^ypt T?o.7 (1878) pu.l-l^j 4nnuat Register, 1876, pp,9»10|
de Precinet, op*cit», p« 157} Dicey,op*eit*, p. 140
3* a® Precinct, on.cit., p. 157
4. Cromer, op*cit«, p*7| Dicey, op.clt., p. 145
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The now Khodlvlal arrangooent was Yeh«iwntly attacked 
In Burope* Tb appease the Bupopean bondholders, the Khedive 
proposed to the Powers to ap^lnt a CormBlsion of the Public 
Debt In order to assist and advise the Sgyptian Oovernraent on 
financial matters. Franco, 4’istrla and It^ aly njMnlnated thelp 
repraaentatlves, -i^ hlle Bn,ffland abstiincxS* Israa’ll hlnself 
selected I«ord Croaer (than 31p ^ vyn Daring)to represent 
Siisland* Th3 Coa^isiion was Instituted bjr a decree Issued In 
May, 1B7S, It \ri3 not eTDo^mrod with any Inltiatlr^ or 
adnlnistratire authority* :^ ut or»e it carae Into exlstorKse,
It began to assart itself and Insisted that it was also its 
duty to find out whether the tuxes wore being collected lep^Lly 
or othepirlse* IsBia*il begari t» oppose the sctiTitles of the 
Coraaisslon and, consequently, the bondlK>lders became uneasy*
At the Instance of these bondholders, in October, 1876, came 
another Conmlssion of Inquiry, the Qoschen-Joubert Comaission, 
representing British and French creditors respectively* After 
making investigations, the Coamisioners presented their report 
recoryrendinc that *'the furaSed debt of Egypt ought to be fixed 
at £ 5D,coo,coo, aj:Ki tliat the interest on tl^ is debt be reduced 
froBi to e^"^* 'Ihe debts were tc be guar&nt€»^ by the 
securities of the Da*Ira lands ttie State Hallways receipts, 
while the dues of the port of Alexcndria were to be put under 
a seperate arranganent~» 'i!he settlemono was to be supplemented 
by another arrangooient on the pert of the IChedive to Buropeanis< 
t*i© State under the supervision of two controllers nominated by 
the Govemoents of France awd Snglarti, and to entrust the
1* Dicey, op«cit*, p* XS3
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StatQ Hallways ibiminlstration to an Anglo-French Board* Shis
arrangement was decreed on rfovaaber 18y 1876^•
The riaw arrangeaeut dealt with the funded debt onl7y
the problem of floating debts reoairted untooohed* When the
creditors were lnfon»3d of the settl^euty the/ filed suit for
jkheir C 50^000,000 In the Intumatiojial Tribunals of Sgypt*
Judgei^&t was givon in thoir favour arid the State was declared
2liable to pay these unfunded debts as weH •
!Ihe Goachen-Joubert recoE}r.iedciatxo2is also ensured 
the reorganisation of tiie Egyptian financesy and the 
adininistaratlve seatiures that were adopted according to these 
recoffissendatlons were far oiore iiaoortant in affecting the 
autonomy of Egypt* Two Controllors-(Jenoral were apnolnted to 
control the Revenue and the Bxpanditure of the States one of 
them was IPWneh, the other British. Thus, an Anglo-French 
control was established arxl the era of the veiled Protoctorate 
began* ISgypt bocaxae virtually dependent on the will of the 
two pov/ers*
In the neantinoy the Comission of the Public debt, 
feeling ltd work not running ssK>othlyf recoassended for another 
International Conoission of Inquiry* Their view was supported 
by t)ie oondholders and xvas approved by the Govemerats of 
France and England*
1* de Frecinetf op*cit«|p* 1^-64| Dicey)Op*cit*y p*153* de Fi*e<*lnot nanon this to'sns'ment as Aiiglo-Frer»h Condorainlua* seo do Freolnotyop*cit*^p* 1612. Dic<^« op*oit,, p.
3* DlceyU x^aark ini ’The Egyptian Crisis'*, (Ninteentii Centu] 
JVprll, 1P79). p* f!70j ’n/lth the appointoent of the 
C^&mission or Inquiry* * * Sngland finally abondoned the attltuf^ e of ncn-tnte’Tvsntlon”*
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In January 1878, a decree was issued to the same 
effect and an International Coimaission of Inquiz^y the third 
in the seriesy came into being, k suppleraentary decree 
extended the povrers of the C<»raission and authorized it to 
Investigate thoroughly into the financial condition of Bgypt^• 
In viev of the liabilities, the interest on the debt, 
the tribute to the Porte, and carrying out the current State 
Expenditure, t^e Ccoaraission, after m^ing thorough inquirjtes 
for about four months, pronosed to the Khedive to surrender 
his private estatos and to accept Civil List* The Cocmission 
also reccH2tiBended that reforms should be introduced in the 
working of the govemetent and that the principle of Ministerial 
Responsibility be accepted* The Khedive, afraid of the other 
alternative i»e* the Intematioml intervention, had no other 
choice* He yeilded and approved the Coassission’s reoc»miendatio] 
Re renounced his personal rule and becase a constitutional head 
of th e State • On August 28,1878, addressing Ntobar Pasha in 
a letter, Isnail authorized hia to form a nev government*
IVubar formed the Ministry with Rias Pasha as the Minister of 
Interior* As a result of the changed state of affairs, the 
Daul Control of Britain and France lost its importance or 
rather its raison d’etre* It v«is, therefore, decided that it 
should now adopt a more vield forms that the Anglo*Freneh 
Control be abolished and the Containers be absorb^ as full* 
fledged ministers in the new Responsible Ministry* Wilson, the
1* Dicey, op.cit*. pp* 174«76| Ibids "The Egyptian Crisis’*, op.cit*, p* 670 2* Cromer, op*cit*, pp* 59*61 j Dicey, “The Story", p* 186
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British ControUeri was ncHnixiated as th« Minister of Flnaivse 
and the French Controller, de Blignieres, was made the Ministei 
of Public tforks.^
With these new aeasiires, the Anglo-Prenoh hold came 
in closer and direct contact with the p«K>ple of the country* 
ISie European Ministers were not the nominees of their 
Govermsents* They vere the nominees of the representatives 
of the bondholders* Still it seemed that it vas simply a 
veiled form of the actual intervention at the Ooverrraent level. 
The Khedivial auttiority was graaSually slipping away into the 
hands of the foreigners and the Khedive was a helpless 
spectator^*
The Responsible Ministry under the presidency of 
Nubar provo3 to be too independent and, at last, Isaa*il was 
annoyed* He had accepted a Civil List| he had accepted the 
principle of Ministerial Itesponsibilityt and finallyf he had 
allowed the Europeans to share in the Ctovensient of Egypt*
How the saae Hes|K>nsible Ministry, with two European Ministers 
was, step \jiy step, going c(»pletely out of his control* He 
began to wait for his chance*
1* Cromery op*cit*p« 63» At the tine of execution of the new changes, provision was made for ^e revival of the Dual Control in the event of reiMval of the Bkiropean Ministers from their posts* See. Letter of Salisbury to Vivian, the Consul-General in Egypti (Egypt Ifo* 3,1879,pp*l«2)*2* !!he Ecom^ aiist, May 29. 1879$ see also, de Leon's remai^ i* The shadow of the stranger projected over Egsrpt hides both the Idirone and the native administz^tion **•■ de Leona " The Khedive's Egypt'p* 387
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lama'll had ascended the vicex^gal throne aiaidst 
the 'fortunate* days of l^e An^rlcan Civil War^ American 
Cotton Industry being destroyed, Sgjnptian cotton had filled 
the gap« The valley of the Riley it was beleived^ was' in
tofuture/supply the looms of lAncashiire with shaple of their 
trade. The area of cotton cultivation vas increased. Sgypt 
vas becoming more and B»rd prosperous, and there vere greater 
expectations. But, then, tiie Jteerican Civil War ended and vith 
it came the collapse of the cotton bo<^. As a result, the 
economic conditions of the peasant class began to deteriorate^* 
In 186i, Isma*il*s loan-deal began which had its effects upon 
ths^asses. Jku taxes were Imposed. The land tax vas raised 
ftooB forty piastres to one hundred and slxty^* Besides,
Isma'il memaged to get the |x>sse3sion of about one«fifth of 
the whole area land of the coimtry^« Here, he vas robbed by 
his agents throu^ whom he cultivated these lands^ and vas 
unable to gather even a tv a c tio n  of the revenue they had 
brou^t in taxation when not in his possession^*
The beginning of the flnaiieial difficulties, 
coincided vith the fall in the cotton prices and set in an era
a Z _____________________________________________________________________
1* Cameront op.cit., pp. 349«>50 2* Bluntt op.cit*I p* 163. Ibid., p* 17t de Leon, op.cit*, p« 236,41071 a  ha4* Blunt^ ^.eii*, 0p. 18
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of eontinuous opprefion an3 ov@r-taxatlon« Xsbki*!! Siddique  ^
vas Isjna*tl*3 choif Agent In this disastrous policy* Wh«n 
the rojulred money was m t  aTallable, the people were corapell* 
to borrov from Qreek ifoney-lenders at hl^ rates of interest* 
When they seemed to he totally exhausted and could pay or 
borroif no more, their lands vere confiscated and sold at 
nominal prices^* The o^er alternative for the Fdllah vas 
imprisoniaent on sc»ne "tnaqp^^up chargey compulsory enlistment 
in the Egyptian army or the cutting of the water from their
3lands" • nie big land cvners could not be troated in so 
sumnary a fashion* They vare, however, called upon to raise 
forced labour to meet the unceasing deatands of the Qovex^ont* 
In return, they were allowed to extort from the Pellahin 
whatever they still possessed after the visits of the tax- 
gatherers^ •
1* Isxna*il Siddique, the z»)torlou8 Mufettish,an Algerian by birthjof fellii origin, coming in Court contact probably in the time of Abbas I, he became Finance Minister in his last days* lie died at the hands of his master on November 15, 18^. Seei de Xteon,op*cit«, pp* 183-^2* Dicey, op*cit», p* 90 3* Xbid, p* 91Xbid,pp* 91** s de Xieon,op«cit*, pp*219,^30*31,237,327** In fact it is going hard with the fellaeen " beasts produce, goats, hare^!, Jewellefy where it existed, and even the land itself are being sold to a»et ^eir debts’** see de Iieon, op*cit«, p* 2191 " Everything is cheapertJian the last year, but thoi^ is no money to buy it with, and the taxes have grown $»eB>Sgy]»^  beyond bearing**Lady Duff Gordon* "Last letters fr<Ma Egypt”* letter dated Movember 21, 1866* p* 86* ’^ r^0^y day sane rroah tax, Everybeast, caisel, cow, shoop, doi^ey and horse is s»de to pay* The fellahin can no longer eat b^ads they are living on barley, maal mixed with water and raw green stuff * * « etc* The t^ation makes life impossibles a tax on evary crop and on eveiTT man, on charcoa^ on butter, on salt"*Ibid^,p* 65 Kn* letter dated 1867*
4*
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the usual procedure of the usu^rers wi(s to have a 
constant vateh over the conditions of the peasants* They 
were constantly In t»uch with the varying conditions of the 
peasantry throu^ their agents* Upon receiving inforoation, 
they offeraS tdieir ’services* on the security of the growing 
crops. The rate of interest varied froa twelve to fr^ fenty per 
cent* According to the needs of the borrower, while payaent 
had to be made eit}»3r in money or in kind at the option of 
the lender* When ^ e  harvest was reaftyy the usujJrer sent 
an agent to squat on the ground laortgaged for «ie laon« and 
to supervise the crop# It was tl» money-lender who detenaln^ 
what aittount he had the right to sei2se* As a rule^ he contrive! 
to leave the borrower still in debt even after he had paid a 
SUB more than sufficient to cover the original loan?*. This 
dark period of the history of modem Egypt is called by Dicey
Oas the "era of Mufettish**, i.e* the era of Isna’il Siddique ,
Xn 1869, the (Tanal was cut# Since the day when the
Project was started until its opening in Kovember 1869| poor
subaissive peasants were flocked in thousands to wot^ there
with no return* The 8gyptian ruler, under the terras of the
Concession Treaty, was bound to supply a certain nraiber of
forced labourers! and this he did. IVenty-five thousand workers
were made to work on meagt^ ration, bi^ l food, and poor clothing*
In the heat of the day and the cold of the night, wnidst their
misery and over-work^ they dlsd like animals and were
1* Dicey. op*cit*, pp. 91,92| de Iieon, op«cit*,pp* 219, 230-31,237,327j Lady Duff Qordon,op.cit* ,pp* 65,86*2* Dicer, op*cit«, p* 92
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iBcnedlately replaood by others* Thd protests of the British 
Pronier and tho prohibitory orders issued by the Porte could 
hardly bring a change in the •tirae-honour»d’ tradition of 
o crwe. SiiBilarlyy tJie 1876 Egyptian ccospaign against 
Abyssinia* which ended in a disastrous failure, necessitated 
mass scale conscription for recruitment. It engaged sixteen
thousand Egyptians^* In order to laake up the expenditure
-Lincurred by this coapaign, the fella^ ln were once again forced 
to fill \ip the empty Treasury^ Blunt visited Egyptian country 
side in the beginning of the year 1876* He was terribly 
shocked by witnessing the results of the inconsiderate policy 
of the Khedive, "It was rare in those days to see a man in 
the fields with a turban on his liead, or with !!»re than a 
shirt on his bsuik • • • • ISie country S^eykhs th^sselves 
had few of thea a cloak to wear • « • • The provincial towns* 
on market days, were full of women selling their clothes and 
their silver ornaments to the Qreek usurers* bocause the tax 
collectors were in their villages whip in hand*"^ Indifferent 
towards politics* and ready to obey ai^ne who would allow 
thon to be free in their fields* the fellahin had not the 
least of a patriotic feetingi They were readiy even to welccnae 
the British intervention if it could bring them some relief^ *
1* Annual Register* 1876* p. 3002* Blunt* op»cit«* p. 113. Blunt* op*cit«* pp« 12*13
Evisr/ yoar broug^ it scwao naw aisdrlas to tho poor 
follahiru Bos idea the land tax, a nuraber of niaoellanooua 
taxes vero levied on o m  accuse or the other* Crcwier, while 
naking Inquiry Jjito tlie finaixsl^ situation in Egypt, re^ jort 
ed to the British Connul-Oeneral tliat there were thirty-sevei
• «
such taxes still he was doubtful if the list was completl 
The taxes vare fixed arbitrarily and were uncertain in 
amount *ith no reference to the time and naiiner of 
realization*
A general discontefitment prevailed* Lord 7ivian,
the British Consul-General in Sgypt, reported on January,
18771 "Bie dovenmont employees are oany iroaths in arears o:
pay, so much so that the cashiers of the Caisse are actually
2being paid out of the private means of the Comissiaors" •
*♦ I hear reports”, he continues "that the peasantry are 
cruelly treated to extract the taxes fi*oa tlioa" • The 
Khedive himself admitted that "in order to pay the coupans, 
the taxes were collected for nine months, in some places for
3a year in advance" •
The conditions of the fellahin further detorioratei 
in 1R78, as the full effects of the bad NUe of 1877 were 
felt only this year. In Upper Egypt there was a famine* 
Alexcndec Baird, a frequent visitor of said in his
reports *»It is aln»>st incredible the distances travelled by
- ^ 7 -
1* Cromer, op*cit*, p* 302. Ibidfp, 33 3* Ibid*, p* 34
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vomen and children baggliig frcn vlllago to village. • • »
The poor ware la seme Instances reducs5 to such extremities
of hunger that they wore driven to satisfy thoir cravings
with the refuao and garbage of the streets**^ .
In Hayf ISTo, a staa of about £ 2,000,000 was due
to bo paid to the interoat of the Public Debt* In March,
only about £ 50,000 voro in t/ie hancis of the Cocr!l3sloner8.
The balance anounting to £ 1,500,000 haS thoroforo to be
collected in the course of one month* fhe aonoy was,
2however, collected and the dues ws3?e paid •
1* clt*, CroBor, op.cit*. p* 352. Ibid*, p* 35} It was ttie darkost period for the fellaliin says Wallace, on the evidence of a bliiai native of Bgypt soe Wallace, **Egypt and the Bgyptiem question**, pp*2TO»7 see also Crwier, p, 381 "Step u  were talcen to collect th monoy* • • • l\j’o of the s»st lron»fisted Pashas were sec into the provinoos* They were accorapanied by a staff ol noney-lenders \fho were prepared to buy in advance the crops of the cultivat^ ors.**Ibid*, p* 38, citing Bairds »In some cases .perfectly authenticated, corn was sold to the acrchants for 50 piastres ajn ardob, which was delivered in one montli’s time when it was worth 120 piastres* * • ’*5 sea also Royle, op*cit*, p. 6} Henry Pensa, "L»Bgypte et la Soudan Egyrtlen”, pp* 11-14Chirol visited Bgypt for the first tiae in 1876* During the Sgjratian Revolt of 1881-82. ho acted as one of the Standard War Correspondent at Alexcndria* His monograph ”The ISgyptian Problera**, ao5 the collection of his articles entitled "Fifty years in a chaining world", are valuable docunonts as conterapomry accounts of an eye-witness* Chirol remarks«
”* * * the half-starved fellaheen dragged avray froa 
their own fields to woflk on the huge o55tates which the 
Khedive and his favoTired pashas had filched from thoBf 
tho foi*ced labour of the corvro, under the ever-present 
nanace of tho whip, to keep the perennial canals 
running for the benefit of others5 tho press gangs 
eicpioyed to d0rivo into the depots the array recruits who 
wore too poor tc buy exeiaption from what they regarded,.irrevocable sentence of death in the far-away Sudan; the miserable ntud-villages frequently desarted because even the kurbash appli^ to 'ttie soles of the fellaheens' feet could no longer wring a piastre out of thes to meet taxes often levied three or tour times over and so even their land had been taken away frcas them in
Contd*********
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Cn Angnst 6,1??7B, Crcaaor anS Kraner sunriarls<M! in  
th e ir  r« p o rt, as the coTibcrs o f tlie In te m a tir i j i l  Coiamlssloi 
o f  Inqtilry, the ctsrAltion o f  t3ie p«opla o f Brorpt In  the 
following xTor^ sx '♦Le eholkh executc le s  or^ ffrQn dxi isoiJdlp, 
©t 1« EtO^ «31r cetnc <!o I ’lnspoctsur gancral qul lufcnra© 
a g i t  par ordi'© stiperlsur • • C*ost l a  lol* Los agents 
du CSonvemononts ♦y eonfom ent, fa t-11  vorbal, o t 11 ne vte^v’ 
>
a I ’o sp r it  dos contrlhuahlcjs n i d*en con tostar I ’catLstenco, 
n l d©3 prot^^ster contro aa tonour* Pom* lo s  Inyjot 1« folia!: 
n© peut 3a p la lnd rst 11 s a l t  qn*on £<;lt par ordre superleur* 
C*est le  potiveimomont lulwaorae qnl le s  roclaaej a qtil 
vouler.-vons qu*ll se plalf^no?"^
(Contd* from pa^e 4P)
gaya»nt« the otwaJs of walling women ancl emaciated children ogging'for a hnsk of malzo; misery s.nd despair up and down that lncor»i>arahle valley of the Ifllo whilst laraa’ll held hli court In Cairo.**.** Chlrol, "The Egyptian Problem*pp*
28-29“The Khedive’s rfrlrate estates wore cultivated forced labonr* The corroe m t  only inposed foarful hai^ dahlps on hundreds of thoujsaiifls of fellaheen whc were eoHssandeercd foi it* It was used aJ.so as a pretext for e^ ctortlng coney from those wkc v-3re not actually liable to do corvee work*"
Ihid*^ P* 32”Ntever was kurhash applied laore persistently to th^ soli of the wretched peasant’s*' feet, to nake him disgorge his lai remaining piastre. I had not to ^  aany miles out of Cairo, to see whole gangs of the fellaheen tom froo their own villanss ar«3 marched, sane of the?, in chains, under an escort of arr.ed t^llce or Goldlors| to wock on the Khedi7e*< •domains’ which Isma’ll had createc. * • acre thrfan a quarter of the i‘iehest lands in the fertile valle/ cf the Hlle. The peasantii own erinuous fields had then to be left 
uncultivated and his faFlly to starve if they had not alreai^  fled to avoid thfs worst fom of conscription* Ifeiln was 
Uiilvcrsal all the evils followed it which in an agricTiltural country are ®ore to be dreaded. Starvation, sickness and n*irrain stalked a land of plenty, where the aun-£crrched desert can he made to hlosscm upio the extresie limits of irrigation aufl on the drawn faccs of an easy going and mlrth-loving people were written such misery and 
dull despair as I have seldom seen elsewhere*”Chirol, "Fifty years In a changing world",p<
1* Henry Pensa, op*cit* , p* 11
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The eonditions of the cities were s<»Mtvhat 
better^ but not to the extent of bii^ satisfaotoiy* The 
spread of Western education and leamingf the * import* of 
the parliamentary institations^ and the resentment against 
the pro^Ttak policy of the Goverment had turned the 
people conscious of their plight* the increasing foreign 
hold was a new factor fcrcing thra to t^ isic about the 
problems of their country* But^ stilly t^ey did not have 
a clear conception of the line of action they should follov*
Dfff-
iii
In March 18711 as«»Sayrid Jaaal ad-Din al*Afghani 
came to Egypt and settled in Cairo^* Mohassn^ S AbdtA has
1« **According to his ovn account • • « Sayyid MuhasmadJaoaluddin was bom in a 'Tillage of /IsadabEuS near Kabul, in the year A.H* 1254 (A.D. 1838-39). His father was Sayyid Safdar. • « * At the age of eighteen he visits Indiay whQTO lee retained for a year a ^  some raonthSy during which tioe he learned something of the Suropean sciences and their methods* Frc»a India he perfom^ the pilgriisage to }tecca« • • • He then return^ to his own country and entered tlfra service of Quit Kuhaaaaad Xhan*««S /^fS^XCivil War broke out in Afghanistan^  ^and at last 
kt al<»Arghani had to leave his country* He **set out for Mecca by way of India in A*H« 1285 IB69)* Therehe was received by the Indian governoi»nt« whichyhoweveri prevented him from meeting ^e leaders of Muslim opinion save under its supervision, and a aonth later after his arrival, sent him in one of its ships to Sues* Thence he visits Cairo for ^ e  first timCf and remained there forty daysy frequenting the great University of Al-Ashar, holding conversation with many of its teachers ani students^ and lecturing to a chosen few in his own lodging*Instead of procecKling to Mecca. Sayyid Jamaluddin decided to visit Constantirrople, where he was well
Contd* «•*•••«•»
described In detail the prevailing conditions in Bgjrpt on 
the eve of the arrival of al-Afghani. According to Abduh, 
the Egyptians had been accustomed to think in terms of 
dbject submissiveness. To them, the Khedive was all in all 
the fortiines of the country, they thou^t, depended upon hi 
integrity and sense of justice. They could not think in 
terms of the privileges of a people, nor t^ y  saw any right 
of theirs to share the affairs of the government whiph, 
they said, was the exclusive affair of the Pasha* Even the 
Assembly of the Delegates was not bold enough to denounce 
any measure initiated by the Pasha^.
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(Continued from page 50),received by Ali Pasha, the Grand Wazir, and other notables of the Ottoman Capital* • * • Unhappily the Shikhul-Islam,, was jealous of the Sayyid, whose injh.uence he was eager to destroy, and when the latter delivered his address to a lar distinguished audience* . * he was watching carefully for some expression on account of which he might be able to X  impugn the speaker’s orthodoxy.** The Shaikhul-Islam was successful in seizing upon some woBds, "and accused Sayyid Jamaluddin of describing the prophetic office as an *art* or *craft*, and the Prophet as an *artificia3b* or *craftsma The matter was taken upon the pulpit and the press, and warmly debated on both sides. , . until finally, for the sake of peace and quietude, the Turkish government ordered him to leave Constantinople for a time. Thereupon he again returned to Egypt, where he arrived on March 22, 1871.Sayyid Jamaluddin’s original intention was to remain in Egypt only for a short while, but Riaz Pasha met hla, wa» greatly impressed by his abilities, and obtained fof* him^  a government allowance of a thousand piastres a month, ’not for any specific services, but to do honour to an illustrio visitor*. Students and others whom his fame had reached flocked to him arsd persuaded him to give lectures in his house, and he expounded to enthusiastic audiences some of the most advanced text-books on various branches of Muhammadan theology, philosophy. Jurisprudence, astronomy and mysticism. His influence am fame continued to increas in Egypt, and he began to direct his attention to teaching his students the art of literary expression, encouraging th to write essays and articles on various subjects, literary, philosophical, religious and political. Hitherto, there ha been but few able writers in Egypt, the most emineiit at tha time being Abdiillah Pasha Pikri, Khayri Pasha,and a few oth But now, thanks to the Sayyid *s efforts, the number of able young writers increased rapidly.
_______ Brown^ "Persian Re volution”, pp.4-81. Rashid ReXa,**Tarikh al-Ustadkal-Imam'*,vol.I, p* 36
With the arrival of al-Afghani, a new esa began 
In the Intellectual and political history of modem Egypt* 
He had already visited the country about a year earlier, and 
within a brief sojourn of for^ days in Cairo, he had 
attr«u3t^ the Egyptian intellige]:|sia towards his personalitj 
RWy 3 group of young enthuslsts ga^ered ai^und hiia* 
Prominent asK>ng these were HuhasBsad Abduh, Ad lb Ishaiy, 
Zbrahin al«»Aghani, Ibrahim al«*Hi^ bavl and Mahaud Sg^ mi • 
al-Barudl^.
According to Rashid Rasa, al*Afghanl had two aims• /*
^  his life* One of those was academiei He desired to 
reform and give a new orientation to the religion of Islam 
and to awaken the Muslims of the world* The other aia was 
soclo-polltloal* Her© again, says aashid Haza, he kept in
gview the renaissance of the t^lory of Islam • Being well 
informed in the political affairs of his tii^ and having a 
strong urge for freedom^, he preached liberfilisa in religio 
republicanism in statecraft, and unity of ttue Muslim world, 
Freedom of press and platform was freely discussed during
his talks, and the audience were Imbibed with the spirit of
'  ^ 5revolt against absolute nK>narchy and naladmlnistration •
Al*Af{^ ianl was nMther a systematic writer nor
even a professional journalist. Ifowever, he created a new
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‘siali Revojd.ution'*, pp« 7,8 “Zu*ama al*Islah fi *Asr al-nadlth’*,?, 67 t, op*cit*, pp.40,73; Zaidan, •♦Mashahlr ash-
1* Brownfi "PersJb i utlon" .2* Ahmad Amin* 3. Rashid Re^iSharq”, vol., II, p.'SS4. Rashid op.cit., p. 405. Toung. op.cit., pp. lCl>,102| ^unt, op.cit., pp. 103*10 Hashia H^ iia, op.cit., p« 55
gener«ti<M} of wpltora ai»3 journalists. But h« was well
awaro of tha laportanoe airf role of iourmlisn?*# He
ancourgaed his disciples to write on literary, religious
and! political subjects* He «»Ksourag8d s«se of th«s to
start their ©vrn papers a?id journals| James Sanua, ( Abu
Naddara), Adlb Ishaq and Abdullah NadlE were sone of the
2leadltig journalists of the period , 551© Egyptian press,
thus, received iMjnentuEi and a rambor of literary and 
political journals be^n to appear* Journalistic 
activities had already been there even before the arrival 
of al-Afghanl« Al«Afghanl accelerated the speed of such 
actlviteS) and gave a new turn to the thli^lng loinds of 
the country, a turn of being critical of every untoward 
measure in the field of politics, social behaviour and 
statecmft* Since al«Af^umi*s arrival, political 
activities of the Bgyptian people also acquired a new 
li!iT>etus* In this case also, al-Afghani was not the prim
moveror in any sense, the originator of such actlvltes*
tr-His Bain contribution was to precipitate the disconteqiTOt 
already prevalent in the county*
Goz»ral Increase in education, de'TOlopoient of the 
press, eaistence of a qvuisi-i^lianentary institution, 
general dlscontonaent as»ng all sections of titie Bgyptian 
people and, not the least of aH, a suspicion against the 
foreigners and tho realization that a better state of
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1* ¥eu Seo in evidence thereof, al»Afghani*s ^ticle wrltt in Persian and published in the monthly Hu*alliji Sh^ia of Hyderabad in 1880, when al-Afghanl was staying at Hyderabad. The title of the article is “the s p r i t s and advantages of joumalism’*. See Mubarizuddin aif*at»s translation of al-Afghanl *s articles* '*Maqalat*i-Afg)mn pp. 65-741 see also, "Sab-ras". monthly, Hyderabad, July-August 19581 *Maulana Muhlbb-i-Husain",pp. 20«40 2. Rashid op.clt., p. 38
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affairs was pcssiM© all theae factors/have oreato
a strong urge anfi desire on the part of the Egjrptian people 
for a change for the better. Al-Sfghani helped in 
crystallzing and syatenjatlalng the vague and dispersed 
desires^. His talks and lectures must have had some 
lasting Impressions upon the ralnds of his unrestlva and
Qdlssntisfiod audience?^  •
Im Soe aalth’s appraisal of al-Afghanl, **Islam in the modem world" ^ p* 20t•• He was neither a profound thinker nor a creative personali'^* Max^ movmi^nts st^^oed froa his activity^ and yet ho was not groat enough to be credited wltti having brou^t tiliem Into being* As I ioe it. Jeuoaluddii] was ttie catalyst of Islamic revo>fl,utlon ratner than its creator* His rtietoric and passionate eloquence called forth from his audiomes explosive responses; but it dl so because those responses were already latent in his hearers. His contribution was to ciystaliso and organise them***The opposite ▼leM_isj|dhored_l:gLjya>ddard ("15ie worl of Islata**;- Browne ("Ihe Persian Eevolutlon**) and oost of the Alters on this topic. They hold that al-Afghan was the father of every shade of Egyptian nation&lisa; and they seem to infer as if there would have been no such mov^ Bienty had al-Af^xani not been there. See Stoddard, "^e world of Islasi**^  p. 148; Browne, "Persia revolution", pp. 4»82. AJinad Amin q^ ioting Salim Bey al-Ahkhuri, "Zu’ama al» Islah fl *Asr al-Ifedlth", pp. 72-TOj "During the year 18*^, his residence in Sgypt became dangerous as he entered in politics and the masses cane in closer conta with hljnt During his conversation, he said to themi »0 Ye, the Egyptian peopled You have oeea brought up in an atmosrjhere of slavery and despotic rule. For a long tine you have been governed under the yoke of autocrats and you have been the targets of their tyrannical measures. * . • Your Governors shopsfored upon you oppression, treacheries an3 tyr^nies and you tolerated them I ra^or you wore content or yottr lot and ramiinad losing the essences of your lire. « Look at the Pyrainids. . . .  (etc.) They are the proofs of the greatness of your forefattiers. Awake froa the sluaber and be like the nations of the world, free aiid prospero See also Prefaco to Zla’uddln Barni’s "Ja^aluddin Afghani"(in Urdu), by Abdurrahinan Siddlqi:d. Slddiqui ha cited tho following fron the book "!!ukallnat--i--iKlrashi«f Qtfo", published in in 1340 H» "He frcaa Idpresidential chair after yhe two third audlnnfte becoae •senseless*, and tho remaining ono^third is also out ofbounds," ----
---- ’ Bamiy op.cit., pp. 25-36
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During this parlod. Intellectual Egjrpt was 
un2arg(fns a rovolutlooary change* An Intelllge^la vhlch 
could Batch the Western people was coming into existence* 
Tlio movoaont for tho revival of Islbsi| its reorientation an 
adaptation to the new circumstancas, started under the 
guidance of al*Afghani and taken up bj his worthy disciples 
had had its own effects* On the other hand, the insonsiAjDi' 
iderate sieasures of Isma^il were creating hatred and 
indignation agairuit the Turco*Circas.s&ian hegenony* At ttie 
same tine the Egyptians were smelling the danger of 
increasing hold of the Western Powers,
As a result of these pesstiDistic and gloony 
conditions, a group of political journals andi newsimpors 
caiBQ into existonce* Many of these were critical of the 
Governmenty while soiae wore very bitter about tiie whole 
state of affairs* Abdullah Abu*s-3a»ud*s Wadi an-Nil* 
started in 1S66, was closed down by the order of tho Khediv 
in 1872^* Perhaps the bl*-wo^ JLy was becoains too outspoken 
In 18G3f Ibrahim al-Mouelhi and I/thman Jalal started a---- >
weekly, :ftig.hat al^ Aflaar, which was also closed down lay the 
Ck>vernQ&nt aft r its second issue^* In 1875, Salim ^ l a3and Basharti Taqla issued al-»Ahran * l3io sacte year,MuhamBad 
TTstfi, the son of ttio editor of Wafli an«»Nil« started i~lau2at
1 * Hafi*i, op«cit*« vol* ly p* 26P.2* Ibid., p. 263 3* Ibid*, p* 2^3
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al«Akhbay. tha political Twsrtloasof uhlch wore written by
hl3 father^ . On al-Afglianl’s iastaiKs*!, Mib Ishaq and
Salim an-rJuqqash started two papei'S, t3i« va^cly Misr in
21B78 and the daily at-Tl Aar&Ii in 1878 • Sie Egyptian 
Qoffurmant could not tolsrato Adlb's plain and blunt 
c;.’ltlcl3K, The papars wore oloBaJ <3own in 1880 and Mib 
waa Qxpollod froa Sgypt, 2d settled aown in Paris, froa 
whora he .‘5tn."ted a nmr papjr al-^ a^hi^ a^ * Be could not 
r«t^ u*n to Sgypt till late in tbe» yoor 1881 when nationalist 
erme to powor^. Jams Samia, arasthor disciple of al-Afglian 
iss^ Abu Ifezsara early in 1877# ISifi satirical pa|»r oad« 
fan of the ways and scans of the Khedivial Goverfflaont* It 
was closod down in the following year^* In Aprilyl879y 
Ibrahira al-Laqani^ cimj of the prordnont disciples of 
al-Afghafti^  Isaued a papor, Mir*at ash»Sharq^. Tbwarda th«
!• All Kubarak; «A1-Khitat at-Taufiqiyya’*. Tol, XI,p.<^2. fefi‘i,op*cit,,p«2CQ5 ihead Amln,op.oii,,p» 69| 2aldan, op*cit*y vol«y lly p« 713. Ta*1ir,op«cit,,p. slj AhmaS Aain* op*cit*,p. 6Q Ahaad Ajain,op*oit«,p*?Ot LaRd&u,ots.oit., p* 95; Blunt, **(]ordon at Khattiai”, P*46t Oibbt B»3.0.s«,7y lt^ p.755: Aba Ifeasara contlnuad in Paris dtirinii tho Arabi Havolt, It was a weekly paper fron August 1S78 to March 1879. (I.anddli,op*cit** p*95| Anin,op.cit,|p«70) At first in 
MS., and then lithographed, it Wi\s distributed fey hand in Cairo aiiS Alexendria* It continued for throe years* In Paris, it was monthly* (Blunt,op*cit,, p* 46)Th© 3haik±i with Blue Spectacles presented thirtytwo dramas when he began his career. They were all on social subjects. Proa the very beginning he was with al«Afghani and Abduh, and with their cooperation he issued his satirical i>apor in Ihis was a peculiapaper of its kind and b»c^ une tjmodel for taolloqisX Arabi
4.
OffenaiVG in charactcr as it vas, it was closod down by
the Gov^ rrEaent and its editor was exiled* Then he beganthe aaiiia paper fr<Mii Paris and its elreulatlon beeama^v in
tho entire Islaraic world. He had a direct concern Ln
ti-ia Arabi Hevolt, In the Mabdist uprising and in the 
Turkish revolt*
5. Hamza,”al*Adab wa*s-Sihafat fi Misr**, p*67
en4 of the year 1879, thoj^  Xbimg Egypt Party started its 
organ by the same name, tha Young Bgypt. Abdullah an»Nadla 
was one of its regular eontrlbutori. The Ministry of Rlaz 
prohibited its publication In the beginning of 1880* 
Abdullah an«lf^iB started his oim paper at«T^ rikit va*t» 
Tfthkhlt in 1881, and after its closure he issued another, 
at»Ta»if^In 1877^ Michael Abdus Siqryld issued al«Watan 
which criticized the government quite openly and boldly 
and presented a patriotic point of view^* In 1879 al^ tfatan 
was suspended the Governsent for fifteen days* Perhaps, 
3cm9 ^ing more bitter had appeared against the corrupt 
govemnent^#
These political papers represented the grwtring 
political consciousness of the people. They were the 
symptoms of the general unrest and discontwtoent* They 
attacked tiie governsent and its administration, and criticia
3^ e  increasing foreign influence • James Saima, in his 
satirical language, disclose ^ e  discrependies and short«
4comings of Iaaail*s administration and policy • Abid Ishaq 
and Salim an«R^qash introduced Trench social and political 
ideas in their writings* Adib wrote on the topics of 
freedom and independence, patriotim and constitutionalism 
and on the duty of the government towards ^ e  citisens^*
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1« Rafi*i,op*cit», p* 2632. Ibid., vol. II, p. 1983. Ahmad Amin|Op.cit.• p* 704. Blunt,op.cit., p. 465. Bamza, op.cit., p. 117
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Tho part plUyed by the Bgjrptlan press In shaping 
and TOuldlng the Ideas of patriotism and,| consequentlyy in 
errstalising the rise of nationalist feelings can hardly be 
oTer-es tima ted •
N the sane resentment as^voiced throu^ the press^
aienifested itself in the proceedii^s of the Assetablji of the 
Delegates, Submissive as it vas in its early stages^ it 
turned more and more critical and assertive* In the 1876- 
session of the Asseably, Uthman al-^ Rarmily a delegate«protested 
against the eontixnaition of the Lav of MDqabala vi^iout 
disclosing to ^ e  &ss«ably the actual finacial position of the 
country* The Khedivial stateaent^ that the continuation of 
the Lotf dopeixied upon the confinoation by the Ass«nbly 
indicated th a t the Assoably had soiae share, at least in nsM, 
in administering the affairs of the country* The delegates 
discussed the financial matters and expressed their desire to 
supervise the' expenditure of tihe State^«
The third session of the 1876.Assembly, continued 
from January to July 6, 1879y was remarkable. After the 
8peech-fro»*the«tiirone and Its bold reply, people's ri^t to 
freedom and the delegates* right to participate in ^e 
formulation of the decisions concerning the future of ^eir 
country were discussed^* They asked the OoverzBBent to place 
its financial plans before the Assembly and to declare its
1* Rafi'iyOp*cit*y pp« 
2* Ibid*y pp* 190«>91 180-81
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financial policy* It was also u r ^  that a reduction in 
various taxes be laade^ * The delegates pretested against a 
decree Issued in January 1879, without ttie prior consultation 
of the Assesihly* In any public matter, they insisted, the 
delegates oust be consulted • It is significant that many 
of the bolder and outspoken delegates of the Assembly were
afrom ajsongst the disciples of al-Af^iani •
At this stage,feeling that the Consultative body 
vas changing itself into a true representative Assembly and 
hence mi^t prove a source of trouble to the Khedive, it vas 
decided to prorogue the Assembly* But the Delegates ^refused 
to disperse* They dessanded that vithout an inspection of 
the financial policy of the Oovenscent, they would not
4disperse * On March 29, the Delegates, in a %rritten protest, 
forwarded to the Khedive, requested that such encroachaent 
upon the rl^ts of the Assembly laay be reconsidered by the 
Khedive®* *Che Assembly, however, remained in session insplte 
of the opposition of the authorities*
Ihe sytaptoras of liberty and freedom wore easily 
discernible in ^ e  activities of the Assenbly* It fail^ 
to achieve any laurels, but It had begun to assert itself 
and was destined to play an important role during the height 
of the national oovefsent*
1* Ibid*, pp* 192<*942* Ibid*, p. 1953* Ibid., p. 184^* Ibid*, pp» 210*115* Ibid*, pp. 211*13
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It
In the early sevontlas, Dlcoy makes allusion to 
the appearance of a Mahdl In a village not far away from ^ 
the l»riks of the Nile In the nelj^ boiirhood of Kenehj ho waa
pious Bian who gained considerable following. Biis MaMi of 
the Sudan of later yaara, waa nothing more than an expression 
of dissatisfaction and resentoent a^inst the existing state 
of affairs involting religious sentiments in order to change 
the prevailing conditions* This ifehdi encouraged his 
adherents to refuse to pay the taxes to a ruler who, as he 
alleged, consorted with the Christians and henoe was himself 
no better than an unbeliever. Wext time, when the tax- 
collectors carae to that village, "they were driven away with 
stones and returned penniless."^ The uprising was, however, 
crushed down in its early stages, but it was an evidencee,
Ofirst of its kind , of popular unrest and reaction as early 
as the beiginnlng of the seventies* What is still more 
significant ia the character of the uprising which was 
anti-Christian* Obviously, by Christians, ttie Kahdi and his 
followers meant not the Bgjrptian Copts but the Buropeans, 
particularly the British and the French who were busy 
increasing their hold on the gateway of India*
1. Dicey, "The Story of the Khediviate", p. 318 2* Zaidan refers to another uprising in the province ofP&yyun during the reign of 8a*id Pasha, details of which are xiot available except the fact that it was quelled vary soon* (Zaidan, "Mashahir", vol* I, p* 28)
There Is yet another anecdote of the sane period, told by 
Dicey* Passing through a street of Calroy Dic^ saw a 
Derviath addressing a BK>b and reolnding of t^e glory of 
the old days **vhen Sg3rpt vas the greatest nation amidst the 
people of the w or l d . T h e  petty anecdote, thouj^ in 4ft 
itself not very significant, is iBsplicitly a crude expression 
of national coi^clousness*
Since 187L, al«Afghanl m s  there in Egypt* His 
antl»Buropean, or in its narrower sei^e, anti<«Christlan, 
bent of Bind was not a secret, and tinder his gaidenee cane 
into existence^a team of staunch filters against any kind 
of toTQtfca bondage* They hated the despotic rule of IsiKi*il 
and resented equally the ever increasing Suropaan hold* They 
held l3Bia*il responsible for this growing influeme of 
Western Powers as also for the deplorable conditions of the 
coBBPon people* Al-Af^iani had gom to the extent of suggest­
ing to Muhanoaad Abduh even to murder the Khedl'^ ra as he was 
the aain source of misery of the Egyptians^*
A moderate Constitutional mov^ient was led 
SherXf Pasha with Considerable following the educated
upper class* Sherlf, a veteran stataemni serving the 
Egyptian Cbvemment for twenty and odd years, and belelvlng 
in constitutional ^ ans, was }»>peful with Isoa*il*s decree 
of 12SS and very much satisfied with the new measures of 
extending the powers of the ^sembly and the Council of
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Minis tars. Bs vas hopeful that a Constitution vrlll, ultima tel] 
bo sancticnod for tho oonntir^*
Rosidoa, another ol^aont was that of th© B^ jrptian 
array. Sn’iS l^ 9ha had gl'^ ea to tlia mtlvos, tha sons of th© 
Pellahin, much cncouragaeient and had boon tay ir^ th«m into 
tho highop services of tho arEiy^ * When Ismail Pasha roTrersed 
the policy of hla nralocosaor, the Fellah soldiers jMiturmlly 
resented* Tho policy of 3a*id had eiaboldoncd thaa so nuch 
that thciy could i»t easily tolorato ai^ chango that would 
affoct theo adversely, The^ Ahyssiniaa disaster of 1P76 had
already dastroyod tha prostigo of the Khedi^ as well as of
jt
the high-ranking offlcors who were mostly of Tiupklsh descent* 
Th© Turkish-spoaking Circassians held alnost exclusively the 
higher posts, vfhllo tho ordinary soldiars and the subordimte
3officers were drawn from amongst the Arabic-speaking Pellahin , 
Thus a class feeling betwesn the tesTo sections grew stronger 
and more bitter.
1. Blunt, pp. 125-127
2. Rafi*i, "Asr Ismail ”, vol. I, pp. 30-31 citing frtna Arabl' 
"Kashf as-Sitar’% p. IS & speech of 3a*id I^sha addressing 
th© Bg3rptians In a banquet in Qasr an-TJli* as follows:
"Brethrenll hare peeped into the conditions of this 
Egyptian nation through its entire history, and I found it 
oppressed aafl ruled by alien nations* . . .  As I count 
rayself an Egyptian, it becoaros lncuat»nt upon ae to raise 
up the ch ild ren  o f  the soil suA m ko then civilixed so 
*rmch so that they become in a position to serve their 
country well and fe«l th-roselves Indopondont of foi*eigtwrs
• Rafl’i continuesj ’♦Conmontlng on this speech,
4rabl Paoha sa y s , that when Sa*ld finished his address- 
tho ’Notables and elites aaong the listeners came out of 
It f^ ii’ious and Msbarastied, while the facos of tho 
Kgyptians wore hrij!ht with dallght and happy news* He 
farther s^ys that ho counts this speech as the first 
stone of foundation of the siov«&ent, *Bgypt for the 
Sgyptiansi.SS
3. Blunt, op*cit*, po. 129-30
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As e^rly fts 1R76, the British Consul at Alnxendrla 
had pointed out the ©xtent of anlooslty that was prevalent
in BsTpt both vflth the a?»3 with ^ e  corrupt
0^ »Tr»?mrJont^ . Sincd 1^76, the fiTances of Sgypt had eomo 
unilor the <5irect <1ual r?ontrol of Pr«nce and Britain and the 
European CorBni.^ aiona of Inqialry intf>rv9r^ In the internal
of th^ country sino^ l«75, Pirmlly vhen the principl
»of Mlniataraal e^syyonsibillty was <!eer«9d in 1878, the 
E^ iropaan Control!srs vore taJc^ n Into the Oovernraent aa 
f1itl-fl*?fllsed Ministers* Thes« develoT'raents simp^ resulted 
In adding f^.iel to fire. The deposition of Sultan 4Mul Aziz 
of Turkey, the subsequent pror-^ uljjation of a Constitution 
in I>er:ej5t?er, 15^6 nii^ ht have had their reoercussions in Egypt 
a province of Tortcey, and the Kfyptian Constitutionalists 
Bight hav» tfilcen the «^ raatlon of Parliament in Turkey as a 
precursor to their own^ . The Russian-Turkslh War of 1877-78 
night have been one of the factors in creating still sK>re 
bittemo'ss apalnst the Christian Europe as also an awakening 
to their lr.sec*urity arjid^ t such international develonments.
•fnrr>‘
ttie first ilesponsible Gsoverraaont headed 1:^  Nubar 
Pasha opened the line of action to bo adopted by the 
discontented claaa, vhen in order to decrease the expenditure
1* Ln*T?ftnj op.oit*, pm 84; Seo also Chircl,cp,cit*,p. 75
2. For the pro?»rulf^ tion of the Constitution and creating a 
Parliarneht, seo Pears, ’Life of Abdal ’laHjid",py, 48*52« 
Later In  IB79, evidence proves that secret meetings were 
held and there it was agreed upon t>wt deinand should be 
made for a conttltution on the n»del of Turkish one.
( Bgypt. rto, 5, <1879) 65 )
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Of the State, T?\ibar dlacilssQd EiSOG offlcfiirs aijdl soldiers 
without clearing off their dues, lana'il, rym wooing to 
ovorthrotf the Nubar-Vfllson Mlnlatr'/, a?inag»d a plot cf aimy 
demonstration against tlia M i n i s O n  Fehraair 8, 1879, 
about 600 8t\3dents of the Military College, lod by Latlf Salia 
the Director of the College, marched twards ttie Hlnlstrv of 
Finance. They vere loinod by the dismissed soldiers and even 
some of the Delejrates of the Ass^bly# In all, about two 
thouswnd persons deFonstmted in frontof the office of the 
Ministry of ?lr»ca. When they saw ’^ibar, they cau^t hold 
of hia, assaulted hin pulled his aowstachs and boxed his ears* 
Wilson, the Finance Minister, who carqe to his rescue, was 
also treated likewise. These demonstraticns continued until 
the Khedive, on the request of the British Consul-Oeneral, 
Intorvoned personally. Re casie and addresssd the demonstrator 
and assured the unpaid soldiers for the j^ aysscnt of their dues, 
and then ordered them to disp^ srse, Aocordinjsly, the 
deraonstrators retired and the matter came to an end, Is!ca*ll 
thus succeede<1 in ’aaklncf the Europeans r lallze that without 
his assistance they were helpless and could not get oa single- 
handed, NUbar, however, had to leave the Presidenship of the 
Council of Mlnist*»rs^ * But the disconterwient of the people
1. Introduction to the Arabic Translation of Blunt*s "Sccrct History",p, !Ufi’l,op,cit,,vol, II,pp. 2C0-*O3j2O5jCrc]abr,op.clt.,vol, I, pp. 74-76579-P0| Arabl citod in r>l'UIlto,Op»C!lit., p.nafi’l says that in these dciLcnstratioiiS the Khedive was r^t privy in any sense* Crcffiier hesitates to give any verdict, but he suspects IsBia»il»s conspiracy. But Arabl openly neclar-es that Isim*il throu^ Sh^ln Pasha and £>hahln through his brother-in-law, Latlf Salln, Esanaged and planned it. This mich, however. Is certain that a discontentment was already prevalent and It could be easil
C o n t i n u e d . •
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continued as boforo, arxl few w»ire satisfied with the 
insignificant changs of tha hands^*
Popular Tinroat, at last, ©xpwi^sod itself in tho 
forTsation of vayious political sociotias, Txwi aost laportant 
of th&0SQ was tho sacr^t doolety of tha aray offleers, founds
2soraatirses in, 1876 'by All ae«3oubi -Uia Cwaaander of tha cavaliTr « 
Latflp, in 1S79| these Cffljors ccox*i3i!mt«d their activities 
wito the ClTillan Constitutionalists and other prcainont 
patriots, a-id foriaod an association which they called al<> 
Jaai//a.t al«^ at^ ni./-vra« *[5113 nariie was later chang<^ into
j5al«^ Iiizb tanl > i^ Q* the liaticnal "Party • This party was 
to coclKil the increaains foreign influame or rather the 
Chi’istian influence^*
On \pril 12, ir:70, the leafiing aeabers of the Party, 
having drafted a Ul£4tional Progranjse* presented it to the 
Khodlvo* tiie Prograrame vas signed W ooro than three huraJred
Continued froic page 64 s
exploited# What is raoro significant is the anti-Christian
charR'^ ter of the deinonstration. ’•Dt^ xth to the Ghristalan”, and
"Down vith the C^ iristian dogs**, were some of their slogara*
( tonn?, ou*clt*, p. 201 )*♦ * ¥ * ♦
1* Egypt 1?0, 5 ( 1879 ), pp* 65, 16^
2, 3akhoura,op.eit», pp. 99-100| landau,op,cit*, p* 76 
Another society, not strictly apoal:ing a politl*?al one,the 
Procnva.sons, headed ^  al-Afr?hanl« 187^73, is describod 
hy Landau as one of t-he important secret ssocieties* I^ t, 
actuelly it plaved little role In the development of 
Kgyntiiin nationalism* Anong its nonbers, there vore soae 
of the le>ading political figures of the day, e-g* Prince 
TaufTq, Is’haq, James Sanu'a, Abdus Salaei al»Mouelhi,
Muhanpad Ab^uh, Rherif Paaba, Batrus GhaliJ. Salim an- 
MtqqaRh, S*a^ ^^ ghli^ l y?»*! Sulaimn Ataza, But AMxsh 
hinself confesses ttiat it was never a T50wer in Sgypt* See 
Hlaat, ^Secret History*^ , p« 491,
3, Rafi*l, vol. TI, p.215 citing the news from the Daily 
at»Tiiarah dated April 1B79 !to* 214 and lio«316*
Continued••#••••••••
Notables, Uloraa, Officials and Uie anay Officers. Aaong 
the signatories^ thor*> wore 93 anay Officors, 72 Qovenmont 
Officials, GO Delegates of Uie Ass^bly, 60 Ulema and 
repi*eseiitativ0s of other roligionsy and 42 Ik^ tables £nd 
mei*chanta^ « Wilaony the Fiiiaiice Minister, had planned out 
a project for the solution of the financial difficiolties 
coiifronting the country^ • The iiatioiml Progranirne vras prepared 
in oppoftition to Wilson*s project, which had declared Egypt 
bankrupt* The Programme put forward a postifatve plan. It 
demanded an increase in the powers of the Assecxbly of the 
£>elegate3« It furt^ ier deioaxided that the 4sseiably should be 
modelled on European Parliaioentary lines with a Hes?>on8ible 
Sgyptian Ministry' # It is beleived, though doubtfully, that 
Isiaa*il*a consent had already be»in given to the draft-Prograaa 
That is wliy, he so easily agreed to accept* lie addressed to 
tlie diplomtic Corps that in accordance with tl^ie will of the 
Nation, ho intended to form a full->fledg3d Oesponsible g^yptie 
Ministry* It was uadorstood that for the fxilfilsont of this 
objective the European Ministers should go, and consequently 
they were released of their duties'^ * Taufi<i Pasha, who had
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1« ;*lari’i*, op*cit«, p« 218
2* Text of Wilson's Project In Egypt Ito# 3 (1379) t>p* 97-138
3. Grower, op.cit,, vol* I, pp* 100»lC«s Kgypt iio» 5, (1379),
pp. 72-03; nafi'i. vol. II, pp. 5^ 15-lS| l,aridaa,po* 87,8R,
4, ]>© Ft'ocinot, op*cit*,p« 175
Continued rrf>K» iwtKe lOr t i- r
4* Iiaboiillos, trie British Cons-il-Ck3E»j?aT^  writing to Lord
SallsJl»\a?y, his cheif, on April 1, 1876, sayss "Considerabl
acitation exist^ i here at the present jaosient* It ann«>ars '
that the Slsetkh EH-Bakrl holds laeotings at his house with
the object of excitins religious aniisrosity against the 
European Ministers* * (Egypt 5,1879, p* 65)
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5ucoes<'c'? %ibar as tho p.resld«nt o f  thf» Council
o f  M in is tsr s , renlgnw! S h ertf vas w ith  the
ta sk  o f  fo m liic  a fu ll-n a d g f* 3  Egyptian m in istry  "In oT^ oSl^ snci
to the positive wishes of t^-ie nation*”^  Ke was also authorisi
to  d ra ft a C onstitutSdn entiworatlng the rjovsrs o f  th« Assenblj
o f  t >?0 D o legatos, Th© now P resident o f  the Council o f  Hlnlst*
infoi'je'9^ the CoKirJssloners o f  tho Puhlio Debt th a t they might
resume th-sir d u ti« s  as Controllcips-Genaral o f  Hxperj^itui^ and
2R a cslp ts , vfhich offeT  th ey , howevori rerus^jd to  accep t .
Shari f  huiS a ls o  decl^r-ad th a t oven  i f  tha Kh<5(!ivo pt*«par9<!
o
to  got hack the ^ ro p sa n  I-iinlv^terSj hlti rK>vorrsr»0nt would not «
Tn tha laaarwJiilo, B r it is h  and ?re'ich Oovornmant wew
4mihappy a t  th^i etlsreisi'al o f  t l ie ir  ns^n • ’/ l ls o n , tho dlanissck 
Finance !!i?i5.;iter, persusidad. |?oth3cilufi to  a c t in  ord.i? ta  sav< 
th a i r  ia /es tiaan ts  in  S grp t, wlUch, Wllso.i;^ convinced thoK, 
wor© jeoper^liaec t y  the novr B<jyptlan FXm cial P lan, th« 
Hothachilda requQstofi tho Goverm3nt o f  Qormanjr to  intarvoti* 
on th<il? behalf* Blstsarck, accusin.^ l a a a ' i l  fo r an o’sen 
v io la t io n  o f an in te rn a tio n a l agreair.snt, forced the Gov r^raiMinl
j, 5
o f  B r ita in  panes to  s tsp  in  ursfl solvith-^ pn>ble®e . In tl
1* l4ettwr o f  I s m ’i l  to  th e European K in is t s r s , c l t ,  Cromor, 
vol* Ij p* 1C3
2. Ciroraer,p. 103} this provision of revival o f  the Control 
\/as agreed U'-on bot'taan the Toifsrs ;irgS S’£/»>t ( <^rypt !fo«3, 
’7^ : po. 1-^ 2 }
3 ,  ’fo , 3 , *7^5 V iv i^ n * 9  l e t t e r :  p» 5
4 ,  On \r>ril P5,v.v/9f S a lisb iiry  vrrote to  B r it ish  Agant in  Rgyi
t b ' i t  tho stop  hy tha Khadiva was not o iily  again st
the o f  1^ >78} i t  W9.s a l3o  a <?iseourtsay to  tho
Pov^'i *«• ( 3, 1879, pm 2 )
5. ®r. 'Hy 11, Cownt Miinstor of Gcrajiar wrot#? to Salisbury thi 
ar\ttr!|i'y a'stion o-^ the Vic^-Hoy of 3g/pt, takf^ n on April 
2 2, vas not dosirabl«5 tht he had isado ©noroacirnent upon 
th« rights of tho creditors without any previous agroeffienl 
ar^ that in .fotwr« Ha rri«iht proofed further on tha saae 
lines I ai»3 therefore action was t^essary* ( Eorptf No* 3, 
X87a, p. 3 )
words of Salisbury, "the goofrftphical sltimtion of Bgypt"^ 
forc^his OovenmQnt to Inteirvene. Th« Governiaents of Brltali 
and Fmnee appr<Htched the Porte and suggested the dissslssal 
of the Khedive. The Sultan, not strong enough to reject th» 
the 4nglo«Prench suggestion, and at the same tine belr^>
envious of the rising pover of Isna’ll, who was after all one 
of his vassals, readily suTwaltted to the will of the Powers. 
He was quite anxious to as ^ ert his authority, and here was 
an opportunity when the Powers had come with the overtures 
to depose the Khedive* Perhaps, he also feared that if he 
did not accede to the desire of the Powers, they might act 
on their own Initiative* On June 26, a telegram from His 
Majesty the Sultan deposed Isma'll and n£»alnated Prime Taufl< 
as the Khedive of Egypt In his place. The matter was settled 
without any reslstence on the part of the lOiedlve or the 
Egyptian people* It Is not surprising that not a single 
voice was heard In the co\mtry protesting against ttils 
deposition^* The people were tired of Isisa*Ilian fx>lltlcs, 
and although In his last days he posed as a protagonist of 
ConstltutloTmlslts and supporter of the national will, no one 
really believed in his sincerity and honesty of piirpose*
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1* Ibid* p* 4s Letter of Sallsbuzy to Lascelles, dated June 18, 18791 "llie fcaographlcal situation of Egypt as well as the responsibility which the English Qovernnsnt have in past times incurred for the actml conditions under which it exists as a State, make it Impossible for them to leave it to Its fate,**2« In his last moment of despair. Isma'll issued a decree on Jur» 25, increasing the art^ y to 150-000 troops| but iwne would believe It and the next day, the hour of doom was struck. ( Cromer, vol. I, p* 140} Young, p. 94 )
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Moreover the prestige of the Caliphal decree was still high 
in Egypt and no one dared challenge it# A Prograsme of the 
National Party published in Rovaober 1879, disclosed that 
Isna'il had asked the help of the Party, but it was too late^ . 
According to the expectations of the Constitutiona­
lists, ^ufiq annouxKsed after his accession that he would 
welcome a Constitut16n; but two months had hazily elapsed 
than he betrayed the cause and withdrew his words. Sherif 
had alroady submitted, in May-June, 1879, his draft-^onstituti 
It was discus !?ed and approve by tdie Assembly* Continuing in 
office, even aftar the accession of Taufiq, Sherif presents 
the Constitution to the new Khedive for his final approval* 
But the Khedive had, in the meazsrhile, completely changed*
The Sherif-Constitution consisting of 49 articles, 
laid down that the Ministers shall be responsible to the 
Assembly for all their decisions and actions, and that the 
Assembly shall discxiss, examine and apnrove or reject all 
laws as well as it shall contz^l the State Finances^* The 
Agents of the foreign Powers, who had in the meantime, 
overpowered the now Khedive, suSvlsed him to reject the pro|M>sS 
and he acted faithfully upon their advice* Sherif resignoS 
on the point of his honour •
Thus the question of the Constitution withered away* These 
events created despair and bitter feeling amongst the 
Moderates, who now tended to align themselves with the 
Sxtremists* The foreign Agents were afraid of another source
ise--------------------------------------------------------------------
1* Landaut op*cit*, p« 902, Rafi’i, op*cit*, pp. 227-293* The Powers had so much influenced the new Khedive, that ItBurope* Sgypt was considered to have come under the co*sovereignty of Britain and Prarwef see The gconomist. May 29, 1879.
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of danser; on August 34, 1879 they advised the Khedive to 
take laeasures against al«Afghanl* A^-Afghani was accordingly 
ordered to leave Egypt at onco^* With him Abduh was also
asked to leave Bgypt and remained In detention In his village 
The Powers had completely overshadowed the Khedive*
In September of the sai!ie year, however, the secret 
political society. Young Bgypt, run by Muhaismad Amin, Hahaud 
Waslf, Abdullah an-Nadlm, Adlb Is»haq and Sallra an-]laqqash 
published a "Project of Heforas presented to His Hlghi^ sss 
Tauflq I, Khedive «f0 Sgypt". Inscribing in detail the 
sufferings and the causes of sufferings of the people, it 
enus»rated the required reforms and the necessity of their 
IfiBsediate realization* It laid empahsis on the principles 
of separation of powers, complete Mlnisteiumjl Besponslbility, 
equally before law and creation of an independent and 
powerful Assembly of the Delegates * In Decanber 1879, the 
Young Bgypt published another boolclet which was devoted to
4the problem of freedom of Press •
On ifovoBber 4, of the sane year, the Ifatlonal Party 
published its manifesto. According to inforaiatlon given by 
the Swiss contemporay, Nlnet, tesldes the promineiit art^ 
officers, ar«Houbi, All Fel^i, Arabi, and Abd al A1 al-Hllmi,
2
!• Hashid Heza, op.cit,, vol» I, pp« 33$ Ahmad Amin, p* 762* Rashid Hesa, vol. I, p* 5613* Jerrold, ” Belgitan of the East", p. 116| Cf* The Timas,SerptOTiber 30, 1879} Landau, op.cit,, p* 1034, Landau, p* 1 ^
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there w«re some prominent civilians such as al-Baroudl^
e
S b ^ l t and M\ihammad Sultan, vho were rosi;K>nslble for the 
drafting of the nwnifesto^* Besides naking public the 
financial and educational schemes of its ovn, the Rational 
Party declared its existence as a Party that had ccMae into 
being in order to counteract the interference of the 
officials of the foreign Povers in the affairs of their 
country* It vas signed by *Aali”y and the authors were 
ifreparod to cone out openly^ slw)uld a diplonatic prot«:tion
Qbe guaranteed •
These * gradual developmmts in the national oovement 
of Bgypt did r»t produce any imaediate results, Poreifpi hold 
over the country was increasing its grip day by day* Tkufiq 
had proved less resistant even than Isma*il* The Dual 
Control had been revived with much more powers to intervene* 
Itetionalists* hopes and aspirations were still unrealised*
1. Ibid., P* 1052« Ibid*, p* 106
C H A P T E R  III
A NATION ,13 BOM _ i THE REVOLT
" ... temporary obstructions In the Canal could be easily removed, but the question is not the removal of an occasional obstacle, but what precautions waia would be necessary to counteract a hostile power who would- if able to place one obstruction, be able to place many more and render the traffic unsafe, and impossible. The only security would be to deny all access to the Canal to such a source of danger.'*
Report: Confidential
( on the eve of military operations,July,
»82.) p. 214
With the accession of Taufiq to the Khedivial throne, 
a new era had begun, A new system of government, in concert 
between Cairo, Paris aiKl London, was being established. In 
place of Anglo-French Ministry, a system of supervision was 
adopted in which British and French Controllers-General, 
nominated by their own respective Governments, were to supervi! 
the Egyptian Ministry^, Thus with the revival of the Dual 
Control, 'pulling of the strings* was again resumed in its
1. Dicey, ‘'England and Egypt”, p, 23
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older form. The Khedive had very little power and had
completely submitted to the will of the Control^. As Gladstorw
2described it, a “political control” had been established 
over Egypt,
On October 16, 1879, British Foreign Office communi­
cated to Malet, the new Constal-General, some basic instructions 
defining British policy towards Egypt* It is a remarkable 
piece in the history of British diplomacy, '^or the first tine, 
British Government openly came out with a declaration of their 
vested interests in Egypt and making arrangements for their 
safeguards. The instructions emphasised the maintenance of 
Egypt’s neutrality as well as the continuance of status quo 
in Turco»Egyptian relations and the autonomy of Egypt, At the
same time it was made clear that as a lost resort, British
2intervention in Egypt was not altogether out of question.
As a matter of fact, Britain as a nation felt bound, by her 
Imperial interests, not to let the Suess route slip away into 
the hands of any other power, and possess it whenever a chance
4arose , But, hitherto, the presence of France as an equally
1, Chirol, "Fifty years in a changing world”, p, 31| Malet, 
op,cit,, p, 55; De Precinet, op,cit,, p, 183
2 , cit, Cromer, op*cit,, vol., I, p, 1^1
3, Appendix I,
4, Dicey was one of the sincerests spokesmen of Imperialism, 
He launched an undefatigable campaign to occupy Egypt, The 
logic of his co-thinkers was quite close to the argument 
put forward by himself as follows*
”In order ,,. to secure our freedom of uninterrupted 
access to India across the Isthmus, it is essential that 
we should not only hav^ 'an unrestricted right of employing 
its \iTaters for war -ourposes but that the course from sea t 
sea as  well as its ports of ingress arwJ egress should be 
under our protection. No strategical knowledge is required 
to a-preciate the importance of control of the Canal to 
England,,,, The commaiKi of the Suez Canal involves of 
necessity the virtual occupation of Lower Egypt,,,,”
________ Dicey:Our Route to India
( an article published ini The Ninteonth Century,June, 
1877; Cf, "England and Egypt”, p, 305 )
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interested Power In llgypt, was a permanent source of anxiety
to Britain, and, inspita of their coordination of policies,
L
each delated the sincerity of the other; and here in this mutua] 
suspicion lay the only hope of Egypt's isurvival.
The situation was beconing almost intolerable for 
the Hatioalists* On the one hand, European influence was 
rapidly increasing, Ctei the other hai^, the common people of 
the country were being exploited by the native ta|>per class, 
namely the Turco-Circassian minority group.
The Egyptian army, while asserting itself against 
the Tfubat/ regime, had alr*oady tested its own strength. Besides 
with the deposition of Isma'il, the dignity of the Khedivial 
throne had vanished away. The man-in-the-street had been 
realising that even the Khedive was under a superior authority 
and liable to be removed whenever it pleased his superiors.
The Assembly of the Delegates had become more assertive, 
outspoken and bold. The Delegates were firm in their demand
for the Constitution which Taufiq had finally rejected. The
i
Constitutionalists, led by Shorif, were thus thrown out of ttie 
picture. With the exile of al-Afghani, the Uberal reform 
movement had also reached an early end just after the accessio] 
of Taufiq, We find, therefore, that the entire forces of the 
nationalists were concentrating round one single but daring 
symbol of Egyptian nationalism, namely, the Egyptian army.
The discontented elements among the moderate civilian 
Constitutidnalists were also rallying round this new and 
vigorous movement led by the native army officers, " If the
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popular moveniant has expressed itself*’, remarked a contemporar 
"it is "becauiJe, in the first place, the army is a national one 
and in the secord place, it is tiie only force tliat is in 
syiapftthy with the native popiilation’*^ *
Early in 1880, Riar., the President of the Council 
of Minister, decreased the nunber of the troops in order to 
inaliie up the deficit of the State ‘budgest. Most of the victims 
vcre of native origin. Of the remaining, the fellah officers 
were kept on half pay, while their Circassian colleagues were 
still getting full pay. On May 20,1880, the fellah officers, 
Ahmad Arabi being one of them, presented to the
Khedive a petition for the redress of their grievances 
regarding pay and promotion, !Ehe petition was well received
pand vras supported by the French Consul General •
In January 1881, after tialet got the abolition of the 
slavery sanctioned by the Khedive, a paper appeared with 
caricatures of Riaz, Taufiq and Malet; Riaz was shown dancing 
before the Khedive and saying, "I liberate your black slaves 
to please the Englsih, buift I give you white ones,,..” Now 
a situation had reached when even good actions v/ere suspected 
and not v^ elcomed, if done by, or with the help of, the 
foreigners.
1, Jerrold, ”The Belgium of the East", p, 31
2, Blunt, ^Secret History", p. 134; Rafi'i, "Arabi", p. 76j 
Yoiing, op.cit,, p* 106; Slgood, op,cit,, p, 106
3, Malet, " Eg3T)t ", p, 93
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The Riaz Ministry, supported by the Anglo-French 
Consuls and supporting them in turn, was unable to solve the 
various problems • lliey all looked after finace alone and 
nothing else. The Fellahin were still being governed by Kurbasl: 
aiMl their iraiebtedness increased rapidly. In the new circums- 
tanc€{^  the time-honotired pro-Circassian policy was too bitter a 
pill to be swallowed easily. In the Riaz Ministry, the War
ndepartment was entrusted to a stauch Turkish Pasha, Usman HifquJ
whose attitude towards the Fellah officers was that of open
2hostility • Allusion has already been made to a petition of th( 
Fellah officers compliaining the preferential treatment of the 
Government. Resentment against the Turkish speaking Circassian 
class becaxae more acute with the accmulating bitterness against 
the increasing foreign hold.
On May 26, 1880, Malet liad reported to his Government 
the numerous intrigues affiot to upset the Egyptian Government
and the European influence. It became so embarassing that Male1
and de Ring made representations, on behalf of their respective 
Governments, and requested the Khedive to look into the matter.
1 , ”4 man of old regime**, believing in the”most absolute forws 
of governamBiit... by espionage, police rule, arrests and 
deportations"; and yet he was a patriot according to his owi 
conception, am served the Dual Control ”to recover Egypt 
from its financial misfortunes... and so get rid of the 
foreign Intervention.” (Blunt, on Riazj op.cit,, p. 128 )
Wallace describes him as of no broad views or political 
insight; that he was used as instruiaent by the Dual Controli 
and that he believed in enlightened despotism. (Wallacet**Sg3
and the Egyptian question”, pp. 157-58)
2, Malet, op.cit., p. 64; Blunt,op.cit., p. 483
3, Malot, op.cit., p. 34
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In order to cnrb down thesa ’sutverslve' activities, 
the European-Circassian regiirc rasiined its rapressieva naaaures. 
Some trouble-makers wore exiled, anrJ savoral otharo were sent 
behind the bars^* Hasan Monsa al-Aqqad, a friend of Ahnad Arabj 
was exiled to the ^ .•Oiite Nile for signing a petition on tiie 
abrupt discontinuation of the Muqabala arrangenents* Another 
person Ahnad Pehnl, was also treated IjJcowise for a siciilar 
petition. Many others/rid of^ on some pretext or the other^ * 
These strong measures had their natural repercussions as well ai 
reactions.
li
It was the dawn of the new year 18S1 that saw the 
storm of the national insiir^ ence burst, Ahmad Arabi, ona of tb 
leading Fellah Officers, learned through a friend that he, 
along with his fellow Fellah colonel, Abd al-Al Hilmi, was 
soon to be dismissed. The tvro Fellah Officers accompanied by 
Colonel All Fahmi, the cheif of the Palace Bodygaurd, went to 
Riaz to launch a complaint against and to demand a dismissal of 
the Minister of War* Hiaz promised to enquire into the 
situation?
To avail his last chance, Usran Hifqui sent for the 
leading Colonels to partake in the arranjjemants in connection 
with a royal wedding. They were to come to Qasr an-Nll where
1, Ibid., p, 55
2, Arabi cit, Blunt, op,cit,, p,484
3, Rafi'ijop.cit., p*84| Malet,op,cit,,pp,97-99} Blunt,op,cit, 
pp, 135-36,485
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arrangeciGiitr. had already" baen niada Tor tiieir ai-rest* But the 
Offloors got an iraiication of the rwal objective beforehand 
and gave instructions to their troops for the timely interve­
ntion* They called on the Minister of War, They were arrested 
and disarmed, but Imodiately the rescue-regimant rushed in 
and released theia^ * Rifqui tooj; flight and the Colonels ”raarched
back at the head of their troops and with drums beating, to
2their barracks,” !Then they approached tJie K3iedive and demaMe
the difsraissal of RifQui. The Khedive acceded to their demand
and replaced him by Kalmud Sami al-Baroudi who was on friendly
terns with the Colonels and henceforward became one of them,
A Circassian by descant, the son of a wealthy father,
Ilasan Hush I al-Baroudi, Mahmud ;lami al-Baroudi was well educate
proficiant in Turkish and Persian languages and a highly cultur
person. He had served for a long time in the foreign xMinistry
at the Porte, When, u^st after his accession, Isma'll visited
the Ports, Sami returned with him to Sgypt and became a
Qa’lnaqara, In the first Ministry under Isjoa'il's successor,
3he became Minister of 4\/qaf • No» in February 1881, he also 
became Minister of War,
1, Blimt, op.clt., T5p, 137-38
2, Ibid., p. 13B
3, Sanii vras a Constitutionalist of the ShorifIan group. VIhat 
he had al^ rays intoddod from the beginning of the mbvemQiit 
was an Ejpryptlan Ropublic on the model of S’.'fltzerland, (Malet, 
pp. 150-51;, He is held as the pioneer nationalist poet as 
also the father of modern Arabic poetry. From him stetnmed 
out the stylo and diction of modern Sgj'TJtian verse. He is qtuoted at length whorein he nenlfcsts himself in the form 
of an ardent Nationalist poot. His Divsn is amongst the 
classics of moder Arabic literature (Dasuqlj ”Mahi!nid «aml 
al-Baroudi”, pp, 47-43^ al-Aaqad,op,cit,, pp.l2,121j See 
also, Blunt, op,clt,, p. 492)
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One of the pioneer Constitutionalists, dating back
from the days of Ismail, Sami vras a close friend of Shefif
and belonged to the same school of thought^ • He did not come
in personal contact with the insurgent Colonels until late in
February 1881, since when he became the guiding spirit of the
rising national movement^, aunanarising the aspirations of
Sami, Elgood sayss "He mediated the overthrow of the Khedive,
the ejection of the foreign Controllers and the establishment
3of an Egyptian republic with himself as president.”
It was from February 1st 1881 onwards that the
4authority of the ruling class remained no more unquestioned* 
From that day onward the natives became more conscious of their 
power. Ahmad Arab! emerged as a public figure arei, within a 
short period, obtained an unprecedented popularity among the 
backward and downtrodden peasantry, whom he represented so 
truely in person as well as in his new role®.
Bom in 1840, the son of a village ShejJch, Ahatad Arab 
studied for two years at al-Azhar, Vfhen fourteen, he was taken 
into the army service. This was the period of 3a*id who '♦wantei 
to have as many as possible of the sons of the village sheykhs,
g
and train them to be Officers." The young Fellah soldier was 
given a rapid promotion* At eighteen, he was captain and at
1. Abduh to Blunt* in Blunt, op.cit.,p.492, also, p.328
2. Ibid., p. 486
3. Elgood,op.cit.,p. 70} see also. Blunt, op.cit.,pp.343-44 
4* Malet, p. 103
5* Blunt, op.cit., p. 154-55
6. Autobiography of Ahmad Arabi cit. Blunt, op.cit.,p. 481
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twenty he became Lt* Colonel. A year before his death, the
Pasha made hlfc A,D,C,, aral Arabi accompanied the Pasha on his
journey to Medina^,
Isma*ll*s policy was quite the reverse of his
predecessor. He always favoured the Turco-Circassians and
hence no native officer, Arabi being no exception, could get any
promotion. Dissatisfied and discontented with the Abyssinian
disaster and its after-effects, Arabi began to take interest
in active politics so as to save his countrjrmen from ruin^ *
He came in close contact with some of the distinguised disciples
of al-Afghani and prominent members of Shefif group* Soon he
began to emerge as one of the important figures in the national
liberation movement} with him the other army officer were
Ali ar-Rubi, Ali Fehmi and Abd al-Al Hilmi.
As compared to other officers, Arabi was better
educated, was courageous in action and eloquent in speech, and
his qualities had impressed his colleagues. As early as 1862,
when he had accompanied Sa*id to Medina, he had acquired a
glimpse of politicojriational consciousness, Reading the account
of the French victory over Egypt in the "Life of Bonaparte" by
Col. Louis, Sa*id passed a remark about the cowardice of the
Egyptians who were overcome by thirty thousand Frenchmen only*
Arabi studied the said book overnight and then argued with the
Pasha that the French victory was simpl^y due to their better
organisation and that the Egyptians could match than if only
2organised •
1. Ibid., p.484j see also, Zakhoura, "Kitab Mir’at al’Asr fi 
Tarlkh wa'r-Rusum wa Akabir Rijal bi Misr”,p. 103
2, Autobiography of Arabi: Blunt, op.cit., p. 482
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When In 1880, the army officer made a petition,
Ajabl was In the forefront. Again, In the demonstration of
February 1881, he led the agitation. The next few moAths
that followed the Qasr an-Nil incident were full of political
activities on the part of the nationalists, ka has already
been said, Arabi and the Constitutionalists or the member of
the National Party had cone very close; Muhanmad Sultan,
Sulaiman Abaza, Hasa^  ^Shere * i and Muhamriad Abduh were prominent
among them^, Abduh had been working in the staff of al»Waaa*i
al»Misrlwa since October 1880, and before the end of that year
he was nsade the sole incharge of the Paper as well as the
2Director of the Egyptian Press * Though he criticised the 
Egyptian government, he was not in favour of a revol;IJution 
which the array Officers had been aspiring for* To him, a 
Constitution granted by the Khedive within five years (i.e. not 
immediately) was enough to satisfy the aspirations of the 
people. He disapproved the overthrow of the Riaz Ministry lest
3some foreign occupation might follow the internal disturbances.
The fear of European intervention was not an improba­
bility. The take-over of Cyprus by Britain, the French invasioi 
of Tunis in April 1881 and the declaration of its protectorate 
over the western occupied portion, had left little faith in 
European morality. This in^sion of Tunis, moreover, had
Aawakened the religious sentiments of the Egyptians  ^But the
1. Abduh’s letter in Blunt, op.cit., p. 490
2. Ibid., p.493. When al-Afghani was exiled, Abduh was also 
detained in his village until his appointment at this post 
in 1880. (Blunt, op.cit,, p. 492)
3. Blunt, op.cit,, p. 493
4. Xbid., p. 123
- 82 -
rulers of Egypt were still isolated from the masses.
In July 1881, two Incidents precipitated the accumul­
ating popular discontentment. Ar\ Egyptian soldier was 
accidentally run over and died. His comrades took his body 
to the royal palace and demanded punishmentsf for the criminals, 
Taufiq took it as an encroachment upon his authority and ordere 
for the arrest of the rigleaders themselves who were sentenced 
to imprisonment* In sharp contrast stood another incident 
when ninteen Circassian Officers charged baselessly thir cheif, 
the Fellah Colonel A M  al-Al al-Hilmi, with the neglect of his 
duties. The charge made against al-Hilmi was proved manufacture 
and entirely baseless, and yet no action was taken against them 
Inspite of representations by Arabi and his colleagues, 
nothing was done to reprieve the mtives or to punish the 
Circassians^. There were two extremes of severity and leniency 
In the month of August, the same year, the Times* Corressponden
frequently reported the existence of a feeling of dissatisfacti<
2and insubordination in the army .
Then, all of a sudden, Mahmud Sami was asked to resigi 
and to quit Cairo immediately. He was replaced by Da*ud Yeghen 
as the Minister of War. The Khedive and Riaz both disliked the
3increasing contact of Sami and the Fellah Officers . Sami had 
already made known to the Officers that his retirement from 
the Ministry would mean an active animosity of the Khedive
4towards them • Now, the new Minister of War ordered the Fellah
1. Rafi*l,op.clt.,pp.l08-10,113-.14i Roylej‘*The Egyptian Campai­
gns”, pp.l7-lB|, Malet*s letter to Granville in Malit,op.cit. 
pp. 155-56
2. The Times, August 17, 1881
3. Blunt, op.cit., p. 492
4. Ibid., p. 141
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Officers to be transferred from Cairo5 Rlaz had turned a personi
enetay of Arabi and everything dangerous that could be expected
was in the store^.
Indignant and enraged, the Officers decided to
overthrow the Riaz Ministry and to enact reforms in the
government* On September 9, on a notice of a few hours to the
foreign Consulates, the Egyptiam Ministry, and the Khedive,
Arabi marched with a considerable number of soldiers, towards
the royal residence, Abidin, and waited on the Khedive. He
demanded a change of the Ministry, an increase in the array up t
the permitted ( permitted by the Porte ) limit of 18,000 troops
and the con^vocation of the Assembly of the Delegates as a
2
Constituent Assembly to draw up a Constitution. There is some 
evidence that the Khedive had the previous knowledge of the 
demonstration, but he did not seem to have any inkling of the 
demands put forward. He hesitated, groaned, and looked in^ain 
for foreign help, and at last acceded to the demands, A 
corjpromise was reached to the effect that the demarsis were to
3be realised gradually and in stages ,
Rlaz was dismissed and fiRierif was replaced as the 
nominee of Arabi. His Ministry was to include the expilled 
Sami as the Minister of War. Sherif accepted the post on ttie 
condition that the aru^ should no more Interfere in the affairs 
of the government and that Arabi should leave Cairo with his
4insurgent troops and be posted elsewhere , Arabi consented to
1, Rafi'i. op.cit., pp. 121-22
2, 0sman Amin, "Muliammad Abduh”, p. 40t Blunt, p. 146
3, The Times,September 10,1881; The Aligarh Institute Gazette, 
September 13.18815 Blunt,op.cit.,p.145;Young,op.cit.,p.109 
See also,Halim Paslia’s remark ini The Nin;J;eenth Centniy, 
July 1885* “So Tewfik made his compact with Arabi and the 
Rlaz Ministry w^s upset." (The Ninteenth Century,July 1885, 
p. 736 )
4, Malet, op.cit., pp. 160-66
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this. In a farewell speech which he addressed to thv ,
he explained the aims of the Coup, namely getting rid of
despotism and the defence of the country and its freedom.
The entire population of Egypt hailed Arabi as their
Savior* Even the Khedive was happy with the changed situation
as in addition to all the changes, he had got rid of Riaz and
the active Dual Control* “Thuoughout Egypt a cry of jubilatio
arose such as for hundreds of years had not been heard upon
the Nile, and it/ is literally true that in the streets of
Cairo men stopped each other, thoggh strangers, to embrace,’
and rejoice together at the astonishing new reign of liberty
2
which had sudenly begun for them **•*'* jhe nows of a new 
era reachai villages from mouth to mouth and from pr»ss and
2plateform, and the people began to talk freely and jubilantly,
4Arabics influence was on the increase *
ill
From its very inception, the Fellah movement led by 
Arabi had a dual character of being anti-European as well as
1* "We stood with you and for you, demanding freedom of the 
country and the end of the despotic rule, and we would nol 
turn back until the country and its people get a new life] 
we did not intend to spread anarchy and disturbance, but 
when we observed that we had been encircled by slavery and 
degradation..., our patriotic zeal and thm Arab pride awol 
to defend the coiantry and its independence and tne rights 
of the nation. God Almighty helped us and orm lord and 
sovereign,the Khedive, accepted onr demands for the dismi­
ssal of the unpatriotic despotic Ministry and we were give 
the benefit of the Assembly of the Delegates so that the 
Kation might see into its affairs and feel its ri^ts like 
other civilized nations of the world."
( Arabi*s Address in Introduction to the Arabi< 
Translation of Blunt’s " Secret History",p.'
2. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 153
3. Ibid., pp. 153-54 (4) ibid., p. 153
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antl-Turco->Circasslan. Nov, the Tunisian tragedy completed 
by the beginning of October, *81, had made them quite vigilant
Even while demarKllng the dismissal of Rlaz, one of the charges
made by Arabl against him was that he ’*hoi sold Bgjrpt to
2
England.** Now, perclevlng the signs of storm, the xAtlve
Press carried a campaign against the Eur&pean exploitation.
3
•*411 OUT revenues are absorbed foreigners," wrote a paper. 
"All our merchants, all our high officials of the State are 
foreigners; they are the lords and we are the donkey-boys. 
They live happily and we live a life of degradation. They are
apaid well and we are paid badly."
In Britain, the progrsmme of the Nationalists was 
not seen with disfavour, as far as It can be judged from the
4reports of the Times. The probability of an Intervention was 
however being discussed In the lobbies and journalists* circle 
but the dominant opinion was that of a Turkish Intervention
c
if it becomes unavoidable . As late as December 26, *81, 
British Consul-General sympathised with the cause of the 
Nationalists and Interpreted It as asking guidance from Brltal
1. Sig. T^i, October 6, 1881
2. The Times  ^September 12, 1881
3. yie Times. November 16, 1881, quoting the Arabic Press of
Sgypt.4. The Times, of the month of November *81, particularly of
November 1.
5. The Times, September, 12-14, 1881
6. Malet, op.clt., pp. 211-12 f.n, t Despatch to Foreign Offl
dated December 26, 1881.
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In a Despatch of British Foreign Office dated Hovember 4, *81, 
it was made clear that Britain was in favour of status quo, 
and that the Powers should protect the development of existing 
Egyptian institutions provided Egypt fulfills her intemationa 
engagements, Tlhe Despatch concluded with the declaration that 
"the policy of Her Majesty’s Ctovemment towards Egypt has no 
other aim tlian the prosperity of the country and its full 
enjoyment of thjifet liberty which it had obtained under 
successive Firmans of the Siatan,.,,’^  3herif had it translate 
into Arabic and given it a wide publicity^.
Apart from this, there was another important factor 
which influenced the formulation of Western policies towards 
Egypt* it was Prance, Since the advent of the staunch Imperia 
list Gambetta to power, the French influence further increased 
How the probability was that of an Euroapean intervention and 
not a Turkish one; Gambetta, at least, was uncompromising on 
this point.
Indifferent of what Europe thought of their actions, 
the Rationalists inarched ahead on the road to reform and 
uplift of the country. Even the Moderates like Muhammad Abdul 
had ‘plunged into the battery-smoke ’i Al~Vaaa*i al-Misriyya 
was rapidly changing into a political paper under his editorsl 
ipj later on it turned quite openly into an organ of the new
1, Malet, op,cit,, p, 191
2, Ibid,, pp, 134«»85
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militant Nationallsn^. With the help of al-Waaa»if Abduh 
inculcated a spirit of patriotism among the common men, taught 
the people to love their country and roused their feelings
9of nationalism ,
Among other public educators, there were the leadin( 
journalists, Adib Ishaq and as-Sayyid Abdullah an-Nadim, Adib,
1, Ibrahim Abduhj ’‘Tatawwur Sihafat al-Misriyya**, p. 177
2, "Linguistically, Watan means, without exception, the place 
where the person lives; it is synonymous with the word
by those who study politics 
place after which you are called- where your right is 
safeguarded, and the claim of which on you/ is known, wher< 
you are secure in yourself, your kin and your possessions. 
It has been saidj 'There is no Watan without freedom*.
La Bruyere, the French philosopher said: »There is no Watai 
properly speaking, compatible with tyranny, but only prival 
interests, personal glorification and exalted places. Watai 
was defined by the ancient Romans as the place where thei 
person has rights and political duties.
This later Roman definition does not contradict the 
saying that therms no Watan without freedom. They are 
indeed identical. Freedom is the right to fulfil the knowr 
duty, and if it does not exist there can be no Watan, sincc 
there are no rights. When political duties exist, then 
they imply the existence of both right and duty, which are 
the motto of all the Watans to which lives and possessions 
are sacrificed, and which are put before kin and friends; 
in generous souls, the love of Watan reaches the height 
of adoration and ^ssion.
But the aboda where the dweller has no rights, and 
where he is secure neither in his life nor in his 
possessions, is, in shatt, the resort of the powerless- 
and the abode of him who can find no way to another; if it 
grows bigger, there is no ease, and if smaller, then life 
inXfi it cannot become worse,.,. It has been (justly) said 
that the relational ending*!* in Misri  ^Inglizi  ^Fransawi. 
is of a kind which inspires regard and jealousy in the 
heart of the Egyptian for Egypt, of the Frenchman for Franc 
and of the Englishman for Englam....”
( Abduh*s article "al-Hayut as-Siyasi3ra** appearJ 
in «al-Waqa'i« of November 1881. Cit. Rashid 
JtazSi, vol. II, pp. 194-95 )
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( 1856-1884 ) a Damascene by birth and Christian by religion, 
came to Bgypt in 1875 and immediately entered into al-Afghani* 
circle. With his friend Salim an-Naqqash, he started his 
papers Misr and at-Ti.iarah. He was exiled by Isma’il and 
in his exile he issued another paper al-Qahira from Paris,
Prom there he proceeded to Beirut and, after the success of 
the Nationalists, returned to Sg3rpt towai-ds the close of the 
year 1881. He was then appointed Nazir in the Ministry of 
Education and was allowed to reissue^ his Misr, Which he 
forthwith began to publish. Later, when he was elected 
Secretary to the Constituent Assembly, he had to reliquish 
the responsibilities of editing the paper and handed it over 
to his brother. He was among the pioneer political thinkers 
who were responsible for the political awakening of Bgypt 
through the press; and his paper, quite popular in the country 
contributed much towards educating public opinion and inculca­
ting a general political consciousness*
Abdullah an-Nadim ( 1845-1896 ) was the foremost 
leading journalist ara3 the spokesman of the Nationalists, His 
was a significant role in the Nationalist revolt itself. He 
was born in Alexendrla and came from a poor family. Fond of 
knowledge and learning from his boyhood, he came to Cairo 
where he made acquanintance with Abdullah Fikri, Mahmiid Sami
1, Adib Ishaq* "Ad-Durar” (edited by ‘Auni Ishaq, Beirut,
1909, pp. 453-54),- pp. 200-201: 453-54: Adib*s statements 
on WataniyyaCt a literal ditto to Abduh*s ideas.
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al-Baroudl and other eminent poets and authors. In 1879, he 
rettimed to Alexendria where his f^riends MuhaBsoad Amin and 
Mahmud Wasif had organised a secret political party, Misr sil- 
Fa tat ( the Young Egypt 5 by name» ^  joined the Party and
began to write on political issues. Tired of the secrecy of
the Party, he soon left it and founded a socio-educational 
organisatiAn, al«»Jamiryat al»Khairiyyat al«IsLawiyya> He also 
founded a public school for which he/^ ot subsidy from ttie
1Khedive, But his uneasy nature forced him out of it as well •
Now he began to weite in al«»Mahrousa and al»*Asr al-
Jadid which were being edited by Salim an-!iaqqash after the
closure of Misr and at-Tiiarah. Since January 1881, he began
to publish his own weekly, at Tarikit wa*t» Tabkit^  which,from
its very start, began attacking violently the *Tadakhkhul al-
Ajnabi* (foreign influence) and the Westernised Egyptians who
2blindly imitated European culture. Later, on the advice of
Ahmad Arabi, he started a new paper at<-»Ta*if from Cairo, which
was held by the nationalist leaders as their spokesman.Through
at->Ta*if. an-Nadira di.sseminated the ideas of constitutional
government and educated public mind in the art of self-govem-
3ment . However he performed his more important role during
A.1, 25aidan» "Mashhir ash-sharq", voL, II, pp. 95-96; Rafi'i. 
»)p, 513-20; Xhmd Amin* "Zu»aoa al-Islah fi *Asr al-Hadit± pp. 211-13
2, Ahmad Amin, op.cit., pp. 213-lS; Zaidan,op.cit.,vol. II, 
p. 97; Bustani, ”Da*irat al-Ma*arif**, vol XI, p. 534; 
Bamza, ”As-Sihafat wa*l Adab”, p. 32
3, Ahmad Amin, op.cit,, pp, 222-23; Blunt, p. 164
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tho Ang^ -o-Sgyptian clash that took place in May-July 1B82 •
As for Arabi, tha 5r.ovement led by him had now
become a mass-movement* It aimed at ’the liberation of Egypt
2from Europjz^ ean Control, and a Constitution.” A recent visit 
of the two-Bien Commission from the Porte in October 1881 had 
given to the Sultan a good impression of Arabi and his
3Kovament,
On December 11, 1881, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, the
4Engl/S\l/h poet^  author^  and ad«entui*fer, met Arabi* In his very
1
1, As a speaker. an-Nadim had no rival, and since the 
declaration of the Constitution, he spoke of"6 and on about 
the Constitution ,despotism and democracy, and explained 
the wa:''s aiid means of retaining independence. In the crisi 
period of May-July, *82, his amotionalism knew no bounds, 
An-Hadira was hear^  0ver3rwhere, among students, common peopL 
Ulema and the people of the upper class, speaking on the 
burning question of the day and making them alive to the 
approaching danger. Till the last moment, he continued his 
struggle. Ha ’^as at Tel al-Kabir iinder the command of Sami 
After the defeat of the Rationalists, he was the only 
prominent figure who did not surrender, and paid a high 
price for his jjatriotism. Remaining underground for quite 
a long time, he was, at last, arrested, but was soon 
rejfLeased by the IQiedivftal order. He tried in vain to 
renew his nationalist activites even after the British 
occupation, and, finally, seeing no scope,left Egypt for 
the Porte, where he got a Government ,job. He died there in 
1896, (Zaidan, vol. II,pp. 97-99} Ahmad Amin,pp. 224-26)
2, Malet*s letter dated OctoberlO,»8l in Malet,op.cit,,p,170
3, Blunt, op.cit.. pp. 155,496
4, Blunt (d. 1924).the author of various valuable books on
Modern Egypt and other Near and Middle Eastern Countries 
and allied subjects, served in the British Agency since his 
18th year of age, and for 18 yoars he remained attached to 
diplomatic services wheico he retired in 1859. After his
retirement, travel became his hobby. During 1873-78, he
travelled through Turkey.Algeria.Iraq,Arabia.Syrla,India, 
Aden and Egypt, At the close of the year 1881,he reached 
Egypt with an intention to leave it soon, but, he had to 
prolong his stay for several months as he indulged into 
Egyptian politics on behalf of the Nationalists. He witne­
ssed the nationalist drama and was himself an important 
actor of the whole performance. During the bad days of the 
Movement, he did all in his power to help it to the last 
moment. He went to London to represent the entire situatic
Contd,..... .
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first moetlng ha was captivatsd Ir/ his personality am saw 
In his movement a real national upsurge* Henceforth, Blunt 
mde the Bgjrptlan national cause his own.
On Docociber 18, Blunt drow up a draft in the forai 
of a Programme of the national Party, thus presenting the 
aims and ohjectives of the simple movement in European 
terminology* This Pronraame vas based on the ideas expressed 
by Arabi, arjd In its final form, it was approved by I4ahiHud 
Sanl, Muhaomad Abduh and Arabi. On 20th December, it was seni 
to British Premier, Gladstone, and a copy of the same was sen1 
to the Times for publicatyion. The six-point Programme coverec 
the acceptance of the existing Turco-Egyptlan relatlons| 
allegience to the Khedivial Gfivernment, but not to despotisia| 
acceptance of the Egyptian indebtedness to foreign bondholderi 
confession of advantages derived from European Financial Cont« 
rol, and yet desiring for an early replacement of foreigners 
by the Egyptians themselves who coul^  shoulder the same 
responsibilities even more efficiently than tliose foreigners* 
It was made olaar that the National Party was a political 
and in no sense a religious party, and that its comprised the 
representatives of all creeds. The Programme insisted upon 
the increase of the Egyptian army upto the agreed limit of
Continuad fram rage 90.
truthfully and in its real perspective to the British 
authorities, aiyi sent Sabunjl, his Secretary, to Egypt to 
continue his work and keep him in touch with the day to day 
developments. At last tho battle was lost and he was also 
a silent spectator like other helpless nationalists*
( Introduction to the Arabic Translation 
of Blunt’s “Secret History”, pp* 3-7 ),
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18,000 men, lastly, it was declared that the general er»l of
the National Party was the intellectual and moral regeneratioi
of the country^*
As regards the Buropean financial Control, Arabi*s
viewpoint was that it must not come in the way of national
2reforms ""by supporting the Khedive’s absolute rule," Towards
the Porte, the Nationalists looked with suspicion and conteopi
But the immediate danger of Buropean intervention had made
them cautious, and they paid at least their liphtMaage to the
person and sovereignty of the Sultan. * e^ are all children of
the Sultan", said Arabi, "and live together like family in
on© house. But, just as in families, we have each of us
provinces of fee empire, our seperate room whichis our own
to arrange as we will and where even the sovereign must not
3want o'iLy intrude*”
iv
On the whole the national movement led by Arab! and 
his collegues should have been appreciated from humanistic 
point of view* But the age of Imperiallsra weighed everything
The Iliaes, Jan\aary 3, 1882; Jerrold, "The Belgium of the 
i^ti Appendix V;
S, Blunt,p* 173 quoting Arabi
3, Jerrold, p. 113
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In t<»rms of increase or decraaso of th® area of influence.
Slowly the British papcjBS ciiaiigad their attitide and launched
a violent propaganda against the Movement* It vras represented
as a raere creation of an ^ambitious soldier,**^  At the same
t5jjie letters from Cairo appearinc in those papers confessed
that the Movement was not the least fanatical, that it had in
Its fold leaders like Arabl frois the array, Sautti from the Minis
try, and the Uleoa from al-Aziiar, and that it treated the
question of European Control quite separately from the demand
2for a Constitution, The Movement had spread from village to
3village with its slogans ‘Egypt for the Egyptians.* Inspite
of all its genuinness, the Imperialists were, however, not
in a iQood to tolerate a Movement which was a source of peril
to tiller own ultiiaate alas.
As for the increase in the amy of 18000 troops
pressed by the Minister of War, there ware objections raised
by the Controllers on finacial groiands, A compromise was,
however, reached ttirough the mediation of Blunt, by virtue of
which the amiy budget was raiuced from the proposed £ 600,000
to £ 520,000, It was accepted by Arabi emd his Party and the
4problem was thus solved •
In the meanwhile, Gaiabetta, the French Premier, was 
dreaming a North African Empire, and towards this aim, he 
persixaded British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville for a
1, i^ll Mall Gazette of London December 1881,cit,, Jerrold, 
p»p, 120-24
S , Ibid, , p • Xol
3, Blunt, "Secret History**, p, 177
4. Ibid., pp, 159-61,183
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joint Intervention in Egsrpt, Throughout the month of 
December, he strived for the sarae and at last he succeeded 
to the extent that the two Governments should address a Joint 
Note to their respective Agents, in Eg]rpt, *he draft of which 
vas prepared by AGambetta hiraself. In a threatening language 
to the Egyptian Govemaent, the Toint Hote aaid, "ISie Bnglsish 
and French Ctovernments consider the maintenance of His 
Righaess on the throne on the tarms laid down the Sultan’s 
Pirmns,,,, as alone able to guarantee*,, the good order and 
the developirsent of general prosperity.,.. The two Governments, 
being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their 
united efforts against all cause of complications, internal 
or external, which might menace the order of things establishe 
in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly give for 
their formal intention in this respect will tend to avert the 
dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be 
exposed, and which would certainly firnS France and England 
united to oppose th^. They are convinced that His Highness 
will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength 
which he requires to direct the destinies of Egjrpt and its 
pfople,"^ This Note was published in the Egyptian papers 
on January 8, 1882.
While the Powers were busy devising means to strike 
at the Rational l-£ovement, the proposed Assembly of the 
Delegates had come into existence, the Delegates being elected
1. Malet, op.cit., pp. 217-218
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tmder the KLcctoral Law of 1366. The Assembly was to E»*t
on Decenber 2^  ^1891. The session began, and the Assembly
started drawing up the Constitution, tho desKinfl for which
had already been accepted by the Khodivo in principle. Sherif
presented to the Assorcbly tho draft-Constitution drawn up by
a coiraiiittee of the Delegates and revised by Shefif hiCTsalf,
It was a liberal Constitution and yet it did not enumerate
the powers of the Assembly. The Delegates, ho\/ever, pressed
thair rights to discuss an<?. vote the budget, at least that
half of the bud^ o^t which did not pertain to any intomational
obligation. Sherif, afraid of some foreign intervention on
this point, declined to co that eiitent ajod resigned on
?ebi*uary 2, 1882^*
In the meanwhile the Joint flote had come early in
January and it constlti’ted an open challenge to the popular
forces. \-fiiQn published in Aj?abia, it created a wide-spread
indignation against Europe. •”Rio person cheifly blamed is
the Khedive’*, reported the British Agent, "who, it is alleged,
requested me to obtain a declaration from aiy Gpvermaent of
othe nature contained in the message.”^  Cfeie of the imediate 
effects it produced was a complete union of all the nationalis 
forces hitherto working in different directions. The army, 
tlie Assembly, the Ulema, all wvere united to face the
1. aal’l’i, op.cit., pp. 18G-209
2, Malet, op.cit., p. 227* letter dated January 10, *82
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ftpT>roachinp; danger* Everyone had the suspicion that 
pretxiratlons were being raade to stage the Tunisian drama once 
a^ln in Ef?rpt^ , The Movement, started as a simple liberation 
strugi^ le, was forced to change into an anti-European and 
ftnallv Into an anti-Christian movemenl?.
In the Assejnbly, the heated discussion on the 
Sherlf-Constitutlon was in its full swing when the Joint Note 
eawe only to add fuel to fire. The Note had completely 
nepl.ftcted the existence of a representative Constituent 
Assembly* It was received with bitter feelings and in reactio 
the Assembly dernanded control of the State budget and a full-
3fledfod Mlnlsterail responsibility •
The Powers were perturbed as there vras no clear-cut 
line cf action. British Agent in Egypt was not against the 
demand of the Assembly i*e, to discuss the unmortgaged part 
of the b\3dget. Granville himself was not yet in favour of 
any European intervention* Moreover, on January 31, Gambetta 
had resigned and was succeeded by de Frecinet who,like 
Granville, was equally opposed to any intervention, whether
4European or Turkish • But they could not let the things slip 
away from their grip, nor did they have any solution of the 
problem they faced^ *
1* Btlim, op*clt«, p* 736
2. Blunt, op.clt,, pp. 139-«30j Malet, op.clt,, pp*226,228-33
3* Malet, op*cit*, p* 2404, Malet, op.clt.. pp* 257-58
5* **The question to be considered is whether it is nost
detrimmental to our interests to lose influence and see
Customs,Posits,Telegraphs,etc., revert by degrees to nativ€ 
hands, or to favour a violent solution based on tho status
quo; both are bad enough.,,.** ( Malet, op.clt., p. 260* A
Despatch to the Foreign Office ).
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Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi succeed^ Sherif as the
President of the Council of Ministers, and Arabi was appointed
tlie iiQY Minister of V/ar^ , Oaa Febnmry 7, 3ami presented to
the Khedive the new draft-Constitution as approved by the
Assembly which the Sliedive reluctantly sanctioned. For the
first time in their history, the people of Egypt were given
a liberal Constitution which gave thaa full siiara in tiie
administration and the government of their country. It
enumerated the following principles in particulars The
Assembly's riglit to discuss and vote the legislation ( Arts,
25,30); right to discuss, examine and vote the annual li^ get,
with the exception of the Tribute to the Porte, the service
of the Public Debt and the obligatidns resulting out of the
Conventions and Arrangements with foreign Powers, ( Arts, 32,
34 and 35 )j right to vote every international Treaty or
Contract, ( Art, 38 )} and lastly, the principle of Mlnisteris
2responsibility, ( Arts, lS-22 ),
In Iferch, *82, the Electoral Law was enacted s 
Membership of the Assembly was raised to 125, Every hundred 
voters were to elect an Elector-delegate, and in turn these 
Elector-delegates were to elect the members of the Assembly; 
they were to serve a term of five years; they wore to elect
1, Other Ministers werej Mahnnad Fehmi, Mustafa Fehmi, Shure* 
Sadiq and Abdullah Plkri, See Rafl’l, op.cit,, pp, 274- 
75; alsct ^^ alet, op,cit,, p, 258
2, Appendix III; s^ e also: Sdirin Pears: Life of Abdul Hamid,
#pp, 48-52; p, 38. the power to ratify the treaties and
/contracts was not granted to the Chamber,
7Accordlng to Landau, "Parliaments and Parties",
- 98 -
their own President, for which they had to submit a list of 
throe candidates out of whoKi the Khedive should noiLinate 
anyone^.
Cri the whole, the 1882-Constltution was more tliat 
of the AssemTDly than that of tlie Government of Egypt; at its 
best, it enumerated the powers of the .Isseiably, It did not 
analyse the fjtructure of the governi.ient, and the position and 
powers of its various agencies, specially the Khedive, The 
Const5.tution presumed a preknovledge of the Khedivial authoril 
Wiat is nore significant is the fact that nowhere in the 
constitutidn, the name of the country i,e. Egypt, was 
mentioned* The makers of the Constitution lacked perhaps the 
perception of the division of authority anong th© throQ 
well-fcno'.m branches of govarnnant, i.e., the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary'j or perhaps they dared not 
encroach so nuch upon the Khedivial authority, specially in 
the prevailing peculiar situation of the ever-present Suropeai 
menace. Perhaps they could not go farther in their aabiguous 
position of complete autonomy under a nominal Ottoiaan 
sovereignty, Anyhofvr, inspite of its limitations, shortconiingj 
and dra-f-ybacks, as the first Constitution promulgated by the 
representatives of the ‘Bgyptian people themselves, it deserves 
Its due place in the development of nationalise in Egypt,
1, Rafi’i, pp. 254«55; Appendix TIT,
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The Movement had received a setback bjr some importar
dissenjiiions* Sherlf, after his resignation, was working with
the British Agent, against the Sami Government^, Muhammad
Sultan, President of the Assembly of the Delegates, had
ttirned antagonistic 'bQcaude he had not been given any
Ministerial post in the !liationalist fJovArr^ p’ent, But these
desertions were insignificant as coranared to the joint front
of the Egjrptians to save their country. The army which,after
the con^vocation of the Assembly of the Delegates, had gone
into the background, again came in the forefront and revived
its activity®#; Arabl, once again took the leadership of the
• 2Movement in his own hands , entire jnovement was speedily
acquiring a definite anti-European character, enlisting withii 
its fold members of every class and section of the people.
On February 13, a correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette
Iattended a political meeting wherein pronginent personalities 
like Sami, Tulba Ismat, All Fehmi, Abduh, Arabi and an-NadlA 
were present, An-Nadim presided at the meeting. Warning the 
large audience of fifteen hundred he saldt "Tell me, my friend 
did you ever read of another nation which von its liberties
3by reason and not by sword?** Then, a forrteen years old boy
made a speech pouring out abuses ajyalnst the Europeans and
charging how they exploited and looted Egypt like Spain,
aAlgeria and India,
1* Bl’int, op.clt*, paga 486
2, Malet, op.clt,, pp, 226,228-31
3. Cit*, .Torrold, op.cit,, pp, 167-72
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The last speaker was Muhammad Abdiih, He spoke on 'freedom 
a M  the Constitution** Such meetings were organised every 
now aiKl tlien.
Eie Government of Sami was running quite smoothly*
A series of reforms were being contemplated e«g. the abolitioz]
of corvee, protection from Greek usurers, and establishment
2of Agricultural Banks", The Ministers had presented to the 
Assembly a list of such reforms that could be put into actual
*3practice*'• A Fetwa in flavour of the abolition of slavery was
4soon to be passed • On April 6, Arabi wrote to Blunt* “We 
have made up oiAr mind to do all we can to give our nation a 
position among civilized nations, by spreading knowledge 
tlirough the country, maintaining union and good order, and 
adainistering justice to everyone*”^
In Britain, a section of the Press and public opinic 
was in favour of the Egyptian National Movement * Prior to the 
advent of S€uni to power, the Economist wrote* "Our best hope 
for future would seem to lie in gaining the friendship of the 
better elements in the Nationalist party, which may in time, 
provide, the nucleus of a healthy and independent Government,*
1, Introduction to Arabic Translation of Blunt, op,cit,, 
p, lOS^ f,n,, quoting de 'P'reolnftt,
2, Blunt, "Secret‘History", p. 233
3, Ibid., pp. 23^-33
4, Ibid., pi<. 254
5, Ibid., p. 247
Tannary-Febmary 15?B2
7. The Eco^mist. Janmry 14, 1882, p, 35
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Hdgardiag tlie 3oml Govorniue);xt tliQ same paper wrote on March 
IS a '‘The IJatioiial party are on thoir trial. It ia by their 
acts they must be jiadged. The interests this coun'toy has in 
Egypt are ooiaprisad laainly in the rigiit or way to our Saatarn 
provinces, for the mintenance of wiiich the existence of a 
Good govermaent, with all that is involv±a%ed in that word, 
are included• If these objects are secured, the natioiial 
Independence of Egypt is not a point which we ought to oppose.
As a matter of fact, nothing was insecure. On the 
other haM the opportunity was ripe to make Egypt a colony 
for tha Imperialistic gains, and all their uneasiness was 
simply because the emergence of a Nationalist government had 
jeopeidized this opportunity.
▼i
The lonpr-awalted or>portimlty came from a stran/?© 
quarteT*, In At)p11 1882, some Fellah officers were given 
promotions which embittered tiietr Clrcassalan colleagues, A 
few days afterv/ards, a plot was disclosed to Arabl, which was 
designed against th« lea/iers of the National Movement, l3ma*il 
Raghlb, the son-ln-la;/ of Sherif, was the main figure and 
Sherlf and tha doposed Isma’il were supposed to be privy to
i, Tlie Economist, March 18, 1882, p. 318
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tha p lo t ,  A p*i’ot3:-ct v as sought in  a decres fo r  the tran sfer
o f  nlno r?ircasslan o f f ic o r s  to  the Siida.Ti vho rofu53e4 to
procaed ’.'Tithotit prom otions. E ighty-one C ircassian  o f f ic e r s
v e r e  tak in c  part In th is  move. The entlr*^ p lo t  was, howevnr,
h etr iy ed  to  Arahi h f one o f  the C irca ss ia n s , The p lo tte r s
v sr e  tr ie d  and fo r ty  o f them ’*fero e c^ilof*! to  the Vfhite '^ile?
TTsman R lfq u i, tha former M in ister o f  t'far was one o f  them,^
To e?:ploit the s itu a t io n , the isfsne was < i^ven a
se r io u s  eo lo u r , !'!al0t ,  the B r it ish  A^ent, advised tha Khedive 
•L
to  w ithold  h is  san ction  to  the sentence fo r  exilem ent,A
Accordin?:ly, the Khedive d eclined  to  s ig n  the decree* His
r e fu sa l was a n e o n s t itu t io n a l. I t  enraged the N a tio n a lis ts ,
2s p e c ia l ly  because the stop vas talren on Suropaan ad vice .
Sstd5 convoked the Assemhly, and the D e leg a tes , se v en ty -fiv e
in  number, met in form ally  and resolved  hy fo r ty - f iv e  to th ir t j
v o te s  th a t in  case o f  K h e d iv e p e r s i s t e n c e  in  w ithhold ing
h is  san ction  to  the punishHer.t decrae, he should be inpoached
and deposed, l^arnmad Si:Lltan, the P resident o f  the Asseinbly,
vTavered and finally broke away from the TTationallstsj he had
3
bean won over by the Khedive ,
On the part o f  the Pcp^rers, arrangeaents vrere inade 
to  send th e ir  Jo in t Anj^lo-French f l e e t s  to  th© Egyptian waters 
In order to  p ro tec t the Sitropoans, to  safeir-^rd the p o s it io n  
o f  the Khedive and to  m aintain a s ta tu s  auo in  the event o f
1 , Bl'':ait, o p , c l t , , pp,
2 ,  I b id . ,  p . 338




'anarchy.* The fleets reached Alexendrla on May 20« However
in the midst of the threats, punishments to the Circassian
plotters were carried out,^
(M May 25, at last, an Anglo-French Note was
communicated to the President of the Council of Ministers
demanding the resignation of the Ministry, Arabics temporary
retirement from Bgypt and the retirement of two other leading
colonels, Ali Fehmi and Abd al-Al into the interior of the
2
country , The Note caused a bitter resentment and the 
Nationalists took an oatii in a formal meeting that they would 
remain united in the event of national crisis. Replying the 
Note, the Egyptian Ministry refused to comply wi-tti any of the 
requests. The Khedive, however, announced the acceptance of 
the Note, ai^, in protest thereof, the Sami Ministry resigned. 
The Khedive was compelled from all quarters of the country to 
reinstate the Ministry. The Egyptian troops at ALexendria 
declared that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi} 
that they gave twelve hours* time to the Khedive to reply to 
their demand|. and that after this they would not hold themself
3
responsible for public peace and tranquility .
On May 29, the Khedive made an annoimcement to 
reinstate Arabi as the Minister of War? other ministertes 
remained vacant for some time and were run by the under­
secretaries^, Raghib, a Constitutionalist belonging to
1. Malet, op.cit., pp. 326—27,335
2. Rafi*i, op.cit., p. 271; Malet, op.cit.. p. 358* Itelet 
has given the name of *Abdollah Pasha* in place of Abd al- 
Al.
3. Malet, op.cit., p. 365; Bafi*i,op.cit., pp. 271,274
4. Malet, op.cit., p. 371
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Sheflf’s group, headed the Ministry* The reinstatement of 
Arab! gave the people courage ar»3 confidence and they took
it as ”a sign that Christians are to be expelled from Egypt." 
The National Movement was taking a serious religious turn, 
almost fanatical, with high hopes and aspirations in the 
countryside, there was a constant danger of collision betweer 
the Muslims and the Christians.^ In the whole set-up, Arab! 
was the master of the situation.
At this juncture, at the British-sponsored request 
of the Khedive, the iSultan consented to send a two-men 
Commission to inquire into the affairs of the ’military 
insubordination*. The Commissioners, Dervish Pasha and 
Muhammad Asad, landed in Bgsrpt on June 8, and were hailed 
with the slogans of "Allah Yansur Sultan** ( Ifey God help the 
Sultan ), "Bl-Lehya, marfudhajmarfudha” (The Note,rejected, 
rejected) and "send aw^ the fleet.^ The Cheif Commissloder, 
Dervish, conferred with the Kationalist leaders, Sami and
1
Arabi, and persuaded Arabi to leave Egypt and jKo to the Porte 
on a subsidy of £ 250 a ^Anth. Arabi declined/the suggestion 
flatly. A Khedivial purse of € 75,000 had turned the Cheif
1. Ibid., p. 375 Letter dated May 30
2. Ibid, pp. 375-76; It may be gauged by the planned riot
of Alexendria, how much combustible this animosity had 
become. See also, Rae, "Egypt today", p. 31
3. Malet, op.cit., pp. 378,394
4. Blunt, op.cit.. p. 306 (TSie text of Arabic citations has
been given in its correct form instead of Ro^manised 
form of Blunt){ see also, Bafi'i, p. 285
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Commissioner completely pro-Khedive, The demonstrations of
al-Azhar students and the stir caused I77 an-Nadim's speeches
against the pro-Khddive policy of the Commission, indicated
which way the wind was blowing^ Dervish, realizing the
seriousness of the situation, took precautions, and retired
to Alexendria, The British-sponsored mission had failed.
In the army circles, there was a deep indignation
towards the Khedive, who, for his petty selfish motives, was
prepared to crush down the national aspirations. Malet report*
that the array officers were considering the deposition of the
Khedive, The head of al-Azhar, Sheikh Alysh, issued a Petwa
that the Khedive was Intent to sell his country to the
foreigners and hence was no more suited to rule over the
2Miislims of Egypt*
On June 11, an antl-Buropean riot brdte out in
Alexendria, which as later proved by evidence, was preplanned
by the Khedive with the help of Ifear Lutfi, the Governor of
Alexendria? The main objective of the plot was to defame the
4Arabi administration . Fourteen hundred lives, most of them 
Europeans, were lost in the riot. Loot and arsen followed 
in the wake of the riots. The Khedivial party seized the 
opportunity to join with the Powers in abusing the Arabi regim
1. Blunt, op.cit,, p, 307-3(®
2, Ibid., p. 326
3. Ibid., pp. 309—313
4, Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", pp. 552-53
- 106 -
The riot began on a small issue. In a street quarr< 
a donkey-boy was killed by a Maltese, and the natives, avengii 
the death, mobbed upon him. This incident, however,soon 
changed, or rather manipulated into a Muslim-Christian riot 
of the worst type. The city was in the hands of the mob and 
the beduins who plundered it. Even such a stauch Imperialist 
as Cromer has remarked that the responsibility of the riot 
did not lie with Arabi, and that the circumstances resulted 
in the rioti However, as was desired and planned beforehand, 
Arabi was exclusively held responsible for the situation, and 
on July 10, British Admiral Seymore handed over an ultimatum 
to him^ .
In the meantime, on )(the initiative of Britain and 
Prance an International Conference of European Powerjwas 
meeting at Constantinople since June 23, with its main object! 
of maintaining the status quo in the Ottoomn Bmpire, On u^ne 
27, it was agreed that “so long as the Conference lasted, the
g
Powers should abstain from isolated action in Egypt,** The 
Sultan remained hesitating to send his troops to Sgjrpt until 
Alexendria was bombarded on July 11, However, on July 15, he 
agreed to participate in the International Conference, and on 
the 20th, to send his troops to S®rpt, He was now told by th< 
Powers that not until he issued a proclamation denouncing Aral 
as a rebel, he would be allowed to send his forces, Cta Augusi
1, Cromer, op,cit,, vol. I, pp, 287-88
2, Royle, ”The Egyptian Campaigns'*, p. 22 
3 , Ibid, , p, 63
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9, a draft of such proclamation was handed over to the 
British Ambassador at the Porte, and negotiations were still 
continued when on August 15, General Wolseley arrived at 
Alexendria to complete the work of Admiral Seymore^ .
Prance, however, could not join hands with Britain
in this Egyptian expedition De Frecinet, the French Prenier,
who had asked the Assembly to maintain a large naval force
in the Canal waters to enable him to land, 8,000 marines in
the event of necessity, met with signal defeat* !Rie leader
of the Opposition asked him pointedly how could he assure .
that the occupation of the Canal would not drag France into
2further action, De Precinet could not answer the question 
and was left helpless* Thus Britain proceeded alone with 
her action.
The nationalists were united under Arabi and almost 
the entire population rallied round him. !Rie Ultimatiim of 
Admiral Seymore had awakened them ard created unity among the 
people. Everyone was ready to defend the country and its 
prestige. The Ultimatum was , however, rejected and the 
British fleet bombarded the Alexandrian forts. The city 
caught fire and the nationalists retreated to the interior 
in Tel-al-Kabir, Taufiq, hitherto watched by Arabi*s men, 
slipped away and with him carried away Dervish and the Bgyptia 
Ministers as well. They all went to the British Admiral and 
took refuge at sea. On July 14, from the British camp, the 
Khedive called upon Arabi to see him for peace negotiation; 
he also ridicxil^ upon Arabi for answering the British 
bombardment. In view of the serious situation, Arabi declined 
to see him, whereupon the Khedive announced that he had
1, Ibid,, pp, 130-31 2, Elgood,op,cit,,pp, 77-78
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dlsnlssed Arab! for disobaying his suprema orders^ ,
Insplte of tho desertion of the iQiedivei there was 
calct and quiet In the Egyptian mainland and administration 
was running smoothly. A General Council,consisting of 
prominent citizens and representatives of all religious 
communities, took over the charge of the Qovernrm>nt as the 
supreme authority in the absence of the Khedive, ^e IQiadive 
was won over by the *infidels* a»a hence his decree of ttie 
dismissal of Arabl was ruled out by the General Council. 
Confirming the position of Arabl, the Council appointed a 
Committee of Dofence under the Presidentship of Yaqub Sami 
to assist Arabl in the operation of War. Arabl v:as practical] 
head of the State^.
Gemeral Wolseley landed In Egypt with his forces 
on August 21, and on September 13, at Tel al-Kabir, the 
British forces met the Nationalist army. The affair lasted 
for an hour; the entire plan of the nationalists had already
3
been betrayed to ttie enemy by a traitor. All Yusuf Khunsif.
Further more, de Lesseps’ promise to maintain the neutrality 
of the Suez Canal had forced the Nationalists to give up theli 
original sbheme of explosion of the Canal; while de I#esseps 
and his country. Prance, watched silently, Wolseley’s forces 
cross€Jd the Canal and landed the shore. After their entry,
1. Blunt, "Secret History”, pp. 382,388,392; Royle: p, 1C»
2. Blunt, op.clt., pp. 382-83, 420-21
3. Autobiography of Arabl in Blunt, op^clt., p. 488
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the invaders were again helped by the traitorsj among them 
were iOiedive*s men, President of the Assembly of the Delegate* 
the bribed beduins and even some of the army officers^* »^ e 
were taken by surprize”, wrote Arabft. "The cavalry Commanders 
were all seduced by Abou Sultan’s promises? ©ley occupdied a 
position in advance of the line, and it was their duty to give 
the warning of any adwance by the Eng]y§4/h. But they moved 
aside and gave no warning. There \ras also one traitor,
Al(^t Boy Yusuf Khunsif, He lit lamps to direct the enemy, and 
then withdrew his men leaving a wide space open for than to
3
pass through*” The nationalists lost their heart. They had 
lost the battle,
Bven if the treachery had not occurred, the results 
would have been more or less the same. At the most, it might 
hava taken some days instead of minutes to defeat •tiie 
Nationalist forces, Arabi*s soldiers, according to his own 
statement, were simple untrained peasants who escaped when 
the shells started falling. The final touch to the treachery 
was given by the tribal'chief, Sa’ud at-Tahawi, who with othei 
beduins, sided with the British army and accelerated the spee< 
of horrifying the untrained soldiers who were fighting to sav<
s
1, In the army itself- the Khedive had spread dissen;tflon 
through his aigent Usman Rif*at, ( Blunt: )^ My Diaries", 
vol, 1, pp, 412-13 )
2, Abou Sultan, that is Muhaamiad Sultan, the President of 
the Assembly of the Delegates, who wrote letters to the 
Civilian cl^fs to the effect that Britain had intervened 
temporarily and that Arabi bad lost the confidence of the 
Sultan, ai^  hence no assistance be given to Arabi against 
Britain, ( Bltint: op.cit,, d, 414 )
3* cit. Blunt, "Secret History**, p, 488
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the honour of thair coimtry and did not know how to fight^•
Lastly, Mahmud Fehmi was arrested before the actixal
war-flght began, Kahmod was the ablest general and the
engineer of the entire plan of the war. He was arrested by
the British soldiers during his 14nely sojourn in the night,
Ali Fehjni and Rashid, the bravest of the Officers, fell wounded
and Muhainmad Ilbaid, another soldier of the sane calibre, was
killed* Abd al-Al Hilni was posted far away from Tel-al-Kabir
and was thus rendered useless for the battle, Hahmud Sami
al«Baroudi was misguided by at-T«^ h3Kri ‘ s bedulns and could not
reach the place where he was most needed. Finally, as has
already been pointed out, tha soldiers, that comprised the
greator part of the Nationalist army, jsainly consisted the
newly recinaited volunteers or regulars drawn frojn the simple
peasantry, and who experienced for the first time the falling
2of the shells • Even Arabi, the 1 -ader of the entire Movement 
and the supreme commander of the Nationalist forces, had
3hitherto no experienco of the actual warfare •
Two thousand B»yptians were killed in the battle,
Arabi and Ali~ar-Rubi, retired and saved their life by flying
away in the interior, Wien British army captured Cairo and
occupied the Administration, Arabi surrendered in person before
4the British General on September 14,
1, At-Tahawi himself confessed, later in 1837 that the Khedive 
had manaf»e<^  to bribe him: See Blunt, ”My Diaries”, p,411j 
Lord Northbrook sent a mission to v/in over the tribes in tb 
East and vtost of the Canal, It involved about £ 20,000, 
Paljner, the famous Orientalist-lost his life while serving tJ 
Mission. See Bliint, «Gordon at Khartum", p. 22 ai^ "Secret 
History**, p,
2, The Egyptian aimy comprised of about 20,000 inexperienced
Continued,,,.....
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Now the loaders of the nation were to be tried by
the Occupation coiirt, Bl\mt*s »hero* had lost the battle.
He, with other friends and sympathisers of the Egyptia
national cause, engaged a prominent advocate, Broadlay, at a
fees of £ 800, to plead the case of Arabi and his colleagues •
Meanwhile, Blunt managed to publish a statement in the Times^
that the execution will hot be done without the consent of
5ngl/$i|h Qovernment and that the prisoneBs were to be defended
2by efficient counsel . There was not the slightest official
authority behind ttiis announcement! but once it was published
in the Times, it was difficult for the British Premier,
Gladstone, to go back upon hus^e decision publicly attributed
to liis Qovernment, Sherif, Hiaz and the Khedive were pressing
3for capital punishment. In principle, however, the right of 
fair trial was recognised.
During the trial, it becjime evident that the normal 
procedure would disclose many treacheries of the Khedive arwl 
his party. Therefore, with the help of Lord Dufferin, a 
compromise was reached at. Dufferin, the British ^tessador
1* Prominent among these sympathisers were Sir WiUaim Oregoi 
Lord de la Warr. F. Harrison, and Lord Randolph Churchill. 
See Blunt, op.cit., pp. 322,432
2, Blunt, op.cit., p. 4335 The Times, September 19, *82
3. Blunt, op.cit., p. 448
aftga*..................
fresh volunteers, while the regulars numbered only nine 01 
ten thousands* See Blunt, ^Secret History”, p. 419
3. Xbid., pp. 419“»22
4, Blunt, op.cit., pp. 423-24
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at the Porte, was deputed to settle the affairs in Bgypt and 
to reorganise the administration of the country* The trial 
of the Nationalists was summarily ended on December 3, and 
according to the Coapromise, Arahi, Sami, A M  al»Al, Tulba 
Ismat, Mahmud Fehmi, Taqub Sami and All Fehmi were sentenced 
with deportation to Ceylon, They left Suez for toelr 
destination on December 26^ .
vii
Althou^ the Arabi Movement was popular in character 
It failed due to some obvious reasons| Firstly, the Sami-AraW 
Government, though established with hi^ ideas, had totally 
neglected the economic factor, namely, the reorganisation of 
tlw economy of the coxintry* While the leaders were busy in 
attacks, conterattacks and defence of the country, the condi­
tions of the masses deteriorated. Europeans who purchased 
the agricultural products of the natives had left the country. 
Banks would no longer lend large sums, while the petty usurers 
loaned money on extremely hi^ rates of interest. "Land is 
everywhere losing its value.Malet reported. This deterio- 
ration reached its culminating point at a time when the
1. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 455-57,472t Cromer, vol. I, pp. 336-3'
2. Malet, op.cit., p. 3CGL, see cilso, pp. w00,395
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canipalgn had enterad into actual operations. In July-Septemba 
ISS2, It servad as a severe blow to the Movement from the rear 
llie announcement of the dismissal of Arab! the 
Khedive had also its cfjm repercussions. It disheartened 
the unlettered Fellahin who knew no more than the simple 
tru.th that their rulor was against any fight with Britain, 
and that he had dismissed their General, the Minister of War, 
IJie Conference at Constantinople also served in 
yet another way in assisting the cause of the enemy, Britain 
was able to get the Sultan to issue a proclanation which 
declared Arab! a rebel. This was done prior to the battle 
of Tal-al-Kabir, The proclamtion reads "The acts which 
Orabi Pasha has dared to commit, with reference to His Highnos 
constitute a flagrant violation of the supreme will of His 
Majesty the Sultan,,,, Consequently Orabi Pasha is considered 
a rebel in the eyes of the Imperial (Jovernment,
In Egypt itself, after the bombardment of Alexendria 
the Khedivial party, consisting of many of the prominent figuri 
of the upper class, carried on an intensive campaign against 
Arabi, in which they alleged that Arabi had joined hands 
with the British forces. This campaign, the main purpose 
of which was to defame the leader of the Movement, continued 
even after the final defeat at ^1 al-Kabir, when Arab! 
was openly accused of treachery* that he had been won over 
by the English secrstly, or else the Egyptian forces would
1. cit. aifa»at* '»The Awakeniiig of Modem Egypt", p. 210;
See also, Cromer, pp,cit,, p, 318
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not have stiffered tha defeat so easily,^
The leader o.f the Movement, was, howover, in no way 
aalnly responsible for the faliura and dafag^ t of the movement. 
He no previous experience of the iDattlefield, much less, 
leading and coinraandlng a force in the battle, InexT)erlanaed 
as he was, he relied upon the promises of de Lesseps, and 
Inspite of the pressure from his colleagues, he abstained 
from blocking or blowing up the Canal. Do Losseps had given 
him his word that under no circumstances would the *^ anal be 
used for landing tha British forces on the Sgjrp^ i^ n soil.
But it vras obvious that de Losseps had no power, while hla 
Qovernnant was not ready to protect his claim* The Canal was 
used and strategically served Britain to procood with the 
entire war planning that solely depended upon the landing, 
of the forces.
Bie lack of planning of the strategy of war, the
betrayal of the nationalists * original scheme and the
treachery of the Bgjrptlans themselves were the othor added
2causes to the main loopholes •
That it was a pouiilar and genuine national movement
3and that Arabl was its ’legitiiuate exponent* is not debatable. 
Bad it not been a mass movement, Arabics pleader, Broadlay,
1* De Frecinet. op.clt., p. 316
2, Summing up the causes of the failure of Arabi Movement, 
in an article in al»TJrwat al-Wuthfla, the editor of al«Urwah 
says^ t '
Continued • • • • •
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argued, it woiild have been impossitile for the aru^ Officers to 
enlist thousands of volunteers and to muster immense supplies. 
The streets of the country echoe^ith the slogans, "May God help 
thou, Arabi (Allahu Yansuruka Ya Arabi^)” and with the chanting 
of *
”Ya TaT.'rfiq vrajh an-nsmala 
Man qalaka t'amal hadhal-amala?
( Oh TariffIq^  thou ant-faced one. S
Who on earth told you to do what you have done" )
Arabl was worshipped alnost like a *hero*. He had prov^ d^
himsalf the njan of the hour* His distinction as also his 
defect seemed to hie in the fact that h© -ifas one of the raaases,
Continued from p. 114«
"When the Arabi Movement started, there were two kinds of 
people inhabiting the country, There were those who preferred 
the old regime; they were content with the Constitution that 
Taufiq was ready to bestcr./ -aDon thom. On tho oWior hand.there 
were those who adhered to Arabi Pasha, but at the same time 
they were afraid of the Khedive and thus wavered between the 
twoj T5iis second group remained ever in doubt to select its 
li?ae of action! and It is obvious that doubt and T/avering 
are just opposite to a determined clear-cut thinking* The 
first group had already reached the farthest extent of 
cowardice and timidity* That is why the English could occupy 
Egypt so easily* They entered Egypt without the least resis­
tance on the part of the people* Threat, bribery, deciepts, 
and treacheries, such were their weapons,*,. Even then no
Egyptian was prepared to believe that tho Englsish had an idea
to occupy the country. They knew only this much tliat they had 
corae to the rescue of the Khedive, Taufiq Pasha, to save him 
from the clutches of the rebels*,.* On the one Iiand was this 
wishful opinion about the English; while on the other hai^ , 
they got a strong plea that the legal head of the country 
was not reluctant to the Englpl/h intervention. So they, the 
people of Egj^ pt reaained idle In their national fight, and 
the English established themselves in Bg3rpt," ( Al-Urtfah, 
September 25, ’84, pp. 20-21 )
3,Arabi*s letter to Broadley int Sroadley, -’How we defended 
Arabi and his Friends", p* 501
l.Broadley, op.cit,,pp, 502-503 (The Homan text given by 
Broadley has been correctly transliterated ).
a true son of the Egyptian soil and hence a genuine 
representative of the Pellahln. Insplte of his eloquency 
In speech, his basic education at al-Azhar, and his courage 
to take Initiative and face the consequences, he lacked those 
qualities of farsightedness, wide knowledge of men and 
things around, and the capability of diplomatic dealing 
that are necessary for a man who leads his nation In critical 
moments* As the leader of the Movement, he proved completely 
unsuccessful, and still he was one of the pioneers of national 
movement If not ” the first nationalist In modern Bgypt"^ *
1* ^ e  phrase was used by Beaman. Beaman began his life as 
a stiident Interpreter. Then In June 1882 he was appointed 
as Assistant Consul at Cairo Consulate of Britain, He 
sympathised with the cause of the Natlonalls'L and regarded 
their movement as^genuine national movement, / Hence, after 
the Bombardment of Alexendrla, he more than once riaiculed 
the official British attitude. He represented the British 
Consul-General at the trial of Arabl, and there he became 
still more impressed with the lost movement and its leaders. 
After the proceedings of the Court of trial had been 
completed, he in protest, resigned, from the po»t he held 
at British Consulate. He then succeeded Sir Valentine 
Chirol, as the correspondent of the Times in Egypt, and by 
the special request of the ’rebels*, he also took charge of 
the properties of the ’rebels' as their legal Trustee,
(See Beaman, “Twenty Years", pp. 41,54,71 and 73), Beaman's 
appraisal of the Arabl Movement, in summary, is as follows t
** TJpto the bombardment he (Arab!) had been moving both with 
the Khedive and the Sultan, After that, I believe, he 
always had the approval of Yeldlz and the whole country at 
his back, as against a nominal Khedive in the hands of the 
Infidels, He simply could not act otherwise. Having 
throughout been treated as a belligerent. It was absurd 
afterwards to talk of him as a rebel. The first test of a 
rebellion is success, and as far as his rebellion went. If 
he ever rebelled, against the Khedive, he was victorious 
along the whole line. He could not rebel against Europe, 
or England, to whom he owed no allegience. As a dictator, 
his conduct was blameless, and after having been for long 
in complete authority over the land of Egypt, which before 
and since had always enriched every individual, from the 
highest officials down to the shadiest adventurers, who 
have ever had approach to its coffers, he went out of it a 
beggar, and Arabl's legal adviser had to buy bread and dates 
to keep his family from starving”, (Beaman: "Twenty years in 
the Near East", p, 70); see «lso, Chirol, "Fifty years in a 
changing world", p, 321 His remarks. "The first leader of 





He was neither a born leader nor the fittest person for a 
movement laimched In such a critical periodj circumstances 
dragged him oHwards, Tha} is why, he was forgotten from the 
memory of his people so soon^•
Inspite of all his limitations, Arabi contributed, 
at least one thing, to the history of Egyptian nationalismi 
He gave to the people a new slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians”, 
and infused in these ‘Egyptians* a feeling of Bgyptlanism’ 
with a sense of pride for their motherland* If there had 
been no Ai«bi, perhaps there would have been no Kamil within 
thirteen years that followed Arabi *s Revo3,knd there would 
have been no general political awakening in the country either 
which menifested itself in the early years of the twentieth 
century. As for Arabi, General Gordon appraised, whatever 
may become of him individually, he will live for centuries 
in the people; they will never be’your obedient servants' 
again." Indeed Arabi was singly responsible for kindling 
the fire of armed resistence among the ever-sulmissive 
Egyptians; he was the first true Egyptian who took up arms 
to save the honour of his country. He had lost the battle; 
yet he was so much reverred by his people that for many days 
people would not believe that he was or rather, could be 
actually defeated • Even after his trial and exilement, there
1, “The memory of Arabi was soon forgotten, and when 
after a long exile, he was permitted to return to Egypt, 
his presence was hardly noticed,,,. He lived in a little 
house on the edge of the desert of :%louan, and I had
to ask several people, before I could find one to direct 
me to the home of the former dictator and idolized hero 
of the masses,” ( Beaman, op.cit,, p, 30 )
2, Gordon to Blunt, in a letter, dated August 3, 1882, See 
Blunt, "Gordon at Khart^ im," p,9^
3, Blunt, Diaries”, vol. I, p,/4-; ^
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was a general belief that he would come back to the rescue 
of his people. But he could not come Tmck before 1901, when 
few remained to hail him^• In 1911, he died tho death of an 
insignificant person. It is only recently that, in recogni­
tion of his services to the nation, the first national
Oovemment, of Gamal Abdel Nasser has presented £ 20, poo to
2Arabics doscendents.
Among other prominent figures of the Movement, 
those who took leading part werej Ali ar-Rubi, the founder 
of the secret Society of army Officers; Mahmud Fehmi, who 
worked out, on the part of the nationalists, the whole 
strategy of the battle, Tulla Ismat, Abd al»Al Hilmi and 
Ali Pehml* Sami had also entered tha battle field when the 
necessity of defence arose; but he is better/ judged as a 
Civilian leader. Mahmud Fehmi ( b. 1839 ) had joined the 
Sami Ministry as the Minister of War. He was among those 
top-leaders who were exiled to Ceylon, where he wrote a book 
called, "al-Bahr az-Zakhlr fi Tiarikh al-Alam wa Akhbar al- 
Awa’il wa*l-Awakhir.** He died in Ceylon in July, 1894.
Tulba Ismat, who was also exiled to Ceylon, died in February 
1900, two months after coming back to Egypt, Ali ar-Roubi 
was exiled to the Sudan, where he lost his sight and health
1. Beaman, op.cit., p. 30
2, Gunther, "Inside Africa", p. 193, f.n.
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and died there In 1891* All Fehral was the most tirasted 
friend of Arabi, and he did not leave him alone even in 
his exile* Among the exiled, there was Yaquh Sauni also 
who was not originally so prominent a figure; hut when the 
actual war broke out, he headed the Committee of Defence 
and organised the campaign. He died there in Ceylon, in 
1900^,
Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi, the ex-President of the
Council of Ministers was also on the battle field, and at
last had to retire with other comrades-in-arm^. After the
trial, he was also exiled to Ceylon, He returned to Egypt
2in the middle of 1399, and died in December 1904 «
Among other important figures, an outstanding
name is that of Sulaiman Sami. Among the top-leaders, he
was the only exception who was hanged; he was the bravest
3of all .
Muhammad Abduh ( 1849-1905 ) had also joined the 
Movement in its last phase. While still in his early 
twentiesjtf, he had 6ome under the influence of the dynamic 
personality of al-Afghani, and ever since he was against 
despotism and corruption Just as the Officers were. But 
he took an exception and supported the Enlightened Despotism, 
such as that of Ri»az Pasha, With other sincere Civilian
1, Rafi’i. op.cit., pp, 503-10, 529} 511-12, 491; 590; 
497: 530; 528
2, Royle, op.cit,, p, 208, f.n,; Landau s op.cit., p, 97
3, Blunt. "Secret History”, p, 465; ”Ck>rdon at Khartum”, 
pp. 24-25.
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nationalists, he had at last joinod the Arab! Movemant; but
actually he never adhered to it whole-heartedly, as is evident
by his curses which during his imprisonmont, ha showered upon
the Loader of the Movement^• Muhammad Abduh was also
punished with a simple exile for three years* tfhtie serving
the sentence, he praised the Khedive, and was able to revive
the *old spirit* only after meeting al«Afghanl once again
In Paris, Soon afterwards, he again changed and fell back,
when in 1889, was allcjwed to come back to Egypt and was
2appointed the Grand Mufti of the country •
Prince Halim is considered by some of the writers
on Modern Egypt, as the moving spirit of the Arabi Revolt*
Halim was the last surviving son of Muhammad All and was a
3
year younger than the Khedive, Isma‘11* Ha is said to have 
had «the voice of all the Egyptians”^  to hail him. To add 
to his right, Arabi puts forward his case, he h ^  "for a 
long time undergone tr^ials of a very grave nature, having
4been subjects to tyrani^ **' I&llm seemed to have been 
reverred by the Fellah Officers, or at any rate, by Arabi*
But It waHld be incorrect to describe him as tlie man who
1* Rashid Resas op*clt*, vol. I, pp* 150-56 Abduh*s 
"Qasldah f 1 • th-thaiirat al- ’Qrabiyya”
2* Rafi»l, pp* 520-26
3* de teon, "The Khedive's Egypt**, pp* 253, 261 j See also 
Halim*s own remarks introducing himself ass **the last 
STirvivlng son of Mehemed All**, **an Bgsrptlan not without 
honour**, amongst his people, "who know that my understan­
ding of them Is as true as my sympathy*" See Halim,op*clt*. 
p. 733*
4* Alibi’s letter, in Blunt, op*clt*, p* 548
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directed or sponsored the Revolt led by tha Fellah Officers^ ,
Allusions have been made to his continuous intrigues and
2plots in 1S77 and the tollofrfing year , in addition, some
more concrete evidences might be supplemented, as given by
some contemporary writers: Describing the caused of the Arabi
Revolt, Malet has referred to Pfelia as one of the main force
working from behind* He also hints at Tauj*iq*s fear of
3being replaced by Hilim during the crisis of May 1882 ,
De Leon lias made allusion to a visit of Halim to London, in 
the last days of Isbb.*11, perhaps in connection with tdie
4question of succession • Again, Arabi himself was an ardent
1* To the author of "Parliateents and Parties in Egypt'*, it 
is unimaginable p6 that the National Moveieent must
have devoid of some highly-placed well-aducated person 
to lead it; and that man was Prince Halim hiiBselfx To make 
liis argument strong- Landau details the charges of cons­
piring against Isma’il, though he also lays down that 
Eallm always denied the charges. Again, he argues that 
this was the raison d’etre of his exileiaont by the order 
of Isma*il, Actually it seems to be quite a sinple case 
of family-feud. and the frustration after the chanfe of 
Law of Succession in favour of the son of Isiaa’il as 
against Halim, was the simple reason of such activities. 
After all, no movement with personal motives, with little 
following in the country, should be describea as a 
National Movement, and Balim as its sponsoror* Moreover, 
most of his concrete subversive activities belong to the 
period not later than 18(^, Even the most important 
document discovered by Landau, belongs to the year 1868.
( i.e. Letter of Col.Easan Pasha to Halira detailing a list 
of ammunition necessary for a pro.jected revolt against 
Isma'il )• Again even tliat document does not go beyond 
proving Balim*s alleged conspiracy against Isma'il, 
an<! that also in his porsonal capacity, and not as the 
leader of any mass Bovement. See Landau, pp. 77-80
2. Landau, op.cit., p. 77
3. Malet, Ap. cit.^ p. 286
4. do Loon, op.cit., p* 253j writing in 1877, de Leon says, 
that Haiiia *Vas in Eondon recently for about a short time.'
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adislrer of the Prince^, and Dufferin*s accusation that the
Fellah Leader had indirect relations with th« Prince throu]^
2al-Aqqad migjithav© liad some "basis • But inspite of all these 
facts, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that Halim 
was the jfoan who initiated, sponsored, or led the MoT-ement, 
The Fellah Movement was the simple natural outcone of the 
conditions that prevailed in the coiantiy. If Halim also 
appeared at the stage, it was simply due to his personal 
raotives, apparent in his struggle against the Khedives, In 
this|< perspective, his activities become difinite and clear* 
The sponsorers of the llovonant, if this ‘pre-requisite* is 
essential to presuiae, we-r*e the down-trodden raasses themselves 
who wanted to become free frc® tlie mtive as well as froa 
the foreign yole and ex5)loitation. It was tho army, led by 
the Pallah Officers, which t^ as the sole spirit behind the 
novement* Nothing was preplanned or chalked out boforeharHl* 
©lere is no evidence of any direct relation with some secret 
society or organised political gro»p, Tliey, all, joined the 
movement, while it began as a natural product of the 
development of the affairs, and in tho full sway of the 
Movement, they created for supporting the movement a nominal 
political party, Kational Party by name, which was anjrthing 
but a political Party in the sense ttie word Implies, The 
entire movement should be studiej^  in tli/is perspective.
1, Bluntt "Gordon at Khartum”, pp. 547-48s Arabi’s letter
2, Ibid*, p* S7J.
C H A P T E R  17
** We are the descendants of the 
empire-'bullders, and hold, in 
trust for posterity, a sacred 
cause: Our Pax Britannia may 
claim its martyrs.,.. "Loyalty 
to our Queen and Constitution, 
faith in our pacific mission and 
pride of race are our highest 
traditions,"
Whites ”The Expansion of Egypt",pp*443,44f
** A fev hundred English officials laid 
down the law to the Egyptian people, . 
althou^ every Government Act bore 
the signature of an Egyptian Minister 
acting in the name of the Khedive,,,,
(It) resulted in demoralisation of 
the Egyptian nation, though Egyptian finaxKses were put on a sound basis,”
Felix Valyit "The Bevolutions in Islam", 
pp, 189-19
The year 1883 commenced with an ambiguous British
»
policy in Egypt, Egypt had come to them not as a preplanned 
share in the spoil of war, but only accidentally when circum­
stances led them in ttie direction of tiie occupation of that 
country. It is for this reason that they were not quite clear 
with regard to their attitude ar^ policy towards this new 
part of their Empire, The Foreign Office Despatch of November
3, 1882, was a hesitat^ing, ambiguous and vague document 
which spoke at length and still said nothing.
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" ••• Her Majesty’s Government while desiring that
British occupation should last for as short aft time as possible.
feel bound not to withdraw from the task thus imposed on them,
until the administration of affairs has been reconstructed
on a basis which afford satisfactory guarantees for the
maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, for
the stability of the Khedive’s authority, for the judicious
development of self-government, and for the fulfilment of1obligations towards foreign Powers,•••"
Much could easily be read between the fSLlnea of
these directive principles. It implied a veiled possession
of the country for an indefinite period. The principles were
reiterated in the Despatch of January 3, 1883, with a
diplomatic explanation of their position in Bgypt.
" In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty
Government are placed towards His Highness ( the Khedive )
imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object
of securing that the order of things to be established shally
be of a satisfactory character and possess tiie elements of
2stability and progress."
1, cit» Colvin, “The making of Modern Egypt**, pp. 29-30s
see also despatch of Lord Dufferin to the Foreign Office 
dated February 6, *83, Cited by Roswell in the Hi^teenth 




Henceforward, the aystean of the duty of giving 
advice to the KhediVjeal Government was elaborated to its 
fullest extent. Lord Dufferin, who was sent to reorganise 
the government and administration of Egypt, stayed there for 
about six months (November 7, 1882- May 1, 1883) and after 
a study of the situation on the spot, prepared an extensive 
report in the form of recommendations to be adfopted by the 
Khedivial Government, in the new set-up of the country.
These recommandations wore decreed by the Khedive on May 1, 
*83 as the new Organic Law of Bgypt, The Law created a 
Council of States, a Legislative Council, a General Assembly, 
and the Provincial Councils* (Art. 1). The Legislative 
Council was to be composed of thirty members of whom 
fourteen permanent members, incluiing one vice-President of 
the Council, were to be the nominees of the Khedive and 
his Government. (Arts* 30, 31); of the r«naining sixteen, 
fourteen were to be elected by fourteen Provincial Coimcils 
from amongst their own members and one each from Cairo, 
Alexendria and some other less important constituencies*
(Art. 32)* The duration of this Council was for a period 
of six years; it was authorized to discuss that part of the 
budget which was not concerned with the Tribute to the Porte 
or international obligations* (Arts* 18, 22, 23 and 32). Th» 
Government, however, had the right to reject any of its 
suggestions, explaining the reasons thereof* Normally, the
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Council was to meet each alternative month arid was to be
convened and prorogued by the Khedive. (Art, 26)^ ,
The Legislative Assembly of eighty-two members
consisted of the Legislative Council, the six Ministers and
forty-two directly elected Delegates, for a term of six years.
(Arts, 40-42)♦ The President of the Legislative Council was
also to preside over the session of the Assembly. (Art. 43).
No new taxes could be imposed without the approval of the
Assembly* (Art. 34). In other matters, it could only express
its opinion, if so required by the Government. (4rt, 36).
This Assembly was to meet every two years^
!Ehe Provincial Councils consisting of three to
eight uanabers, elected by universal suffrage and presided
over by the Governors of the respective Provinces, enjoyed1advisory rights in local affairs. (Arts, 2-6).
The Council of States was dropped at the instance
of Lord Cromer and the injlfitiation of all legislation was
2assumed by the British Advisor.
The Legislative Coimcil and the Legislative Assembly 
were endowed with nominal powers. Besides, the number of the 
nominated members was very large; the peoples were backward, 
consequently the elected members were to belong to the rich
1. Rafi*i, "Misr wa»s-Sudan** : Pull Text of the Law, pp,
191-200| see also Colvi^ op.cit.■ pp. 33-34; Cromer, 
op.cit.y vol. II, pp, 271-73t Milner, "England and Egypt", 
pp, 379-84; Browne, "Bonaparte in Egypt and Egyptians
of today", pp. 126-30; Kohn, op.cit,, p, 185
2, Young, QP.cit,, p. 151
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class, who as a rule, supported the ruling alique* Moreover, 
tlie Government was not bound to accept any suggestion put 
forth "by the Assembly or the Council, The Khedlvlal Qovermaent 
consisting of the Khedive and his eight Ministers, was to remain 
in pie name the supreme authority, which in actual practice 
was to be directed aiKi guided by the British Agent, their 
cheif Advisor, as was implied in t^ e Despatches of the 
Foreign Office.
In June, 1883, the list of the voters was complete 
and the total number reached 903,395 la. 13.28 ^  of the total 
population of the country^• The elections were held under 
the guarded police supervision inside the police stations, 
and in most cases, the Governors or the Prefects of the police 
were the elected candidates. “It could not have been otherwise**,
2remarked an eye-witness •
The new era of British control^ had dawned upon 
Egypt. The system of Dual Control ceased by a decree of 
Janoary 18, 1883. A new post of Financial Advisor was created
3for the British Controller y while his French counterpart 
disappeared from the scene. But Fiance still enjoyed, with 
other Powers, the extra-territorial rights of Capitulations, 
and thus was to remain a permanent anomoly and source of 
trouble to Britain for a long time to come. The British
1. Landau, op.cit.« p. 45
2. Blunt, ** Gordon at Khartm”% p* 6731 Letter dated September 
8, 1883, addressed to Hamilton.
3. Royle, on.cit.. pp. 224-26
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Financial Advisor was entitled to attend Cabinet meetings,
to exercise powers of inquiry and to give advice on financial
questions, Tho British Agent and Consul-Oonoral was to
e/xercise the duty of the Cheif Advisor to the Khedive in
the advisory systf^ en to be evolved during the coming years.
Concluding his report, Lord Dufferin had written*
“ I hean commissioned to place the affairs in Egypt on
the footing of an fnvprticy Indian subject State, the outlook
vpuld have been different. The inaaterful hand of a Resident
1would havaa quickly bent every thing to hi» will..,." Lord 
o /Cromer‘S, Sir Blven Baring, realized Dufferin*s aspirations, 
perhaps even beyond Dufferin's isagination. Within a decade, 
the 'laatarful hand of the British Resident* brought Egypt to 
the virtual status of an ’Indian subject State*.
1* cit,, Hoyle, p. 228
2, Sir Elvejm Baring, later Lord Cromer, the writer of two 
valuable monographs on Modern Egypt, and the British Agent 
during the most crucial period of British occupation, 
joined tdie Hoyal Artillery in 1S59 and began his career 
from that point. He became the Commissioner of Public 
Debt ia Sg^t in 1377-79, and Controller-General of the 
Egyptian finales in 1879-80. During the period 1880-83, 
ho *^ s v»i?y awa-y from Egypt and was the Financial Member 
of the Council of 71ce-Hoy in India. Since 1883, he 
performed his duties as tho British Ag©nt*and Consul genera] 
replacing Sir Edward Malet the ex-Consul^enearal in Egypt. 
In 1883, he was made viscount and threeil^terwards the 
Earl of Cromer. He retired from the Agency in 1907.
In his retirement, he wrote '‘Modem Egypt" in two volumes 
and ” Abbas 11^  published in 1907 and 1915 respectively.
He also connlied the collection of his Essays: Literary 
and Political, some of which also deal with the Egyptian 
problems, ( 5ee Elgood, op.cit., p. 94j Cromer’s own 
scatterod narratives; Zetland: "Life of Lord Cromer"j
and, Triall: "Lord Sromeri A biography").
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All key posta were given to tJie Engls^ ish. The 
administration was completely Anglicised at tiie higher level • 
A British advisor was attached to every Egyptian Miziister, 
whose advice was tantamount to atn order. Eie British Agent 
was the cheif Advisor in this hierarchy, and, as such, the 
Khedive was also bound to take and obey his advice in all y/i 
matters of policy* This entire policy was not derived 
from any writ, decree or law. The British genius was evolving 
it as a convention and tradition* Iii name, Egypt was as yat 
a province of the Ottonan Empire paying anniail Tribute and 
adhering to all time-honovred traditions* The Khedive, as 
the vassal of the Sultan, was in name tlie highest authority 
in Egypt who governed the country with the help of his 
Ministers and decread lai^ s witl-i the advice of the Legislature* 
In reality, hot^ ever, all power, vested in the British Agent.
** We do not govern Bgyptj we only govern the governoi
2of Egypt. * *5' summed up a British author, making observations 
on the system of Euarptian government. The actual procedrc 
was that the British advisor would sayt ♦* *I think it advisable 
that your Excellency should issue such and such an order*.,,. 
His Excellency docs not always comply with this admonition; 
but if he reguses too grequently, or on sufficiently serious 
occasions, the «advisor* reports the matter to M s  own real
1. Colvin, op.cit,, p. 38; Bl^ int, ” My Diaries **, vol* I, 
p* 263
2. » Egypt In transition pp. 200-201^
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the pTl?re advigor, the British A?ent, who, if necessary, 
would carry it to the lOiGdlvaj and in that csase the minister 
nlsht be faoftd by the alternative, se soiimettre on se demettre^” 
This was the pattern of the government. A system of "personal 
rule”^  of the British Agent was in evolution. Cromer afgued 
that, incapahle of govorninK Itself, the semi-barTsarous
0
country was to learn the lessons of government and administratio 
k Despatch of Foreign Office dated January 4, 1884, was more 
clear on this point* ” It should be inade clear to the 
Egyptian Ministers and CJovernors of Provinces that the 
responsibility which for the timo rests on England, obliges 
Her Majesty’s Government to insist on the adoption of the 
policy which they reconiaend, airf that it will be necessary 
that thoso Ministers and Governors v;ho do not follow this
4course cease to hold their offices."
The British official viewpoint had now become more 
definite as to their ob.ject of stay in Sg3rpt, while in 
itself Croner r-ras coisnetent enough to fill up the gaps In 
the policy directed to hiti by the Foreign Office. In jfiiis 
view, inaplte of the regular px'omises of the British 
Government to evacuate Sgypt at their aarliest, to talk of
1. Low, "Ea:ypt in transition", pp. 200-201
2. Low* Introduction, xi
3. Cromer, vol. II, p* 383
4* Clt., Colvin., p. 49; see also, Kohn, cp.cit., p. 1S6
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evucuation was quite a remote question,^ He believed in
giving a distinctly permanent character to the Occupation,**
Kheidve Taufiq reigned Egypt as "nominally indepen-
2dent sovereign urider virtual British control.** He commanded
3
no respect in his country, and was dependant for his
maintenance upon Britain. The de facto ruler was Cromer
and not Taufqiq, "Under Taufiq**, said Cromer, **I remained
4more or less hidden. I pulled the strings.,.,"
The British occupation had taken place hy chance.
It was simply because Trance had detached itself at the 
eleventh hour, that Britain had to proceed alone. Now there 
was no apparent justification for a permanent occupation 
as they had avowedly declared that they l^d cc^e to restore 
the Khedivial authority. Once the Khedivial authority was 
restored, they were obliged to leave the Ottoman territory. 
The Sxiltan-Caliph was still, in name, the legal sovereign 
and the overlord of Egypt, The Occupation regime admitted 
it time smd again. Through conventions and negotiations, the
Ppor'^was continuously trying to oust Britain and to vacate 
Egypt, Other powers were also concerned in the problem, 
and, as such, Britain deemed it advisable to return the 
spoil of war to her *weak friend* rather than to share it 
with any of her rivals, Britain, however, could not vacate
1, Cromer, op,cit,, vol, II, pp, 382-83
2, Dicey, **The Egypt of the future**, p, 23
3, Blunt, **Ctordon at Khartum**, p. 5TO
4, Cit. Zetland, **Life of Lord Crc»ier% p, 192; see also,
Pensf§\i;ld, "Present-day Egypt**, p. 143
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Egypt without any definite soliution, lest other Powers should 
intervene. It could not, at the same time^  annex Egypt as it
was also a concern of the others^*
Speaking in the Parliamtet on July 24, '82, Gladstone
had declared that "Great Britain is sending her troops to
re-estahlish order and to restore to the Khedive the authortty
that he has lost* She will forroally sulmit to a European
2Conference the regulation of the Egyptian question. ** Again, 
on August 16, he/ reiterated the policy: **As soon as order
is re-established, we shall submit the Egyptian question to 
Europe, The Conference of the ambassadors at Constantinople
g
Will, and should, resume its sittings.” But nothing happened. 
Once the country had been occupied, it was difficult to keep 
up the humane words. The Question was never submitted to 
Europej nor did the Constantinople Conference resi2oe its 
sittings again. The Powers, specially Prance, were closely 
watching the developments and waited for a suitable opportimity 
to quarrel.
In order to restore the economic position of Egjrpt, 
early in 1884, Cromer proposed a loan of £ 9000,000 on the 
security of Britain ai^ 6ther European Powers. France asked
1. Annual Register, 1883. p. 17
2. clt. Elgood, p. 91, f.n.
3. clt. Elgood, p. 91, f.n.
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as a price a prior settlement of the Egyptian question and 
a definite date of Evacuation, besides an all-Powers guarsuitee 
for the maintenance of neutrality of the Suez Canal, After 
several conferences and continued negotiations regarding the 
proposed loan, France, at last, tanpoiarily agreed to the 
proposal on March 18, 1885^• Bie ratification of the 
Convention was an indirect acknowledgenient and de facto 
regonition of British authority over Bgy^t.
yThe question of neutrality of the anal was again
raised by Prance, and continued to claim the attention of
Britain, until the Convention of 1888 recognised the right
of every nation to use the Canal both in times of peace and
2war •
Negotiations with the Porte were not resumed for
a long time. Lord Mo*thbrook, who was entrusted with tJie
task of working out a slilution of the Egyptian enigma, had
recmnmended,after his six«^onth3 sojourn in Egypt ( frcaa
September 1884 onwards), that no definite date of evacuation
should be fixed, and that no kind of internationalisation of
3the Egyptian Question was advisable • It was not until 
Salisbury came to power in June, that a genuine effort was 
made to solve the problem. Soon after he became Prime Minister.
1. Elgood. p. 104s Dicey, "The Story of the Khediviate",?, 371
2. Hure-witz, op«cit«, vol. II, p. 250, Text of the Agreement.3. Dicey, op.cit., 3)./9s--aot
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Salisbury resumed negotiations with the Porte. Sir Henry
Drummond Wolff was authorized to negotiate an Agreement with
the Sultan initially on the basis of securing the military
cooperation of Turkey in the Sudan.^ Afterwards, ttie British
Commissioner was allowed to lay down a scheme of reforms to
be carried out under Anglo-Turkish auspecies in Egypt, aiKi to
provide for the withdrawl of th& British Occupation within a
term of years, subject in certain circumstances, to eventual
2Anglo-Turfc^ l/h re-occupation* To quote Salisbury* ”It is the 
wish of Her Majesty’s Government to recognise in its full 
significance the position which is secured to His Majesty the 
Sultan as Sovereign of Egypt by Treaties and other instruments 
having a force under international law* They are of opinion 
that the authority of the Sultan over a large portion of the 
Muhammadan world which exists under his rule will be much 
assured by a due recognition of his legitimate position in
3
respect to Egypt,"
After many ups and downs, a Convention was signed 
on May 22, 1887 between the Ottoman High Commissioner, Mukhtar 
Pasha, and the British Commissioner Wolff^ It ensued the 
defence and reorganisation of Egypt and the withdrawl of the 
Occupation army within a period of three years; the Ottoman 
Government was free thereafter to use its right to occupy Egypt
1* cit* Colvin, pp, 146-49 
2* Ibid*, pp. 146-47; Cromer, vol* II, p. a m
3, Chirol, op*cit., p. 53; £olvin, pp. 145-49
372
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in case of certain emergency, lnjA/hich ease Britain was also 
authoriied to send her troops *to cooperate' with the Ottoman 
forces. (Art, 5), The Convention also stipulated that three 
years after the ratification of the Convention, it would be 
presented to the European Powers for a general mutual agreement, 
(Art. 6)\
Article^ 5 of the Convention which stipulated 
Britain’s right of re-entry was, however, opposed by Prance 
and Russia, They threatened that in the event of its 
ratification by the Sultan, they would occupy Syria and Armenia 
respectively^• At last British Hig^  ^Commissioner returned 
home without getting the convention ratified by the Porte, 
while Britain had already given her final sanction ffto it,
TherS is no doubt that it was a genuine effort 
on the part of Britain to solve the Egyptian Question and to 
vacate the country, and that the chance was lost for many 
a year;^  to come. The strong opposition front of the Powers, 
the trouble in Idie Sudan, and the continuous pledges of 
Britain to vacate Egypt were the obvious factors, fortunately 
combined at that time, which had forced Britain to yeild 
so easily.
The Convention failed, no doubt, because its conditior 
were too harsh to be accepted by the R>rte honourably* Circu-
K  To3r, jr, 3?S5
1, He^ cwitz, vol. I, pp, 201-202: Text of the Convention}
see also, CrcMaer, vol, II, p, 375$ Dicey, op,cit.,pp,413-14
2, Cromer, op.cit,, p, 378j Hafi*i, op.cit,, p, 75j
Yoiing, p, 154
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mstancas of ro-entiy of Britain were hinted out in the 
Agreemant, but it vras Britain herself who could 3udgo and 
decide whether such circumstances existed at a given raomentj 
and such a moment could arrive as and when Britain desired* 
Anyway^ Britain had won the diplomatic hattle^ ar^ could 
boast that insplte of her best effor^ts, the Question could 
not be solved due to the attitude of the Porte.
The role of the Porte, or rather of these 
negotiations^ in instigating tiie nationalist feelings araong 
the Egyptian people is nonetheless significant. So long as 
Wolff*s stay in Egypt and Turkey continued, which continued 
for about three years, there was anxiety as well as 
dissatisfaction among the Egyptians and a curiosity to see 
the things beyond as a resultodt of the negotiations*^
The Geman Foreign and Diplomatic Papers of the 
following year ( 1889 ) give some information about the 
possibility of resumption of the Anglo«Tur]^ 3/h talks. In 
1890 again there was a continuous exchange of letters* But 
now Britain Insisted In stronger terras on its right of 
re-entry, and declined to fix any definite date of Evacuation* 
Gerraar^ on behalf of the Porte, made diplomatic efforts to 
avoid the question of fixation of a definite date of 
Evacuation, and emphasised on ttie settlement of the question
1* Wood, ** Egypt under the British ", p. 62
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of Turkish sovereignty. But the Porto, once again under the 
French influence, refused to negotiate on these lines*^
After the break-down of these negotiations, there 
was a period of inactivity for a while* Cromer, under 
Salisbury's Government, was left without any definite policy
Oexcept that of waiting and watching • But a staunch Imperialist 
as he was, Cromer, inspite of all difficulties, pursued his 
ideas. He followed his own policy of making Egypt virtually 
a dependency of Britain. He organised a press-campaign in 
favour of Occupation, and weakened the nationalist forces 
which could emerged again as a strong opposition. After the 
failure of the Wolff's Mission, ho was in a better position 
to carry on his policy ahead.
As in other partd of the Bsipire, in Bg3rpt also, 
the Empire builders tried to turn the country into a market 
for raw materials. Like India, it was declared as only an 
Agricultural country, and all efforts for development were 
made in that f/^ 4/ld. Factories for armaaant, paper, and 
cotton were closed down, and cottage industries were discoiu»ged 
Soon, Egypt had turned into a mere supplier of raw-cotton to
4Lancashire , Europeans were generously encouraged to start 
factories aM invest money in establishing companies for 
trade, conuaerce ao3 industry. This was an additional blow 
to the national economy.
1. German j^reign and diplomatic documentsf pp. 60, 66, 68
2. Blunt, ** 1^ Diaries ”, vol. I, December,1888, p. 153. Ibid.: p. 54 * > ^
4. Rafi'i, pp. 17, 182-88; Confession of the fact by Cromer 
in 1905* See fTRafi*!,?. 183
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As for the financial restofation of the country, 
as claimed by the British, It was never genainaly done for 
Its own sake, but due to continuous danger of European 
Powers^* Tlie creditors * dues had to be cleared some^how or 
the other. If the British Govemnent were unable to pay it, 
the Powers on behalf of their respective citizens could 
intervene at any time* It was thus in their own interest tk 
that the British authorities improved the finacial position 
of Kgypt, and though tlie State Treasury was full, the lot of 
the n^asses was nover iaproved. Their condition changed frwa 
bad to worse^ In England, the capitalists and the Tnanufact- 
urers were in their best of humour* Bioy had fo\md a vast 
market with iranense potentialities, which they had to retain 
at any cost.
ii
ISie victory at Tel-al-Kabir brought to an abrut end 
the rising national movement in Egypt, The feperial hold 
had cone to stay, !Eho policy of the British Government, 
chalked out on the spot by the msterfiU. hand of Iiord Cromer, 
was so fina and definite that it did not leave any opportianity 
for the nationalistic tenf^ encles to re-^ araerge, and at le«at 
not until the tlmlci Khedive Taufiq occupied the throne,
1, RafiU, p. 184
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Arbitrary arrests, confiscation of properties, and imprisoriBent
without trial were the order of the day* The prisons were
full of untried persons, and there was no liberty of the press
or plat^form^• 15ie native strength of the movement had
collapsed. Amidst the repeated pledges of the British
Government for upholding the autonomy of Egypt and evacuating
it at their earliest, new administrative arrangements had
already been accomplished at the hands of Lord Dufferin*
The wealthy landowners, always wont to salute the
rising sun, bowed before the British authorities, offered
them presents, mixed up with them, and thus implicitly
acknowledged and recognise their Occupation* Many of the
leaders of the Revolt had also reconciled and had sulMdtted
2their opologies *
Arabic was replaced by EngljS#i} schools were filled 
with British teachers awid many of the native educational and 
technical institutions were closed down • In the first year 
of Occupation, only £ 99,5,549 wer8 allotted to the bi;dget 
for educatidn, which sum decreased in the following years,^
!Die education Imparted was so mutilated that the new generation 
became estranged to ideas of patriotism and did not form any 
conceptions of rights or privileges*
1* Colvin, p« 28
2* Rafi*i,op*cit., p* 176j see also Blimt,op*cit*,p, 47, on 
the situation in September, 1883j ” About the actual 
conditions of things in Egypt Sanua told me there were two 
parties, the Clerical which looked to Constantinople for 
help, and the lay which was powerless because it had no 
leader”.
3. Ibid., p. 179
4, Ibid., p, 181* In 1891, the budget allotted to education 
had decreased to £ 88,478
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As for the peasantry, they had returned to their
fields, and it seemed as though they had succumbed to their
fate. However, they still adhered to Arabi, who, they thought,
would have delivered then from the usurers and the Pashas^ *
Even the feforms introduced by the new regime were looked upon
as siaply the initiation of the original plan of Arabi himself^•
There were others who regretted the failure of Arabi, whereas
the Pellahin of the remoter districts cared little for
politics as they still had the traditional respect foe for
the Khedive. Yet many of than beleived that Arabi would cone
back and deliver them. Arabi, inspite of his misfortune, was
popular in Cairo and in other towns , « I have heard ", writes
Blunt, “people complain of him for his conduct in the war,
for his neglet of blocking the Suez Canal, for his praying
when he ought to have been fighting and for his running away
at Tel al-Kablr. But they talk kindly of him, as the first
4fellah who ever held supreme power in Bgypt....** Bven as 
late as 1888-89, there was a strong movement in favour of 
the recall of Arabi, which Arabi while Cromer and the Khedive 
were totally opposed to any such Idea^ , Gradually, the masses 
** were biing more reconciled to the state of affairs."®
1. Cromer, op.cit,, p. 187
2. Ibid., p. 191
3. Ibid., pp. 191»92s Blunt, op.cit., pp. 577-78
4. Bliant, *' Diaries ", pp. 20,40
5. Ibid., p. 38 quoting Muhammad al-Moelhi on June 12, 1890
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On the whole, there was little chance of the 
re-emergence of the national raovement fron any quarter of 
Egyp^ »^ long as this state of affairs continued.
ill
Hbvever, the trouble started in from unexpected
quarter, namely, the Sudan, an annexee to the Khediviate of
Egypt since the days of Muhammad Ali, and being governed through
a Governor-General appointed by the Khedive,/was now in revolt
against the authority of Egypt, or rather against the authority
of foreign Power that dominated it, "Scarcely had the Arab!
revolt been suppressed ", says Royle, "than troubles which
had arisen in another quarter called for attention# Towards
the end of October 1882, Abdel Kader F^ sha, Governor-General
of the Soudan, telegraphed from Khartoum that the troops which
he had sent against the Mahdi had been out off, and that a
force of 10,000 men should be sent as reinforcement, otherwise
he would be unable to defend the town,**^
Among the main causes of uprising in the Sudan, the
2suppression of Jfslavery was one, the Arabi Revolt was the
3second , the fear of foreign or rather Christian Occupation
4 5was the third , and misgovernment the last ,
1, Royle, op.cit., p, 210
2, Ibid,, p, 213; Many tribes of slave-himters were with the 
Mahdi, see Rafi*i. op.cit,, p. 89
3, "Telegrams were actually sent them by Arabi,ordering them not 
to recognise the authority of the Kh€»dive," See Royle,p. 213
Continued
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I-ftihammad Ahnad al-Mahdi, the leader of the rebellion, 
was a pious man who preached the gospel of tfeihdi*ism. In 
August 1881, at the age of twenty-six, he had declared
himself as the He soon succeeded in getting a large
2 ofollowing • But the Sudanese Governor-General did not bec/4ro
aware of the significance and the consequences of the uprising
until July 1881, Meanvrhile, the MalKii*s following had swelled
to huge numbers, ai»5 when in August 1881, the first force was
Osent to suppress them, it was easily defeated * Another
4expedition in the following December was also an utter failure •
One more campaign was launched in Ifey *82, and with no better
results'^ * In January 1883, the Itahdists occupied al-Obaid
and henceforward, Mahdi*isn was a political force which took
about two de<fades to be broken up. Al-Mahdi died a natural
6death in June 1885 , Abdullah at-Ta»ayishi became his spiritual
7auccessor and Usman Digna took up the military command.
It was, in fact, the landing of the British forces
at Alexendria, that turned the Mahdi Movement into a fanatic
-S' ^one , In its dual character, it was analogous to Arabi Movement
1, Bustani, •♦Da’irat al-Ma»arif”, vol. X, p. 177
2, Rafi*i, pp. 92-94; Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum**, p. 15
3, Rafi'i,pp.94-955Royle,pp.214-15;Bustani,op.cit.,vol.X,p.l77
4, Hafi'i, pp. 95-96; Hoyle, pp. 215-16
5, Young, p. 133; Royle, p. 217; Rafi*i. pp. 96-97
6, Rafi’i.p. 131; Young, p. 133; Bustani, vol. X, p. 184
7, Rafi*i, pp. 140-51
8, Blunt, **Gordon at Khartum**,p.16; see also, Balim,op.cit.p.75 
Halim explains them as parall^ movements,in Egypt and Sudar
coirriTmED frc^  p. i4i.
4, “ISiat the European intervention in Egypt in general and th< 
Engl/^ijfli invasion in particular created the Mahdist movement 
cannot be proved-but seems probable.” See Young,op.cit.,p.l2
5. Young,p. 132,citing Col. Steward on Feb.27,1883; see also, 
Rafi*i, pp. 87-88
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It started as "the natural rebellion of a people against long
missovernnent and taking later a religioua coaplexlon
when Christian Europe had intervened in support of the
tyrannical ruler against the peopled ** In a way it was a
2counterpart of tJie Arabi movement*
It is difficult to assess the influence of the
Egyptian national movement on the inception of the Mahdi’s
uprising* The exiled al-AfJg^ bani and the defeated Arabi, both,
3had strong sjnapathies with the cause of the Mahdi* Arabi was
4aaong the trusted ones in the eyes of the Mahdi * As Minister 
of War, Arabi "had put hinself into communication with the 
Mahdi'^ * Al-Afghani claimed that the Mahdi had confidence in
him and that many of his companions and followers had been
6his sti»3ents • He gave much importance to the Ifovement* **^ e 
Muslins beleives in Mahdi as the saviour of Islam from 
non»beleivers”, al-Afghani wrote in a letter, **and hence I 
am unable to understand as to how a peace treaty could be
1* Blunt, op.cit., p* 79
2, Balim, op.cit,, p. 738
3, see al-Afghani*s al-Prwah  ^ai^ Arabi*s letters in Blunt, 
op.cit.. Appendix B. j
4, "If you are resolved Jco to the Mahdi**, Arabi wrote to
Blunt from Ceylon, ** I must most earnestly entreat you to 
secure beforehand some letters stamped with ay seal, in 
order that they may serve as the proof that you are a 
faithful friend of the Moslem world and that you have been
instrumental in saving our lives.” see Blunt, **Ckjrdon at
Khaitum", Appendix B, p.^8i Arabi*s letter dated June 2,188
5, Ibid., p.77| see also Arabi*s Programnie in Appendix E, of 
the same.
6, Ibid., p. 542. Letter of al-Afghani dated AprU 21,*84
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concluded while the Engl^ih were still In Egypt, ” Al-Afghanl^
paper, al-Prwah was for the most part devoted to the cause of
Egypt and to that of the Mahdi's Sudan. Later, in 1885,
al-Afghani was so deeply impressed by the Mahdi that he prayed
2
for his being proclaimed as Caliph at Constantinople,
In its pure form, the Mahdi Movement was a religious 
movement, and since a Christian Power controlled Egypt and 
consequently the Sudan also, the Movement took an anti-British 
turn. As late;t< as February *85, the anti-British paper, 
Bosphore Egyptian, published a proclamation in Arabic, reported 
to have been issudd by the Mahdi in which he invited the 
Egyptians to Join his cause^• Although it was alleged as 
being spurious, the Proclamtion betrayed at least a genuine 
desire on the part of the Egyptian intelligansia to support 
the cause of the Mahdi, or else it would not have been 
published in vain by the l^ per.
During the winter of 1888-89, the most popular 
figiires among the Fellahin of Egypt were those of Abdullah,
•
the successor of the Mahdi, and Usman Digna, his fighting
4lieutenant • «*i3ie popular imagination amongst the fellahin
1
1, Ibid., p.545* Letter of al-Afghani dated April 28, *84,
2, Ibid,, p, 492
3, Rafi*i, pp, 163-64; Milner, op,cit,,p, 120
4, Blunt, op.cit., p, 16, The position was not changed iilte
1884 when Muhammad Abduh told in his interview to the 
Correspondent of Pall Mall Gar.ette. that the Mahdi “has
the symj^ pathy of the masses because they see in him a
deliverer from Christian aggression," see Blunt, "Gordon 
at Khartum,” p, 624
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credited thaso with heros^ lc qualities and it was confidantly 
beleived that the Dorvish forces would before longyUpper Egypt,' 
Since the political repercussions of the Mahdist 
Movement reacted against the British, the Port© also seemed
pto he in syepathy with the cause *
iv
"■Rie English Goverraaent is attempting an iapossible 
task", Arahi reaar’ced while in exile in November, ’83« **They 
wish to asake Tewfik popular and they wish to introduce reforas. 
But Tewfik will only ronain popular as long as he is supported 
by the Eagl/SUh troops5 and when those are withdrawn, he will 
fall. Personally, Tewfik is without a friend in Egypt* The 
Egyptians hate him for having betray^ his country and the 
Circassions despise him for having betrayed his religion.
The better he is to the Engl^ ith the less chance he has of
g
conciliating his Countrymen.*•
Blunt,op,cit,, p.16, The position was not changed 4iUtel884 
when Muhanaad Abduh told in his interview to the Correspondei 
of Fall tlall gazette» that the Mahdl “has the sympathy of 
th« Sifyyt ^sses bccause they see in him a deliverer froa 
Christian aggression,” see Blunt,“Crordon at K3iartu»”,p,624
2, Blunt, Diaries,” vol. I, p, 13: Evidence of a nephew 
of Is»a*ll residing at the FHjHe,
3, The Tisaes, DecOTiber 13, 1883; Blunt, op.cit., p. 518^  
see also pp. 576, 677
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Bren six or seven years after the Occupation, the
popular attitude towards the Khedive had not undergone any
considerable chanje^. They looked down upon hia^  hated him,
but the reien of terror could not allow anyone to express
his real feellnfs* Ttiufiq, who was no less an antagonist to
the national movement than Lord Cromer himself, had become
wiser and more thoughtful with the passage of the time. The
British Agent tightened his hold more firmly day by day,
Egypt was becoming Anglicized rapidly and Taufiq was helpless
to check it* Once on seeing a British soldier passing by,
he remarked to one of his Ministers: **Do you suppose that I
like this? Why, every time that I pass a British soldier in
2
the street, I long to get out and take him by neck,** Such
reactions on his part, however, do not seem to have been
motivated by any noble nationalist sentiments, but by his
selfish Interest in his personal rule which Britain had
restored only to control herself. Otherwise, Taufiq never
diverged from the characteristic feature of his nature; he
3remained ‘loyal* to the Occux>atlon regime.
The national mo ement in its wider sense had died
down with the exile of Arabi, British was now the supreme
power in Egypt, The only checks to her unlimited authority 
were the Capitiilations, Prance and the Porte, The silent 
native resistence, besides their hopes of liberation in view 
of the continuous British pledges to evacuate the country and
1, Ibid,, p, 15
2, Dicey, writing in the Ninteenth Century of February, *92
cited by Rayt p, 33
3, Moberley Bell summed up Taufiq »s Character In the word
*loyal* t See "Khedives and Pashas'*, p, 4; se^lso.Ram, p, 289 » » 'i- »
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the autual negotiations of Britain and the Porte to get an 
honourable solution to that effect, was also a factor to be 
reckoned with.
Prance, taking advantage of the Capitulatory rights, 
made the Occupation regiae uneasy. In 1892, there were 
twenty-five newspapers published from Egypt in European 
languages, and most of them were in the French language.
They attaj^ cked British policy and administration in Egypt, 
and lost no chance of fishing in the troubled waters, 
laportant among these papers were Sphinx. Phare d* Alexendrie. 
and Bgs.phpr^ . Egy^tj^.^ Even an Arabic paper, al-Ittihad 
al-Misri. was being edited by a Frenchaum in 1886^•
Bosphore Egyptian was the most offensive of all these 
papers. It had been started from Cairo in pre-Occupation
3
days . It exploited every chance to instigate the Egyptians
against Britain. In the crisis-period of 1881-82, it had
4openly supported the national moveaent led by Arabi. In
February *85, the proclamation ejgganating from the Hahdi, already
5alluded to, was published in this paper . It was closed down 
by tja^  Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister \mder the new regime^ l
1. Rae. pp. 243-44, 245-46
2. Lanaau, p. 104
3. Rae, p. 240j Colvin, p. 115
4. Rae, p. 297
5. Rafl*!}. op.cit., pp. 163-64; Colvin, p. 116; Milner, p. 129.
Milner gives the month as April instead of February.
6. Under Occupation Sherif was the first Premier; Nubar
replaced hii|^.
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but the Capitulatory ri^ts came in between, and Nubar had to
take back his order^. After about seven years, a eonte«porary
writer cited sone more e*a»ples of its being a permanent
agitating element in the Egyptian politics: In the issue of
January 4, *92, the Paper ridiculXed the so-called reforms
brought fcbout by the Occupation regime. The entire structure
2sttod on sand, it remarked « fhe same language was repeated 
in the issue of Janiiapy 8, '92, On January 21, the Paper 
published another article of the same nature. About the 
Engl/^i!jh it remarked: **We see but a single category of 
individuals in Egypt that can hope to fish in the troubled * 
waters...,"^
As for the native Press, it was too feeble to come
out with such boldness. In 1892, there were twenty-one
newspapers in Arabic issued from Cairo ar^ Alexandria, and
only a few of these were important enough to be described
any contemporary writer, and fewer still which dared to
4criticize the Government , Al-Kuaattam. which started in
1, Milner, p, 120. On February 29, 1884- the Egyptian 
Government issued orders to suppress the paper. But 
Capitulations cane in the way, ”Por thirteen months, the 
Government put up with the open defiance of its authority. 
But when at the beginning of April, 1885, the Bosphore 
published a pretei^ed proclamation of the Mahdi inciting 
to rebellion in Egypt, and on the day following ••• repro­
duced the document in an Arabic translation, the cup of 
endtirance overflowed,
2, Rae, p, 241
3, Rae, pp, 240-41
4, See Rae, Hartman and Browne,
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March 1889, was a pro-Occupation paper edited by Syrian
Christians^. In the Pall Mall Gazetta of October 14,»91,
an interview of Dr* Niaar, the editor of this paper, appeared.
He said that there was no national activity whatsoever of any
2kind in Egypt, and as such there was no Egyptian Question • 
Al-»Ahrac and al»V/atan were moderately critical of the existing
3state of affairs, and al-Ahram supported France and Turkey,
Another paper al^Muav-^d. which started in Deceaber 1889, was
mildly critical of British policies. It was edited by Aha»d
Mazi airf as-Sayyid Ali Yusuf, and froo November, 1891 onwards,
the latter was the solo incharg© of the paper. Its policy was
nationalist-cum-Islaiiic, and it played quite a significant role
during this period. It campaigned against the foreign hold
and kindled the fire of nationalism at a time when pessiaism
4had overtaken the people of Egypt •
During the period following the Occupation, the 
liberation moveraent of Egypt was represented abroad by 'tiie
1, Sarruf, Nim#r and Makarius, See "Egyptian Enigaa”,
p, 28, Rae, p. 249
2, Rae, p, 249j Browne has called it as % unhealthy influences 
of British control
3, Rafi*i, pp. 162-63; Rae, pp. 247-48;
4, Rafi’i, p, 249; Wood, p. 154; Browne, pp. 331-32
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we«kly al»Pr^at al-Wuthaa. of al-Afghani, Interned in Calcutta
during the daya of Arab! Revolt, al-Afghani was allowed to
leave India, and he sailed for England on September 23, *83,
On h l3  way froai Port Sa’id he wrote to his exiled desciple
Muhaasaad Abduh informing hi* about his future programme^.
Instead of proceeding to England, al-Afghani reached Paris
and there set hiiaself to work for the liberation of Eastern
countries in general and Egypt and tJie Siidan in particular,
Abduh had responded to his call and had joined him in Paris.
They founded an Intornatlonal organisation, al-Jam * i'rvat
£^-»Ur\/at al-Wuthaa by name. It was a secret political society
2al-*T7rwah was laade its organ . Al- *Prwah was despatched
to every Muslia country and to eminent politicians cf the world.
Among its main objeetlves were: resistance to ard freedom froM
Imperialism, revival of the golden period of ttio Orthdox
Caliphate by tt^ e establisheaent of Islaafc rule, and bringing
out reforms in Islasic faithj the imiedlate object was, of
3course, the liberation of Egypt and the Sudan,
AL-'Urwah was edited by Muhanmad Abduh and al-Afghani 
together, The character of the paper was not different froa 
that of director of the policy of the paper, al-Afghani himself, 
who was a staunch antl-Iaperialist, had frequently visited 
and resided in nany Islamic countries, and had political 
connections with most of these countries. Hence he concieved 
the entire Muslia world as an organic whole. To hi^ , the 
political problems of Iran, Afghanistan or India were the same 
as tiiose of the Sudan, Egypt or Turkey, the only difference 
being that of degree. Broadly speaking, all these countries
n  Bashid Reza, '•Tarlkh al-Usta|Ktal-I«UB'*t vol. i*pp« 281-822, Ibid., pp, 283-288
3, Ibid,, p. 283
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were confronted with the same question, naaely, how to face 
Inperlallsm. Al-Afghanl's sole ala was to awaken the political 
consciousness of the people and to create unity aaongst thea 
so that they night be ahle to oppose laperialism of Russia, 
France and Britain, % e  question of Egypt and the Sudan was, 
however, an inmediate one as it was resulted from the latest 
Imperialist aoves,
Al«*Urwah claimed that its aias were in no way 
sectarian. "The objective is to awaken the Bastern people 
in general and the Muslias in particulars to the danger of 
foreign domination.••• The particularization in addressing 
to the Muslins is because they coaprise the najoril7  of the 
^inhabitants of those countries which have been dominated by 
the foreigners," al-Urwah explained Urn its policy^.
The first issue of the journal appeared on Marek 13,
1884, and the last on October 16 of the same year. Al-Afghani
was the director of the policy ( Mudir as-Siyassat ), and Abduk
was its editor-in-cheif, Mirza Muhamnad Baqir of Iran was
assistant to the editor and translated news from the European
2press • Rashid asserted, on the authority of Amir Shakib
Arsalan, that the contents of the paper were of al-Afghani,
f 3whereas the writing was that of AbduhJ's • Most probably, ttie 
form and the matter were the result of their cabined efforts.
1*. Al-Urwat al-Wmthqa, May 15, *84, p. 190
2. Ahmad Anin, op.cit., p. 81
3. Hashid vol. 1, p. 289
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AWuh, no doubt, 'oelonged to an Arabic speaking country by 
birth, arid al»Un/aiir vras in Arabic. But ke lacked the qualities 
of tiie dynamic personality of al-Afghani, in who* a statesman, 
a thinker and a journalist vor© fused in one. Moreover, 
al-Afghaiii had the opportunity of residing in Egypt for about 
nine years, and for an intelligent person as he was, this 
period is sufficient to acquire a thorough knowlege of, and 
a coKimand over, the Arabic language^, Al-Urwah, in its entirety
betrays the spifcit of al-Afghani rather than of Abduh or
a/anyone else, and it is not exgeration to say that in every
page and every composition of the journal, ai-Afghani*s voice
2was clearly discefnible •
It is Interesting to note and signifies the
importance of the paper that even before it started, the news
of its publication had alaread the laperialisfca who were
annoyed with the very idea of such paper. British papers,
launched a caapaign against it, warning their Oov9rn»Beat to
3take step beforehand •
Apart fron the problems of India, Aghanistaa, Iran 
a»d Turksy, and the news la brief of the neat iaportaat 
events of the world, greater part of the journal was devoted 
to Egypt and the Sijian. On the Egyptian Question, al-*Urwah
1. On al-Afghani’s stay in Eg3rpt, see above, p. Ill
2. It is sipcnificant that Muhamad Abduh, after departing froa 
al-Af{;hani, never wrote anything in that particular forceful 
style of al-*Urrfah which style may easily be distinguished 
aeong the conteatjorary Arabic writings of the period,
3. Al-*Urwah, AprU 10, 1884, pp. 112-13
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exprassed the view that the sovereign rights belonged to the
Sultan-Callph. It admitted that Egypt had becone a concern
of the Powers due to is financial obligations as also by-
virtue of possessing the naritiae highway through the Caaal.
Keeping this situation in riewy al-*Urwah proceeded on its
mission, attacking the MaladBinistratito, caused by the
Occupation rogiae and the tyranny and injustice, perpetrated
by the laperialists, and encouraged its readers to rise against
1slavery and foreign doaination.
Its naijB objectives were "the preservation of the
independence of the Eastern people, and the admonishing of2
the Engl/S^ Government," But the main emphasis always 
remained on the Egyptian Question. In fact, on one occasion 
al«'Urwah declared the defence of Egypt as its main objective. 
Most of the editorials were written on the Egyptian Question, 
wherein the Occupation was criticized and the situation was 
analysed scientifically so as to inctlcate among the Egyptians 
the spirit of revolt. Instigating the people to rise against 
the Occupation, it emphatically proclaimed that to defeat
3the Occupation forces was an affair hardly of a few days .
There is no evidence, however, of the actual 
influence it exercised on Egypt or tJie reactions it caused
1« Bashid Heza, vol. I, p. 331 
V 2. Letter of AMuh to Blunt, dated April 11, »84 Blunt,
" Gordon at Khartim ", p. 541
3. Al-Urwah, August 3, p. 60j Al-Urwah, September 24, ‘84
pp. 203-204
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tkere. This nuch Is certain that the P^per was Isanned by the
1EcTptlan Governraent 9 which Indicates that It did exercise 
considerable Influence•
Besides leading the campaign /Stor Egjrptlan freedoa 
through the press, al>Afghanl and Abduh continued their struggle 
through talks with Influential personalities In political 
circles and by Issuing statements In various papers of Bnglaiai,
In August *84, Abduh visited Iiondon, »et the top-polltlclans
theve, and argued with then over the genuineness of the 
Egyptian cause. Again, interviewed by the Correspondent of 
the Pall Mall Gazette on August 17, he saldt '*We EgyptlaLss of 
Liberal party believed once in English libeiallsm and Engl/ish 
sympathy; but we believe no longer for facts are stronger than 
words**.. You have ruined everything that was good in us so 
that you nay have an excuse for keeping possession of our 
country.••• Before the war and (furlmg the war, we quarreled 
with each other. We wished to break down the tyranny of our 
rulers; we complained of the Turks as foreigners; we wished to 
improve ourselves politically and to advance as the nations 
of Europe have advanced in the path of liberty. Now we know 
that there are worse evils than despotism and wo9se enemys 
than the Turks^ We see in them our brothers in religion, not 
in race and if you would only leave us alone with them we should
know how to get on In peace.
1. Ibid.,
2 . Blunt. Op.clt., p. 623
After aakiag a strong plea for Evacuation, Abduk argued
for the appointment of a new ruler for Egypt for a ter* of a few
years, and finally the people would elct their ruler theaselves,
However, his visit proved of no avail. He returned to Paris
dejected and disappointed. Al»*Urwah wrote about tdaia Mission
and enuaerated with deep regret the causes of its failure. The
essence of al«*Urwah*s appraisal was that the laperialists were
not going to leave their possession so easily^,
ProB July to October 1885, al-Afghani was in London*
With the combined effor/ts of Blunt, Lord Rando|>ph Churchill and
al-Afghani, Vfolff had been agreed to take al-Afghani im his
company to Constantinople with a view to get his assistance in
2the Anglo-Turkish negotiations • Wolff, however, changed his
sij»! at the eleventh hour and ijiformed about it on August 15.
3The chances of an honoiirable agreement were lost •
On the whole, throughout the period lu^er review, the 
liberation movement continued to remain weak. Al-*Urwah> at least 
deserves a high place as regards its role in the entire struggle. 
Its struggle did not bear fruits in its lifetime, but, certainly, 
it had some significant far-reachiag effects, and it must have 
had its influence in creating in the next generation sc»e bolder 
and most powerful fighters for the cause of their country.
1. Al-Urwah, August 14, *84, pp. 113-14
2. Blunt, op.cit., p. 475-78
3. Ibid., p. 481
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C H A P T E R  V
__ NEW NATIONALISM
"Twenty years before, it was 
possible to question even the 
very existence of Egyptians••••
But since a tremendous change 
has occurred. These twenty 
years that have been passed 
under the domination of a 
righteous foreign rule, ha¥e 
helped them reviving the 
patriotic thinking and its paraphernalia. 
The Egyptians of today know, 
as they ought to know, that they 
have a responsibility towards their 
Motherland which demands certain 
duties to be performed.”
Lutfl Juma* "Tahrir Misr",p*116 
( published in 1906 )
"Ky countryi ny‘countryl For thee, 
my love, my heart; for thee my 
life and existence, ny soul and 
blood...j verily thou, thou art 
the life, and there is no life 
without thee, 0 Egypt.**
Kamil
cited by Haikali "Tarajim'*,p.3
“Through the spoken word, through the newspapers, 
and througji the books, I will strive 
to aweOce my countrymen’s patriotism, 
so as to restore Egypt to the Egyptians 
and the Egyptians to Egypt."
_____  Kamil
( Letter to Mne. Adam, in 18? 
cit9, Kohn
On January 7,1892, the *lo3ral» Tauflq died, and with hia 
severed the Englishman's 'admirable link*^ between Egjrpt and 
Britain. Tauflq ruled Egypt only in name. Virtually, he had 
completely surrendered to, and was under the direct control oJ
1. Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol. II, p. 331
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1 ^Cromer • Cromer’s legal position was that primus inter paresA
in relation to the Consuls of other Powers, anA in fact he
2was the Virtual ruler of Egypt, A veiled Protectorate worked
smoothly and Taufiq never dared to resist any attempt of
encroachment upon the Khediv4al authority,
Abbas Hilmi, a youth of eighteen, succecled his
father Taufiq as the new Khedive of Egypt, He was educated
at Vienna, was brought up in a free atmosphere and hence
was unfamiliar with the ways and means of the dual government
of Egypt, That is why he became a source of trouble to the
Supervisors of Egyptian Government, Abbas did not form a
good opinion about his lojral father; he reverred Isma*il
3who did not willingly surrender to foreigners , During his 
first interview with the Khedive, Cromer found in him a
4youth who was "going to be very Egyptian,"
On his accession, the first thing Abbas had to 
encounter with was a show of sovereignty on the part of the 
Su4tan, A Caliphal Firman of investiture to each new ruler 
of Egypt was a time-honoured tradition and a prerogative of 
the Porte, The sovereignty of the Sultan had been displayed 
in the case of Isma*il's deposition, and, for a second time, 
in the negotiations with Britain and with other Powers on the
1, Dicey, "The Egypt of the future", p. 23j Diceyi " The 
Story of the Khediviate", d, 337
2, In 1898, White ( A. Silva ) asserted that even without
a declaration Britain had a Protectorate as Prance had
in Tunis and Madagasear. without any formal usage of that 
word. See White, op*cit*. p. 359
3, Cromer: " Abbas II p, 12
4, Ibid,, p, 4: Letter to Lord Rosebery dated February 21.
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EgTptian Question, before and after the Occupation* This
time again, the Sultan had the opportunity of making a show
of his sovereignty. The incident was not in itself significant
but its consequences were far-reaching.
The new Firman of investiture laid down the Egyptian
1frontiers as "drawn from Suez to El-Arish**; the Sinai 
peninsula was to revert to Turkey. Britain, in its own 2interest, interfered and the Sultan at last had to surrender.
It took about three months to settle the matter, and after
it had come to an end, it had left some permanent impressions
on the youthful mind of Abbas as to exploit the sovereignty
of the Porte against the British Supervisory regime.
Cromer saw in Abbas an Egyptian patriot, who woiild
be re^y to listen to those advisors who would support the
3idea of an autonomous Egypt . He hated those Eg3rptians who
had reconciled with the Occupation. Re liked Tigrane Pasha
4because Tigrane was a true Egyptian , but he hated Mustapha
5 6Fehmi , who was "too English.” Na,rrating the events of
1892-93, Blunt observed that the Khedive had "managed to
gather about him the nucleus of a new National party which
consisted of what elements there were in Egypt either of
1. Cromer* "Modern Egypt", vol. II, p. 268
2. Ibid., pp. 268-69
3. Crcaaer: ”Abl»s 11", pp. 9-10
4. Tigrane was the son-in-law of Nubar. He collaborated 
with the political party, "Young Egypt" which was working 
to get rid off the Occupation and was almost exclusively 
ccanposed of levantine and Armenian Christians. See Dicey i 
The Storjrfy of the Khediviatej alsos Cromer* "Abbas II",p.1]
5. Fehmi, who later became prime minister and proved to be 
too loyal to Occupation.
6. Cromer, op.cit., p. 10 quoting Abbas, the Kheive,
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discontent or of such patriotism as was to be found in the
country,•• which resented the prssence of foreign and
Christian rule,,,. By the end of the year 1892, the Young
Khedive was already popiHar witti his native subjects,,,,**^
In August 1892, Liberals again came to power in
England. Gladstone*3 pledge of Evacuation still stood
unimpaired. In Egypt, the young Khedive started behaving
like a real ruler of the country, Ka made tours round the
provinces, met the Sheikhs and the Ulema, visited academic
and other institutions, enquired into the affairs of various
branches of administration, and made observations regaMing
thejdiscrepancies in the departments of Education ar^ Army,
2and in general administration • IJnexpectGd as such behaviour 
was to the British Agent, it was most unwelcome and as such 
was not appreciated. Yet Cromer took natters lightly in
3view of the changad atnospheue.
In December 1892, liustapha Pehmi, toe pro-Occupatior 
Premier of Egjrpt, fell seriously ill, 'Dio question of his 
successor, in the event of his death, perplexed everyone. 
However, Fehmi improved and got well. But the 'very Egyptian* 
Khedive had found an opportunity to get rid o ^  the British 
tooge^and he gave orders for his dismissal on JanuarJ; 15, *93, 
appointing Ffeikhri Pasha in his place. Along with Pehmi,
4another Minister of ttxe same group was also dismissed .
1. Blunt* diaries”, vol. I, p. 104
2. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p, 235
3. Cromer, op,cit,, p, 18
4. Dicey, op.cit,, p, 461; Cromer, op,<.cit,, pp. 18-21
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Cromer sav in these dismissals an obvious intention on the
part of the Khedive to give a decisive blow to British
influence; he feared that Arabist ideas were being revived
under a new garb of Khedivialism^. Re telegraphed the
position to the British Foreign Office, stating that ” the
whole situation Tjoiy only of the English officers here,
but also of Eng]^^ Governiaent will be changed if ttie Khedive
2is permitted to act as he has done in this matter,.,,"
Cromer strongly urged his Government to act firmly at least 
regarding the nomination of the Premier, and the foreign
Office forthwith sent a telegram strongly objecting the
r) 5^appointment of Pakhri and insisting on the maintenaco/status
3quo • At last a compromise was reached. Instead of Fakhri,
Hiaa was nominated as Premier, to which, Abbas, considering
4it a lesser evil, gave his consent • For Cromer, neither
of the parties had come out -with a decisive victory®.
Perhaps he was not satisfied with his vlctoiy at least.
In the meanwhile, Rlaz himself had somewhat changed.
With an anti-Buropean bias which he had developed, he was
keen to see the British Influence reduced to the minimum.
He encouraged the shadow-representative institutions to
6assert themselves against the Occupation . He gave his full
1. Cromer, op.cit., p. 33
2. Ibid., p. 23
3. Dicey, on.cit., p. 463j Triall, op.cit., p. 285; Cromer, 
op.cit., p. 24
4. Dicey, op.cit., p. 462-63; Triall, p. 288;Royle,op.cit., 
p. 499; Cromer, op.cit., p. 23
5. Cromer, op.cit., p. 27
6. Ibid., pp. 43-45
u ii: .
I O f
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support to the Khedive in his anti-British activites and
observed that ” the Khedive *s coriduct had iimnensely raised
him in the popular estimation and that all the Egyptians
were on his side."^
Abbas had actmlly become very popid.ar among the
masses, Ihe native press described his recent action as a
2
decisive victory over the British Agent , Denonstrations
were held in front of the office of the pro-British paper
al-Muaattaa, Many meetings v/ere organised to condemn the
British policies and deputations came to the Khedive to
3congratulate him on his firm stand .
At this Juncture Abbas thou^t of exploiting the 
sovereignty of the Porte and of fitting another duel with 
Cromer, after securing the support of the Sultan, In the 
summer of 1893, he visited Constantinople where he endeavoured 
to enlist the symi>athies of the Sultan. Simultaneously, 
a deputation of the Egyptian Sheikhs arrived to present a 
petition to their sovereign to save Egypt from the foreigners. 
But the Sultan, always wavering in his policies, coi^ not 
muster enough to oppose Brit/iin quite openly. The deputation 
was treated indifferently and the Khedive was adv4s«3 to 
resign himself to the dictations of the fate, Abbas returned
1* Ibid,, p. 3 6 ^
2, an-Nadim*s articles In his weekly al-Ustadh under the 
title "Lau Kuntiun Mithluna la PJaltum F’lluna" ( If you
were in our place, you would have done like us____ ”Salafi
Un-Nadlm" vol.II, p« i^; See also. Ahmad Amin,op,cit,,]f,2383, Cromer, op.cit,, p, 38; Ahmad Amin, p, 238
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to Egypt completely disappointed and dejected •
In July 1893, Abbas appointed Mahir Pasha as the
under-Secretary in the War department, and Mahir set himself
2to undermine the authority of the British General^  Kitchner • 
In January ’94, accompanied by Mahir, Abbas went up the 
Nile, inspected the native troops, made critical comments 
on the organisation of the anay, and ‘insulted British
3
officers*• Matters came to a head when on January 19,
Ite Abbas, making various observations in connection with
the army, at Wadl4 Haifa, publicly remarked that “it was
in his opinion a disgrace that the Egyptian army should be
4so insufficient," Upon this. General Kitchner launched 
a formal protest, tendered his resignation and telegraphed 
the situation to Cromer who was himself in search of a 
"suitable opportunity for striking a decisive blow."® Now, 
he could easily allege that the Khedive "had begun to 
encourage disloyalty and disobedience .on the part of the 
soldiers towards their own officers,"® He had found a 
favourable ground on the basis of which he could inflict 
upon the Khedive "a severe humiliation than has ever befallen
7the ruler of Egypt since the days of Arabi," In a telegram
1. Cromer,op.cit,,pp. 45,46; Blunt, op.cit,, pp. 205,255-56, 
To Blunt, Abbas related his failure-visits. and complained 
after his second visit in 1895, of the indifferent 
attitude of the Sultan: See also-Triall*s remark that the 
reaction of these visits "balanced" the mind of the 
Khedive, Triall, op.cit,,p. 308
2. Royle, op.cit,, p, 50; Triall, op.cit., pp. 301-303
3. Cromer, op.cit.. pp. 51,57
4. Ibid., p. 51* Kitchner»s Telegram; See also. Blunt, oprcit 
pp, 155-59
5. Cromer, op.cit., p. 50
6. Ibid., p. 52
7. Milner, "England and Egypt"* Preface, xx
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to the British Foreign Office on January 20, Cromer explained
the whole situation and asked for sanction to remove Msihlr
Pasha from his office. The Foreign Office responded to
his call and the following day Instructions came In the
following terms* "The removal of Ifeher Pasha and the
Issue of an order ••• In commendation of British officers
and the army Is the only reparation which ••• the Khedive
can make. In the event of his refusing to give just
satisfaction, stringent measures must be considered.**."^
At last, the Khedive had to yelid and In an open letter
expressed his full satisfaction with the General and his
organisation of the Bgyptlan army. Mahir was replaced hy
2a norainee of the General • Soon after, Rlaz was replaced by 
Nubar anfl, when Nubar retired due to ill-health, the 
Premlerahip returned to Mustapha Pehml in 1895. 15ie Young 
Khedive seemed to have been exhausted, as he raised no
to.objection against the appointment dlc;ted by Cromer.
3"In the "struggle wltti Abbas", as Cromer puts it,
Cromers* diplomacy had seemingly won the day, and as such,
Cromer marked the year 1894 as a decisive turning point in
4the British diplomatic history . Blunt also remarked that 
the Insurgent nationalism died in 1894 only to emerge late 
in 1906®. With Fehml commenced a new era which was to last
1. CrOTier, op,clt.,p.57j Despatch of Rosebery to Cromer.
2. Ibid., p. 59
3. Ibid., p. 65* Letter of Hosbery
4. Ibid., pp. 63-64
5. Blunt, op.clt., p. 171
- 164 -
for about a decade during which time Cromer was supreme, 
"governing through merely dummy native Ministers with Muatapha 
Pehmi at their head.**^  Ablms had completely surrendered to 
his fate.
In fact, the insurgent movement of 1892-94 was
not a national movement. It vras a Kone-man struggle for
securing his own personal dignity. It had no deep roots
amongs<^ the people of Egypt. The middle-class of Egypt had
not yet become fully conscious of the political importance
of the situation. Yet, this one-man struggle gave some
impetus to the popular movement which was still in the making.
Moreover, it had emboldened the common man, who, following
the exaiaple of the aggressive Khedive, had begun thinking
2in terms of self-respect . He was re-assured t2iat with the 
backing of the legal ruler of the country, he could now 
openly criticise the Occupation and its policies. The Khedive, 
had to quit the battlefield. He had succeeded, however, in 
creating among the people a critical spirit and a bold 
dutlook.
11
In the pre-Occupation days, the Egyptians were 
divided mainly into two groups: the Fallahln, mostty belonging
1. Ibid., p. 251
2. Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol.II,p. 200 i Letter of an 
Egyptian Sheikh dated February 2, 1894
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to Muslim faith, and the Turco-Ciroassians. After the advent 
of Britain in Egypt, the Turco-Circassian class began to 
identify its interests with those of the widdle or lower 
middle classes of the natives. This change in their attitude 
came only after ttie passage of time. Thus, in sharp contrast 
to Arabi Movement vfhlch signified the struggle of the lower 
class both against the Suropaans and the Tureo-Circassians, 
the post-Occupation period had dissolved to a great extent 
the class spirit in face of a foreign domination. In the 
new situation, the leadership was also to be changed* 135ia 
modernising measures of British administration, and the 
spreading of Western education since the pr«-Ctecupatlon days, 
were giving birth to a new middle class politically more 
conscious than even the pasha group of the pre-British era. 
Settled conditions of order, peace and prosperity had made 
them thoughtful of the problems beyond those of bread and 
butter, ’•Already richer then ever in tJielr history, eve rone 
seems to be striving after ir«3ependence'*, remarked a 
contemporary trevelleri'
•nie now emerging leadership respected the Sultan 
as their spiritual head but not as their temporal sovereign. 
Even in the Pirman incident of 1892, few Egyptians took the 
side of the Sultan, Once again, when in 1906 the question 
of Sinai peninsula arose, strong pro-Turkish feelings were 
temporarily roused among the people, but they soon vanished
1, Kelly* "Egypt painted and described", p, 231} see also 
Chirol, op.cit,, p, 85; Cromer, p, 14
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away and died a natural deatti^ . They hated foreign yoke,
whether it was British or Tiirksih,
Freodoni of press aijd palatforo enabled the Egyptians
to voice their grievences. **The best Aft that England has
yet given to Egypt is**, the freedom of the Press", observed
a natiiralized Egyptian writer in the early years of the
2present century • The Press kept the people informed of 
political developments in the contemporary Islamic world,
✓
outside Egypt. It also increased their knowledge of European 
culture and institutions. As a result, they became more 
politically-conscious. The native press was often blunt hn& 
harsh towards the Occupation regime, and in its criticism 
it followed the pattern of the Franco-Sgyptian press.
One of the French papers. Journal Egyptian, referred 
to above, published in its every issue ”tiie pledges of 
Great Britain,^ The following statement was regularly 
printed in every issue of the paper* "The policy of Her )t 
Majesty’s Government in regard to Egypt has no other object 
than the prosperity of the country and its full possession 
of the (liberty which it obtained by virtue of the successive 
firmans of the Sultan down to, and incliiaiing, that of 1879,
The tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, 
an important safeguard against a foreign intervention; and
1, Cromer, Modern Egypt, pp. 169-70
2, Browne, op.clt., p, 334; see also !4sihbub Alam, edited
by Abld Heza, Burhan, JTovember 1958: Amrlfesari, edited
by Abid Reza, *Biurhan*, October 1958
3, Wood, op.clt,, pp. 58-59
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for that reason our object is to maintain that tia such as
it exists today. Any intention on the part of our Government
or the other (French or English) to enlarge its influence
would be sufficient to destroy this useful cooperation.
The Khedive and his Ministers may be rest assured tiiat
Her I>(^ je3ty's Govennent does not aim at any departure from
the line of conduct v/hich it has itself hitherto traced.
(Despatch of Lord Qranville)."^
Another paper of this type was Sphinx  ^which
2severely criticiaed the Occupation • The Phare d*Alexendrie -
was said to have been subsidized by the Khedive so as to
3work against the Occupation •
The main period of the French journalistic activities
lasted until 1892, but since then it was mainly the native
Arabic press which gave the lead, educated the people,
informed then w^^^Pnational and international affairs and
led the agitation and resistance movement.
In 1892, ttie total number of newspapers and
4Journals published in Egypt was about fifty . In 1898, the 
number had reached to about two hundred®, and in 1904, it 
was almost double that number* In 1904, 188 papers were 
being published in Arabic} of the remaining, fifteen were 
in Greek, three in French, three in Englsih, six in Italian, 
three in Turkish, two in French-Arabic-Englsih, two in 
Englsih-Prench-Italian, and one in Prench-Arabic 6
1. Ibid. pp. 58-59
2. Rae, op.cit., pp. 243-44
3. tfooa, op.cit., p. 41; Rae, pp. 245-46
4. Rae, op.cit., pp. 338, 239-40
5. Young, op.cit., p. 180
6 . Al-Hilal, Janiiary, 1905, p. 542
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The Egyptian Press did not only glvs expression 
to public opinion and public sentiments. It moulded it too. 
Political groups were centred round those neifspapers which 
began to be used as ysarty-organs, As a mater of fact, the 
entire raovement for national liberation had been concentrating 
on using the papers as their mouthpiece, and seemed as 
though it had turned into a newspaper \farfare, Araong the 
leading papers were* al-Muayvad of %eikh Ali Yusuf (estd,
December 1, 1889) and, al-Liwa of Mustafa Kamil (estd.
2January 2, 1900)  ^second in importance were: al^Ahran.
Fellah, and the Sg\>'r)tlan Herald, all the three being
3pro-Turkish • Abdullah an-Nadim‘s weekly,j(^6Usta^,
( estd. August 23, 1892 ), migjit havo become the leading
paper, had its life not been cut short soon after its
inception* It made severe criticism of European culture,
and aimed at reform in politics as well as in the society.
Besides, encouraged both indirectly and as well as directly
by the attitude of the Khedive, al-Ustad^openly opposed
4the Occupation and its continuation •
As for al-Muayyad and al-Liwa, inspite of tiieir 
differences in methodology, their objectives were common,
1. Brown&op,cit,,p,1645 Al-Manar,October 30,1913,^, 154
Hafill, "J!ustafa Kamil”, p,68t In the beginning, the Daily 
tm contained four pages; but since 1906, the pages were 
increased to six. The Snglsih edition of al-Liva. "The 
Egyptian Standard”, was started on March 3,1907, and the 
French, ‘’L’Etandard**, on March 2, 1907
3, To explain the trend of al-Ahram; it wrote in one of its 
issues that till the autumn of 1896, within six months, 
Britain would vacate Egypt. See wood,op,cit. ,p,119,f,n. ,1:25 121-122
4, Ahmad Amin,op,cit,,pp.235-38: see also: an-Nadim*s article 
published on January 17, 1893, wherein he analysed the 
structure of Imperialism and encouraged his countrymen
to gather round the Khedive to safeguard their legal 
rights (Salafat an-Nadln, vol.II,pp,64-83), It may alsoCONTINUED.....
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namely the education of public opinion and the Evacuation
of British forces, Thtjy supplemented each otiier, ”In th®
militant article; of al-Liwa vas heard ttie heart beatings
of the nation, while al»Muayyad represented the deep
1thinking intellect of Egypt," Ali Yusuf was a journalist
in the true sense of titie word, while Kamil was a political
agitator and$^  a public orator, and this was the difference
between the two papers. Thus each represented a seperate
way of thinking and methodology, Ali Xusuf adopted a moderate
2viewpoint, whereas Kamil was nothing less than an extremist ,
Al-Liwa represented the majority of the Egyptians,
but before its publication, there was no match to al-»Muayyad.
Writing about Sheikh Ali Yusiif in 1893, Hartmann wrote*
"His paper is a power to be reskoned with, Moslems read
it with pleasure, finding in it what most delights their
3hearts,**
1, Ham2^a, op,cit,, p, 107
2, Al-Man^, October 16,1913* Article on Ali Yuauf.
3, Hartmann, '‘Arabic Press fli^ Egypt".|ip.ii} H,A,Browne*s 
remark on the paper is wort3i quoting. The reaark comes 
from hislas a contemporary of All Yusiif, who met him, 
Brovme was also a keen observer of the developments of 
Egyptian politics, Th» remark is about the year 1907,
•^ is Daper is a power to be rackoned with, Moslems 
read it with pleasure, finding in it what most delights 
their hearts,,,! When I add that this man is a nan of 
thought, of great self-restraint, endowed with patience, 
energy and porseverenee, I have drawn the pictiire of one 
who, in any community, must exercise a large influence 
as a journalist but amidst a people like the Egyptians, 
so little prone to think for the^elves, must iiadeed be 
a pcwer to reckon witli. As e^ aet, he has done more to 
guide and mould Moslem opinion in Egypt than any other 
ten »en that could be named^” Browne,op,cit,,pp, 331-32} 
see also, Bara3a^ .88-9
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The spread of education had produced a considerable
number of literates among the Pollahln who read the papers
and passed on the gist orally within their circles of influence.
Contemporary observers confess the influence and popularity
of the native press. Everything that appeared in black and
white was accepted by the Fellahin, specially if the charge
made was one that appealed to tlieir "instinctive dislike and
1distrust of foreign rulers."
ill
^art from the journalistic activities, many poets
and authors had joined hands with the nationalists in opposing
the Occupation, (bhmud Sami al-Baroudl ( d. 1904 ), the leading
revolutionary of 1881-82, left his impress on the poets of
his age. He had brou^t about a drastic change in the style
and presentation of poetry as also in its subject-matter.
The aim was to make poetry as simple real and natural as
2possible . The new generation had emerged as more humanist
1. Dicey, ”The Egypt of the Future”, p. 195
2. Dnar ad-Dasuqi, "Mahmud Sami al-Barudl",
Continued from p. 168.
be noted that the article appeared amidst the duel between 
Cromer and Abbas, on the question of appointment of 
prime minister. The duel had awakened the Egyptians to 
the danger of dissensions caused by the Occupation. See 
also Ahmad Amin, p. 238
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and practical. Among thera vras Khalil -^Sit2^ an ( 1870-1949),
a nationalist poet of a very high calibre. He composed the
first non-official national ant?iQn for the Nationalists^,
Hafiz rbrahia ( 187L,>'72 - 1932 ), the soldicr-poet had
dfjvotad his entire potentialities to tho cause of tho
liherati6n of Egypt. He was among those eighteen officers
who had rebelled in the Sudan in 1899, Ha wrote Inspiring
nationalist poetry in satire and v/it. His oda on the
•Dinshawai Tragedy* stirred the Egyptians and precipitated
the fall of Cromer. Hafiz was a close friend of Kamil,
Muhammad Abduh and S'ad Zaghlulj and inspite of his less
polished diction, his compositions bore the stamp of a staunch 
SbRationalist • Ahmad Shawqi (1S68-1932), vho for many years 
was against any kind of nationalistic activites, anS had 
ridiculed Arabi and his movement in his verses, tumed into 
a patriot after the death of the »loyal* Khedive Taufiq,
Ho became very close to Kamil, who appreciated his poetry, 
Inspite of an aristocratic tinge in his poetry, he soon became 
rival of Rafiz in patriotic poetry. Pride in ancient history 
and the glories of Islam and Arabic language were his chosen 
subjects? Among the other nationalist poets of lesser
1, Islamic Culture, April, 1949, Article on 'Hafiz Shawqi 
and Matran*
2, Ahmad Amin: Introduction to the Divan of Matran,pp,(in 
Arabic) j,k,m,kh,gh; see also, C3iorbal, ”Tarlkh ai-Mufawaza 
al-Britainia”, vol. I, p. 32
3, See ^.avqiats 4 vols.
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Importance, the names of al-liashlf al-GBiayatl, and Isma*U
Sabrl are votth mentioning^•
The nationalist poetry of this period is full of
vigour and enthusism. The compositions of all these poets
on the events of national importance, such as Dinshavai,
Cromer's fall, and lately, the Suez issue and the murder of
the Copt Premier Butrus (Siali, are the typical examples of
2such poetry •
Prose writings of the period also contributed to 
a certain extent to national awakening, but not as much as 
poetry did. Apart from the vonks of Kamil, and the writings 
of famous journalists, small amoimt of political literature 
was produced in prose. The/ Syrian refugee Abd ar-Rahman 
al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) is a solitary example who, in 1899, 
wrote his famous monograph Taba*i al-Istibdad. a critique 
to Islamic States, and Dmm al-oura  ^a critique to Islamic 
people. The works proved to be most effective and gave 
an impetus to new revolutionary thou^ts in the coming
3generation •
Most of the prose-writings of sutiy worth deal with 
the social rather than the political problems of the country,
4Among such writings those of Muhammad Abduh (d, 1905), and 
Qasim Amin (1865-19C^) are representative ones, Qasim Amin 
was the pioneer worker for the emancipation of woman in 
Egypt, In 1899 and 1900, he published his "Tahrir al-Mar*at**
1, Bamza. op,cit,, pp, 84-97
2, See Divan of Matran; Shawqiayat: Divan of Hafiz




and *^Mlp*at a l-Jad id a" , which sxercisod a great Influence on
contemporary soc ia l thinking^’, Ahduh*s main in te re s t  was
in  the problem "how to  bring Islam and i t s  ways in to  harmony
2
w ith modern society  •" To achieve th is  e i^ , he made e ffo rts  
to  carry  out reforms in  al-Azhar and i t s  curriculam . As a 
m atter of f a c t ,  h is  famous !l^fsir of the Quran, edited by 
h is  d esc ip le , Rashid Heza, i s  a lso  a complementary work 
w ith the wider aspects of Abduh’ts  aims. Next in  importance 
was T ai‘a t  Flarb, the authdr of Tarbivat a l  Mar*att then 
Parid Wajdi, a p ro lif ic  w rite r  on the subjects of re lig ious 
and so c ia l reforms; and la s t ly ,  the e n tire  al»Manar grpup 
which, th o u ^  reactionary  in  p o l i t ic s ,  had d is t in c t  progressive
3
ideas on so c ia l and re lig io u s  reforms •
The word »reform* was so much in  vogue th a t i t
4became a Jo u rn a lis tic  term of d a ily  use • The reform ist
movement advocated by prominent authors and jo u rn a lis ti  
included some of the Government o f f ic ia ls  a lso , e .g . Ahmad. 
Fath i Zaghlul, who tran sla ted  the book "S irr  Taqaddum a l -  
Injliz**, in  1899, and wrote a thou^t-provoking Introduction
1 , Baikal, “Ta^im**, p. 164} Muhammad H usain,op.cit.,pp*278, 
291-93 A
2 , Cromer, "Modem E g y p t" ,v o l.II ,p . 182
3. Hamza, o p .c i t . ,  p . 40
4 . Ib id .,  p. 39
£onttofd..:rrpffl P- 7^2*
4 . In h is  new ro le , Muhammad Abduh never revived ttie old sp irii
o f an ac tive  p o l i t ic a l  career. A fter R econciliation, h is
e n tire  l i f e  in  Egypt was spent in  soc io -re lig ious reforms, 
whcih, however, had no s ig n if ic a n t d ire c t  bearing on the 
development of nationalism  as such.
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to it, wherein he dwelt on the cause of the Egypt*s
backwardness and inferiority in comparison to the West,
which according to him nainly lay in ignorance and illiteracy
Inspiitod by this translation, liuhammad Ifear
produced in 19(38 an^ ( original work entitled "HadHir al
Miariwin au sirr T& *akhkhurihim" (”The present state of
the Egyptians or The causes of their retrogression”), with
an introduction by Almad Fathi Zaghlul, TSnar divided the
Egyptians into Upper, Middle and Lower classes, diagnosed
2the maladies of each class and discussed their remedies w
Latfi Jum'a»s "Tahrir Misr” followed these pj^ ioneer
works, and was published in 1906, In that period of
Cromerian regime, his book was indeed an indirect ravolutionar
pamphlet though presented in the most tolerable, and serious
style. The questions that confronted Egypt, the inception
of those questions, arwi finally the immediate action that
should be taken in order to aake their country free, these
were some of the themes, the book dealt with. No olear
soluti6n was laid down, but at least an urge va,3 made to
3search out the solution •
Social trends were manifested even in light 
literature, such as story-writing, which was evident with 
the appearance of **Hadith Isa bin Hisham” published in book
1, Ibid,, p. 41
2, Utnarj •*Ha4ir3, Lutfi Jum'a * "Tahrir Misr«,^Ha4 ul Msriyyin au sirr Takhkhurihim”,I' ■ ‘
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form In 1907 by Ibrahim al-Mo«lhi (1858-1913), a desclple 
of al-Afghani, Al-Moelhi analysed the causes of general 
decay and demoralization in the Egyptian society, which 
according to him were European ciilture and its blind imitation 
Such were the general trends of contemporary 
Egyptian literature. These literary pursuits were not 
directly connected with political movement, nor any solid 
outcome, as a direct result of these writings, may be 
produced, Literay pieceji has, as a i!«tter of fact, no 
direct off^springs anywhere, Nevrtheless, they contributed 
a great deal towards the social and political awakening of 
the Egyptian people.
!▼
The Legislative Council and the General Assembly 
were the other vehicles throu^ which the voice of Egypt could 
be heard though moderately. The nationalist group that had 
secured some seats in the Council and the Assembly was 
inevitably of a moderate type. But most of the members were
1- Oibb, B.0.A.3, 7, 1933-35, pp. 5-6} Muslim World, January, 
1952:- "Modern Arabic books**, by Kermit Sehotinver, p.Sj 
Heimza, op.cit., pp, 45, 49
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experiancod and therefore self-confident. Towards the end
of 1895| follw^lng the example of their legal ruler, Abbas,
the Councillors protested against the discrepancies in the
British-run administrative system • Since 1892, the Council
seemed to have been asserting itself a.nA mildly criticising
the Government on questions like the expenditure incurred
on the Occupation anay, the Sudanese campaigns, and British
2apathy and negligence with regard to public education •
Among the Councillors, there were some prominent
figures who had open nationalist ideas* !Ihese were:al«Moelhi,
Sheikh Ali Yusuf, Isma'il Muhammad Pasha, and Muhammad Abduh
3
who was appointed to the Council in 1899 • ISiis group, with
some of their followers, formed the *party of opposition* in
the Legislature, Chirol cites an example of the Council’s
assertive nature when on one occasion, an Egyptian Minister,
supporting an item dictated to him by his British Advisor,
was violently attacked by the members, and in the end having
lost his courage, he confessed that he supported the measure
4
simply because the Englsih wanted it , The Councillors had 
acquired enough courage to criticize any measure that they
1. Landau, p, 46, f.n.
2. Blunt, op.cit,. p. 150; Rafi'i, ^  "Misr wa’s-S\jdan”, 
p# ISO, referring to the year 1894
3. Landau, pp. 47,48
4. Chirol, op.cit,, p. 210
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thou^t vas against tlie interests of th® pcopl®. The 
MinisUrs had to listen to their point of view and discuss 
their suggestion which ware usijally accepted, and if they
rojactad them, tliay had to give sound reasons for doing so •
A3 in other fields of nationalist activities, the
2Anglo-Froneh Entente of 1904 affected the natural growth 
of representative institutions also* Heretofore, they did 
not interfere with the biniget or raise^ i" any objections to it. 
They did not even launch any serious protest^ against a 
national tragedy as ttie Dinshawai incident. Popular voice, 
however, echoed througji the native press and was taken up 
here as well. The General Assembly, in its session 
of the year when the Dlnshawai Tm^edy occurred, passed 
several resolutions which demanded* re|>ease of the Dinshwai 
prisonersI a Constitutional and represantative Government} 
Egyptians to be appointed on all high official posts; an 
Egyptian Municipality for Cairoj Arabic to be the oMy 
official language of the country; abolition of the use of
1
1, Ibid., p* 90
2, By virtue of a convention betwean Britain and France, a 
declaration *on Egypt and Morocco* was signed on April
4, 1904. Its iraportan^ provisions which affected the 
national movement of Slgypt were as follows*
"His Britannic Majesty's Ciovernaent declare that they 
have no intention of altering the political status of 
Egypt. The Government of the French Republic, for their 
part, declare that they will not obstruct the action 
of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit 
of time be fixed for the British occupation.... "(Art.l) 
“His Britannic Majesty’s Government, for their part, 
recognise that it appertains to France- more particularly 
as a Power whode dominions are cofitorminous for a great 
distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in 
that country- and to provide assistance for the purpose 
of all administrative, economic, financial and military 
reforms which it may require.” ( Art. L )
Continued,
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English soveraign as coinage; and finally, concessions to
1foreign companias to be ceased •
On the whola, these Council and Assembly of Egypt, 
/keeping in viev thi limitations of such institutions at 
that time, performed task of creating a feeling of 
naticnalisK among the people well* Their speed was slow, 
but that could not be helped^for as long as the British 
Resident supervised their activities, there was no other 
choice.
Political groups that had ovolyed round the 
newspapers organised themselves as political Parties. These 
Parties, in most of the cases, were led by the editor or 
proprietor of a partic^ar paper, who was the real spirit 
behind the organisation. Again, the Parties varied between
1. Kohn, op.cit., pp* 195-96; Landau, p. S'© 
fiQ0ySB2d_f>2s_p. 177
“The two Ctovarnments agree to afford to one another 
their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the 
execution of the clauses of the present Declaration 
regarding Bgypt and Morocco*” ( Art, 9 )
"The mutual engagement shall be binding for a period 
of thirty years.** I Art, 4 ). 163-2^^
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moderates and extremists depending upon the political outlook
of their leaders. The moderates adhered to constitutional
means, whereas the extremists advocated and practised the
employment of any means as f^ong as the main object was achieve<!
Sheikh All Yusuf, the editor of al-Maayyad« was
the leader of such a political group which on December 15,
1907, was organised as a political Party and was named
1al-Hizb al»Islah.ad~Dasturla. i.e. Party of Constitutional
Reform* Ever since he started his journalistic actlvites,
All Yusuf was contemplating and shaping a political group of
distinct ideas. He was bdrn in 1864/65 ( 1280 A,D, ),
completed his education at al-Azhar and started from Sairo,a
2weekly, al-Adab  ^a religlo-political paper • In 1890, he
joined the staff of al-Muayyad, which was being published by
Sheikh Ahmad Mazl since December 1889, Three years later,
when Ahmad died, he became the sole proprietor of the paper.
According to Blunt, al-Muavyad was the first nationalist
3paper issued from Egypt since the defeat at Tel-al-Kablr •
Another contemporary author, Browne, has given It the title
4of the cheif opposition paper • Before joining al.Muayyad.
5All Yusuf used to write frequently in al-Ahram •
1. Browne, op.clt., p. 331
2. Al-Manar, vol. XI, No. 16, 1913
3. Blunt, op.cit., p.139: Hartmann, op.cit., p. 12
4. Browne, op.cit.. p. 139
5. Al-Manar, op.cit.
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But Insplte of all htaianitarlan outlook of that paper, and its
lldJentification with the nationalist ideas, al Ahram had
certain limitations by virtue of heing the property of
Christians. The majority of the Egyptians were Muslims and,
as such, the national movement must have inclined towards
acquiring some Islamic character, Al-Muayyad provided ttiis^ .
Soon it became the vehicle of al-Azhar and the reformer
group and got a wide circulation not only in Egypt, but in
2the entire Islamic world ,
As a moderate in politics, Ali Yusuf always tried
to create an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation between
the Egyptians and the Sngl^h so much so that he was
criticized in some circles as having been purchased by the
Engl^^. Al-Liwa groftp called his paper **al»Muaattam al-»Ahmar'
i*e, the red Muqattam, simply because his criticism
4of the EnglS^h and the Khedive was never harsh or violent • 
However, although he employed constitutional moderate means 
in his Struggle against the foreign domination, he never 
accepted a compromise with the Occupation, In an interview 
given to Browne, he expressed himself as follows:
"Whatever may be good things that have been brought 
by the fact of the Occui>ation, they are as nothing when 
compared with the ultimate object, which is to arrive at a 
destruction of the political life of the country. Before the
1. Ibid.
2, Browne, op.cit,, p, 332
3. Ibid,, pp, 332-33
4, Al-Manar, November, 29, 1913, p, 951;/p, 333
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last years^, all Egyptians were able to look with a satlsfactloJ
upon the reforms accompanying the British Occupation, because
they always had the encouzragement that the English would one
day keep their promise* But since three or four years, the
English having shown, or having porhaps declared, that they
will not evacuate the country, those reforms are not esteemed
2by the Egyptians,”
To the question of the capability of the natives 
for self-government, he retorted* ”So long as the present 
state of affairs lasts, that is to say so long as we have 
the Occupation, the capacity of the Egyptians to govern their 
own country will diminish. We think that the English seek 
to monopolize all the administration and to hinder the 
Egyptians from being capable of governingj and that makes 
us lose all hopes.... We claim our independen«§ and that
3is the view we stand by in the programme of our journal, * 
Continuing his reply, Ali Yusuf proceeded to sayx ”Our objec­
tion to foreign Occupation applies with the same strength 
to Turkey, were the Turkish suzerainty to become an active 
force.... Wa say 'Egypt for the Egyptians*. If we are
exhibiting an inclination towards the French, it is the
4English themselves who have caused it.** This interview
1. This interviev/ took place about the year 1907.
2. Browne, pp. 144-45
3. Ibid., pp. 149.150
4. Ibid., p. 152
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explains at len,;»th the views of All Yusuf and his co-thinkers, 
and thalr attitude towards Turkey and France also,
Ali Yusuf had thought over the causes of the failure 
of national movement of 1881-1882, ar^ he held that it was 
mainly due to the non-cooperation of the Porte* Hence he 
eaphasised cordial relations with the Sxiltan as long as they 
did not clash with the national interests^. With this dual 
strength he tried to win the battle throu^ constitutional
2means, his ultimate objectives being Evacuation and Autonomy •
vi
Mustafa Kamil, the editor of al-Liwa« was the founder
of another political party al-Hizb al-Watani i.e., the Rational
party, which emerged from the group that had centred round
his paper. Kamil was bom on August 14, 1874. His father,
Ali Muhammad was a military Engineer, and hia brother, Husain
Wasif who supported Kamil after the enrly death of his father,
3in 1896, was the Minister of Public Works •
1, Al-Manar, November 29, 1913, jjp. 947-56j Chirol, op.cit., 
p. 92
2^ Sladen, op.cit., pp. 114,135; Baikal, op.cit., p. 31
3. Rafi»i, « Mustafa KamU «, pp. 12,13
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Kamil had Imbibed nationalist feelings in himself 
from his boyhood days. He had already come in contact with 
an-Nadim in 1892, after the later»s return from exile, when 
he piihished his weekly al-Ustadh« Prom an-I^dim, Kamftl learntA
the secrets of the Arab! I'tovement, as also the causes of its
failure* The main cause#, as he learnt, were % firstly, its
dependence upon a particular section of the people i.e. the
array; and secondly, the break up with the Khedive, Keeping
in vievr this past experience, when Kamil launched his movement,
he tried to get cooperation of every section of the people
as well as the sjrmpathies of the Khedive^* In January 1893,
a demonstration of the Law College stiKients against Cromor
and Mustapha Fehral and in of the Khedive was orgaAised,
and Kamil as a student of that college took leading part in
2it • Isma’il Sidqni, the erstwhile Premier of Egypt, refers 
to another deraonstration which was organised by Sidqui in 
collaboration with Kamil during -aieir college days in which
3the demand for a Constitution was cade .
Kanll completed his education in Franco and took
his law degree from Tolouse in November 1894. While in Prance,
4he continued his political activites against the Occupation • 
There, he came in close contact with the French statesman,
1. Rafl*i, p, 30} Ahiad Amin, pp. 246-47
2. Rafi*i, p. 28
3. Isma’il Sidqui, " Muzakkarati ", p. 7
4. Rafi»l, p. 32
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Deloncle, who was veiy anti-British^ and with }fcie. Julietta
Adam, a dominating literary figure of Parisian society.
Through Itae Adam, his contacts grew still wider, many of
the political and literary dignitaries used to have regular
meetings at her house* ffcie.Adam (1836-1936) was herself
interested in the Egyptian Question, and later in 1922 she
even published a monograph on that topic entitled “England
1in Egypt”,
Kamil retxirned to Egypt in December 1894, He already
had some experience of editing a journal. When a student of
Law College at Cairo, he edited the Journal al-tfedrasa •
After his return, he began to write on Egyptian problems in
2al-Ahram and al-Muayyad ,
On February 1895, a decree was passed by virtue of
which a special court was to be installed to try those natives
who offended British soldiers. Kamil strongly protested
against this despotic decree and wrote an article in al-Ahram
under the title "Sawa*iq al-Ihtilal", i,e, the lightnings
3of the Occupation , However, he felt that hia main field of
work was not Egypt but Europe, Unless Europe was well-informed
of the Egyptian point of view, there would be no support in
the international forum, and without an international support
the Evacuation was impossible. Hence he proceeded to France in
4May 1895 with an organised plan of mass scale propaganda ,
1, Ibid., pp, 44-45; landau, op.cit,, p, 108
2. Ibid,, pp, 33,37
3, Baikal, op.cit,, p. 148; Rafi*i, op.cit,, p.
4. Rafi*i, op.cit., pp. 39-40
28
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In France he made speeches, wrote articles in rench
papers and met the Influential figiires of the country in
order to acquire their support for ttie Egyptian cause. He
published there a painting in which Egypt was shown asking
for French help, in getting rid of the British Occupation^,
Three Arabic verses with their French translation were written
below the picture, Kamil sent its copies to important newspapei
of the world and presented one copy to the President of the
French Assembly requesting him to respor^ to the Egyptians’
cause and come to the rescue of the Egyptian people ,
He then published a pampMet entitiled "Le peril
Egyptien,” an the dangerous consequences of the British
2occupation • In July 1896, he published a record of his
speeches under the title "Conference sur I'Egypte faite a
3Toulouse,” In January 1896, he returned home and stayed 
at Alexendria. There he started iSTgiving public speeches and 
educating the people in political thinking. The main topics
of his speeches weres the demand for a Constitution; Evacuation!
4and protests against the British-led Sudanese campaigm ,
He made efforts to unite dispersed and disintegrated 
nationalist elements and gathered around him a group of
1, Zaidan, vol. I.p, 296: Rafi'i, op.cit.. p, 41: Bstikal.op.cT 
p, 149, Baikal has given the description of the painting, 
as follows*
In the picture, France was shown standing,,, and seeing 
Egypt imprisoned supervised by a British soldier; a 
gathering of Egyptian people asks France for help. On the 
painting three verses were written in Arabic and French whicl 
also invoked the French people for help,
2, Baikal, op.cit,,p, 150: Rafi*i, op,cit,, p, 44
3, Landau, op,cit,, p. 108
4, Kohn, op,cit,, p, 188
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intellectuals who were ready to work with him. Prominent
among them were* Latif Salim and his son Fuad Salim} Ali Pakhri;
Muhammad Parid; Muhammad Salim; Waisa V/asif; Muhamsad labib
and the poets Shawqi, Ifcifiz and Matran^, This entire group,
with Kamil as their leader, awakened the political consciousness
of the people throu^ word and throu^ pen.
At the Same time Kamil made continous efforst to
secure the cooperation of the Khedive, since he realized that
his movement may fail if there was oppositidn tram these
quarters, as h®d been evidenced in the case of the Arabi
Movement. Kamil was successful for a while in winning over
the Khedive as Abbas himself disliked the Occupation regime.
In 1895-99, they had very cordial relations, and in 1899 Kamil
was made Pasha. Since December 1901, Cromer banned their
mutual meetings, and, at last, having given hope of winning
in the struggle, specially after the Anglo-French Agreement
2of 1904, Abbas reconciled with the Occupation •
Kamil also tried to get the support of the Sultan
in his struggle against the Occupation, and he partly succeeded,
3but he could never completely deperal upon it •
On the other hand he made attempts to unite the two
religious communities of the country, the Copts and the Muslims,
for the common aim of Egyptian independence. It was his credit
— I ‘ ‘ . ....................... M l  H IM —  -
1. Rafi*i, op.cit., pp. 68,164-66
2. Ibid., pp. 144-46; Young, op.cit., p. 181
3. 7oung, op.cit., p. 181, lAndau, op.cit., p. 121
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that for the first time Egyptian Muslims and Christians were
united against ‘Christian* Britain. He used to say that
religion and patriotism are complementary to each other, and
that every sincere religious man must have a passion for
his Motherland^,
He felt that the apathy and intflfference of the
people towards the liberation of their country was due mainly
to £ack of education and information. To remedy this
situation, he founded a non-official school in 1899, and there
2he started giving lectures himself . In his opinion the
Egyptian children, whether boys or girls, needed a healthy
education which would teach them tollove their motherland.
The girls, he said, were the mothers of tomorrow, and as such,
if they were educated on correct lines, the ccaaing generations
3would certainly be balanced, healthy and patriotic •
To educate the masses on a wider scale, he started 
a daily paper, al-Idwa in 1900, It published reports of the 
activites of the nationalists, their speeches, addresses, 
proceedings of their meetings and articles on the Egyptian 
Question, which essentially aimed at Evacuation and the
4achievement of a Constitution (Inkhila wa'd-Dastur) .
1, Rafi*i. op.cit,, p, 195; Laniau, op.cit,, pp, 118-20; 
Steppats op.cit., pp, 26«, 274, 267
2. Bafi’i, p. 65
3, 8it. Steppat, op.cit., pp. 320-321, 324; Rafi»i, pp.112-13
4. Rafi'i, pp, 70-73; Landau, pp. 110-11, 122-23
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Besides this Daily, a fortnightly paper was also issued which 
suppleraented its activities.
Outside Egypt, Kamil carried on his propaganda 
campaign both throu^ the press and the platform* He toured 
the Buropean countries every year, convincing the people 
about the genuineness of the Egyptian cause and winning their 
support for it^ . In December 1900, he published frcan Paris, 
a collection of his jJspeeches and writings on the Egyptian
question entitled "Egyptians et Anglais**, which was later
tf 2 reproduced in -^ rench papers in extracts • Buropean papers
published his original articles as well as translations frcan
al-Liwa. Thus it was that for the first time Europe listened
to the voice of nationalist Egypt.
Meanwhile the movement received some setbacks, which,
however, instead of weakening it, further strengthened it.
The failure of the Khedive to assert himself and finally his
break-up with Kamil, did great dan^ to the movement as it
lost a great supporter. On December 11, 1898, the Pashoda
incident occurred in the Sudan where Prance inspite of Its
support to the Egyptian cause, tried to assert its sovereignty
over a part of the Egyptian territoiT'. Had not the British
forces threatened with a firm action in response, the Trench
3offensive forces would not have retreated • Though It was a
1, Hafi’l, pp. 49, 54, 59, 97, 106
2, Ibid., pp. 87, 320
3, Ibid., p. 6i
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incident, y®t it b«trayed the real motives of the French
behind their support of the nationalists. Further, it resulted
in creating self-confidence and a feeling of strength among
the nationalists. 3?hen the conquest of the Sudan at the harris
of the British forces, and a forthwith declaration of Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium on January 10, 1899 shocked the
nationalists^. They \|ust could not concieve how it could be
possible for a foreign nation to share the government of a
2territory that was a part of Egypt • Finally, the Egyptian 
Question entered a nev; phase, when an Agreement was signed 
b> Fmnce and Britain, in January 1904, Under this Agreement, 
a joint declaration was issued on April 4, wherein the two 
Governments agreed not to interfere in their respective 
spheres of influence. His Britannic Majesty’s Government 
declared that ttiey had “no intention of alter^ iing the political 
status of Egypt’*, and the Government of the French Republic 
on their part, declared "tlmt they willjnot obstruct the action 
of Great Britain by asking that a limit of time be fixed for 
British occupation" (Art, 1). In bargain, the same rights of 
French Government were recognised in Morocco (Art. 2),
Moreover, adhering to the '^ a.nal Traty of 1888, Britain declate^
1, Ibid., pp, 63-64
2, The Egyptian nationalists, in general ( aiMS Eamil was not 
an exception here ) ttiought in this connection always on 
pure Imperialist lines. They were never prepared to give 
the Sudanef5© people the spune status as they themselves 
demanded ^I^Britain,
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that th« stipulations of that treaty should now be put in forci
(Art. 6), Lastly, the two Governments agreed "to afford to
one another thoir diplomatic support, in order to obtain the
the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration1
regarding Egypt and Morocco,” (Art, 9)
Whatever hopes there were left with regard to
France had now completely shattered, and there was complete
disappointment. The Agreement had changed the whole
sit\iation, and the Egyptian Question became less acite as
an international problem, after the conclusion of this
Agreement, The cleavage with the Khedive and the departure
of *^rance caused the Movement to change into a truly
popular and pure national movement.
Early in 1906, the Occupation authorities and the
Porte clashed on the question of sovereignty over the Sinai
peninsula. The Porte claimed the disputed area as Turkish
terriotry, while the Anglo-Bgyptlan authorities asseted their 
2own claim , The Porte, due to its weakness had however to 
yeild and as such the incident had little significance.
But its repercussions on the people of Egypt were far-reaching, 
Cromer *s Report of that year mentions some "unrest)^  among
2 PMuslim population," For the first time, the ^aliph-Sultan, 
still the legal sovereign of Egypt and the spiritual head of
1, Anglo-French Declaratidn, Text in Hurewitz> "Diplomacy 
in the Near and Middle East", vol. I, pp. 263-65
2, Annual Register, 1906, p, 408
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the Islamic world, was openly dishonoured in the lai^ which
was his, and among the pwople who still heliavod in the
1Grand Caliphate , This unrest, at last, manifested itself 
in a "brutal assault on an English soldier in Cairo, for which
]two natives were sentenced to ten and seven years imprisonment,
However, it left no more serious aftereffects.
With the tragedy of Dinshawai, the national
movement received a real momentum, to June 13, 1906, five
British officers went near a village namei Dinshawai, to
shoot pAgeons* They had been informed beforehand that the
villagers did not like pigeon-shooting, A village woman was
accidentally wounded by one of the officers, and a peasant-hut
was set on fire either deliberately or by accident, h^e
villagers became furious and besieged the officers and
injured three of them. One of the injured ones died during2
his flight .
Lest it might create a sense of superiority among 
the natives, the Occupation regime took strong measures 
against the villagers and sentenced some of them to death and 
some others to various terms of rigorous imprisonmont. The 
death sentences were carried out in the Dinshawai village 
itself^.
1, Ibid., p. 410
2, Annioal Register, 1906, pp. 410,411; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 
90-92; Kohn, op.cit., p. 195
3, An espocial Tribunal was installed for the trial of the 
villagers who were arrested in scores. The judgement as a 
•commar^ affair* was passed forthwith. On June 10, the 
sentences were passed. Four of the fifty-nine accused 
villagers were sentenced to death, two to penal servitude, 
one to fifteen years imprisonment, six to seven years
Continued.......
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Tills action resulted lii a general outburst of 
protests and agitations* Even in England, the liberals 
protostod against thosa cruel maasuros,^ In the modern 
history of Egypt, this was th« first incident of its kind.
The tragedy gave an opportunity to the discontented elements, 
and soon the passive resistence changed into active violence. 
The mixrder of the Copt Premier Butrus (2iali, a few years 2
later, was one of the direct consequences of this tragedy ,
The Egyptian Press turned violent and made the Cromor regime 
a target of continuous attacks. Special publications
3dealing with the tragsdy appeared in several languages ,
The Dinshawai tragedy was the single factor responsible for
a sudden general awakening and political consciousness
4among the Egyptian people ,
1, Annual Register, op.cit,,p, 410s Marshall* ”The Egyptian 
Snigna", <33
2, Marshall,pp, 83-84; Kohn, p. 195, Butrus Ghali had presided 
over the special Tribunal which consisted of two Eg^tians 
and throe Englishmen. ( Rafi'i, p. 94 )
3, A Pamphlet written in Turkish, Arabic. Persian and Urdu was 
published in Constantinople and was circulated in Egypt.
Its Arabic title whs ^Khulasa Waqa‘1 DlAsliawai’. In 1907, 
Mahmud Tahir Haqqi published his book ”Adhra Danishwai***
In 1903, anothor book entitled "Iladitha Dinshawai** appeared 
in Cairo, These books contained several photographs of ttie 
Ti’agedy. { Landau, pp, 46-50 f.n, )
4, Qasire Amin was the eye-witness of the tregedy and its 
repercussions. Giving the account of the sentences, he 
says! «I saw every person, I encountered with, heart-woun- 
ded,.,. Orief and sorrow lingered on every face... The 
people seenied as if they were gathered in a house of dead, 
or if the souls of the crucified men wandered everywhere 
in the town. The consciousness, however, remained hidden 
in their hearts finding no outlet for coming outside," 
cit, Rafi’i, p, 97; Seo also Mershall.p, 83i "It was the 
plan on which the Nationalist movement was founded and 
provided a platform for the late Mustafa Kamil, the apostle 
of nationalism. Before the Denshawai incident, he had not 
managed to create any impression on the mass of the people, 
but the trial unfortunately gave him a hearing even outside 
the limits of his own coimtry."
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Th« inmadiat* «ff«cts of th« tr«g«dy w«rei th»
Acceleration of natloml movemant, tha attantion of world
Prass di^wa towards tha Egyptian Quastioa^ and finally a
shift to modaration in tha policy of Occupation ragima.
Again, it was this tragady that lad to tha fall of Cromar1
(April 1907) and Iftistapha Fahni, as wall as to tha
appointmant of an Egyptian ( S*ad Zaghlul ) as tha Ministar
of Education. Tha tragady was also rasponsibla for tha
formation of organised political parties. Finally, it
accelerated the movement launched for the astablishement
2
of a National University •
Kanil was in Europe when the news of this national
tragedy reached him. He led a fierce campaign a^inst the
inhuman treatment of the Egyptians. On July 14, 1906, he
visited London and pleaded the case of human grounds.
Questions were raised in the Parliament and Cromer's action
3was criticized. On October 15, Kamil returned to Egypt .
1. Hodges* “Lord Kitchner", p. 198
2. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 104; lAndau, p.
3. Rafi’i, op.cit., pp. 97-103
aontinued from p. 191.
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imprisonment, three to fifteen lashes and one year 
imprisonment and five to fifteen lashes. (Annual Register, 
I906t pp. 410*11; Rafi’i, op.cit, pp. 90-2; Kohn,op.cit., 
p. 195). lAter on, after much agitation and demonstration 
and criticism in Press and in the British Parliament 
itself, the Anglo-Egsrptian authorites reconsidered their 
decisions and in December 1907, it was decided to reprieve 
the prisoners of Dinshawai. They were freed in January,
1908. ( Rafi’i, pp. 134-35 )
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It has already b««n pointed out that tha formation 
of political partiaa was on* of tha diract results of tha 
Dinshawai tragady. Most important among thasa partias was 
tha National Party of Mustafa Kamil, Tha tragedy, however, 
was not solely responsible for giving birth to the Party.
In fact it was the growing political consciousness and the 
unanimity over the necessity of organised political propaganda 
that necessitated the formation of the Ibitional Party, 
together with scrae other Parties, with which we will discuss 
later on* The Dinshawai incident, however, made the 
nationalists feel the necessity of an early realization of 
their vague ideas about the formation of the parties.
The Rational Party, al«.Hizb al^Watani. came into 
existence on October 27, 1907^• Its Programme had already 
been made public in the month of May. The ten-points 
programme included the demands, firstly, for the revival of 
Egyptian autonomy as agreed in the London Treaty of 1840, 
and endorsed by the Sultan, and secondly, for the formation 
of a native Ministry responsible to a European type of 
Egyptian Parliament. (Arts. 1 and 2). According to the 
Programme, the Party was to strive for: the spread of 
national education with the help of the wealthy class of the 
nation; making efforts for the development of agriculture
1. lAadau, op.cit., p« 115
- 195 -
and industry in Egypt In order to achaive both iatellactual
and aconomic indapendanca; educating public opinion^
IzMBlcibytlng national spirit, and making them conscious of
thalr political rights and duties; and creating unity and
harmony betwaen the two religious communities of Bgypt,
(Arts, 4-8). The Programme also declared that the Party
would honour all international treaties and obligations
regarding the indebtedness of Egypt, and even in the event of
getting autonomy, would accept a European financial control
such as the Anglo-French Corad(Mniniura, until the timi Egypt
was in debt to Europe, and Europe wanted such control,(Art.3),
Finally it was pledged that the Party would strive for
strengthening the bonds of friendship with European Powers
on the one hand and with the Ott(»tan ^ pire on the other,
and thus would try to win over the international moral
support for the Egyptian cause, (Arts, 9-10)^, With a
thirty-members Executive headed by Kaail himself, the first
2popular political Party came into existence ,
On February 10, 1908, the leader of the Movement
died an immature death at the age of thirty-four, '*It was
for the first time since Dinshawai that the heart of Egypt
3sank to the lowest level**, wrote Muhammad Husain Baikal , 
Another contemporary observer, remarked* "Never was there 
such a spontaneous and universal demonstration of grief, 
for,,, there is no doubt that he gained the affection of 
the Egyptian public as no other Egyptian patriot has done 
before or since. Huge crowds of mourners among whom were
1, Programme of the Ilational Party cit, steppat, ‘♦National- israus”, jip,3s9-i>39
2, Landau, pp. 115-16
3, Baikal, op.cit,, pp, 140-41
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many of his vigorous political opponents, coll«ct«cl la th« 
neighbourhood of Bl-Liwa to participate la the pathetic 
scenes of public mourning,••• His funeral, the following 
day, was one of the most impressive sights ever witnessed 
in Cairo in modern times,
Kamil was the leading spirit of the national 
movement during the period commencing with the accession of 
Abbas Hilrai and ending only with him. He had a positive 
outlook and a definite criterion with which he judged all 
matters, always keeping in view the perspective of national 
liberation. All of his views centred round this single aim 
of his life.
He was clear in his conceptions of nation, ccMemunity 
and religion and their inter-relationship. He was a Muslim 
and gave a hl^ place to Islam as a religion} but his Islam 
did not come in his xfay of joining hands with the Christian 
Copts who were the sons of the same soil. For the first 
time under his leadership, Muslims and Copts were united
2on the basis of a national jdiilosophy which Kamil had evolved
Karall had a due respect towards the Sultan, but «iat only
3as a spiritual head like Pope of the Christian world , He 
called himself an Ottoman Egyptian, but that only in 
technical sensej otherwise, he never imagined to offer his
4loyalties to any thing except Egypt ,
1, Alexenderi "Truth about Egypt**, p, 139 cit, Kohn, 
p, 190: also Sladen, op.c&t,, pp. 95-96
2 , Steppat, op.cit., pp, 274, 255-56
3, Ibid,, pp, 284
4, Ibid,, pp, 287-88
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His incessant linking up his country with th« Ottoman Empira
WaS only to socura a permanant shiald to fight tha of
indepandenca; otharwisaj ha expressed time ai^ agaia that
by virtua of tha Finnans of 1840-41, tha Sultan had already
given Egypt a conplete autonomous status • As to !6islim-Copt
relations, ha asserted that, so far as the political goal
of tha nation was concerned both the communities were
indivisible parts of the same whole, the Egyptian nation.
Tha Egyptian nation, he held was ccaaposed of the Copts who
were the ancient Egyptians, the Arabs, who were residing in
Egypt since a millenium, and the foreigners i,e« the
Circassians as well as those Europteans who supported the
national cause; everyone residing in Egypt and striving for
2national liberation was, to him^ a true Egyptian • This
Egyptianhood, he held, did not clash with any religion; so
far as Islam was concerned, tolerance was the spirit of all
3Islamic teachings • Thus he cemented the two diverse 
elements of Egyptian nation into one aational aspiration.
He was also clear in his attitude towards the 
Occupation. Estimating tha blessings of British advent in 
Bgypt, he commentedj "To us Orientalists, material civilizatio 
is not genuine civilization. True civilization is bas;tfed 
on the moral rectitude and freedom of the peoples. Of what
1. Ibid., p. 289
2. Ibid., pp. 257-58
3. Ibid., p. 267
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value to us are the telegraph, the telephone, the gramaphone,
and all European mechanical inventions. If we are oppressed
by the inventors of those fine appliances and if they only
serve to hasten our subjection* I would rather a thousand
times wandor a horseback in the desert and feel free, thaa
fly with the threefold rapidity of a motor-car across a
1country dominated by the Bnglsih." Emphasizing the pApular
basis of civilization, he saidt "Egyptian civilization
cannot endxire in the future tinless it is formulated by the
people itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher,
the pupil, in fine every single Egyptian, knows that nan
has sacred intangible rights} that he is not created to be
a tool, but to lead an intelligent and worthy life; that
love of country is the most beautiful sentiment which can
ennoble a soul; and that a nation without independence is
a nation without existence. It is by patriotism that
backward peoples ccane quickly to civilization, to greataes
2and to power*” For indicating "Uiis spirit of patriotism, 
he stressed that the syst«B of national education should be 
organised at a vast scale* national academic institutions 
should be established which may produce patriots and not the 
Civil servants to serve the British masters* The movmaent 
for a national University was an annexee to the same idea*
In his methodology, Kamil remained too precautions 
not to quarrel either with the Khedive or with the Sultaa*
For quite a considerable period, he had cordial relations
1* cit* Kohn, op*cit», pp. 188-89S Speech delivered in 1904 
2* cit* Stoddard, ”The new world of Islam**, p* 151
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with the nationalistsi Kamil never attacked his person. To 
him, the Khedive was the symbol of the technical and legal 
independence if not of national autonomy, and as such he was 
to \m respected at any cost.^
K^il did not believe in vlAlence, ai^ yet he was
A 2never prepared to compromise as^the question of independence •
His immense love for his country and a passionate desire
to see it a free self-governing independent state had reached
3 4its extreme limits. His Journalism , hi# poetry , and other
Swritings , in fact his whole life was devoted to this single 
aim of his life,
Kamil, like Jamal ad»Din al-Afghani, died unaarried. 
Like al-Afghani, he had married his nation, Althou^, ob 
the whole, he was simply an agitator, yet he was the fittest 
person to lead the Movement at this stage. Within a short 
period of ten or twelve years of his active political 
career, he created among the middle c&ass of Egypt a living 
sense of nationalism and a passion to achieve their ideal.
He used the Press and platform for his propaganda and 
agitation, and although he did not achjS|(ve the Qhjdiit desire
1, Steppat, op,cit,, pp, 323<*324, 326—27
2, Xbid,, pp, 293, 314
3, As a matter of fact, Kamil’s whole personality can be 
summed up in the word Journalist, From his boyhood days, 
when in his college he edited al-Madrasa  ^till his death, 
when he left besides his other legacies, a well«establish 
popular paper al-Liwa. his entire life is that of a / 
Jouranalist,
4, Some of his beautiful verses filled with patriotic fire 
have been quoted by Yasu»i, **Tarikh al-Adab al-Arabiyya“, 
pp, 44-45
5, Apart from the collections of his speeches and writings in 
al-Liwa, two monographs are worth mentioning* one is the 
History of Spain and the other is on Japan entitled **The 
Rising Sun" ( ash-Siams al-Mushriqa),
e
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of his heart, naBely, independence, yet he was able to 
bring about the end of 4 Cromer’s regime and to create among 
the people a national consciousAess, which served as the 
foundation of the future movement for independence.
During these sixteen years (1892-1907), the
national movement had advanced with an imprecedented speed.
The British Agent, however, continued to report the situation
as though no change had taken place, **Over and over again, it
has been urged on me that the (Nationalist) party consists
merely of a few noisy individuals whose action is often due
to no very reputable motives, and in no way represent the
real wishes of their countrymen. I believe this view to be
1subsequently correct." Not until Croner had to say good-bye
to Egypt, that he smelt tdie revolt in the air. The.ifovement,
inspite of receiving serious set-backs within the short spam
of one and a half decade, had been firmly rooted and had
2become a mass movement .
As for the 'White man's burden* of making the 
uncivilized and backward people civilized and training them 
im the i^rt of self-government, the Occupation regime did
1. cit., Kohn, pp. 195-96
2. **!niere is no village in Egypt in which there is not
some Mullah or Mahdi or holyman... who was only too
glad to announce to his adherents tkhat the downfall
of the infidel was at hand, and that the day was 
coming when Islam would once more become supreme."
( Lcfws **The new Spirit in Egypt", p. 260, quoting 
frt» Dicey in 1907 ).
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perform some welfare work for the society and the State^ ,
but It did nothing to educate the Egyptians in the art of
self-government* Inspite of the repeated pledges of
Evacuation on the part of the British Government, the grip2
was never loosened. On the contrary it became more firm • 
The real aim of the policy of British Agent as also of the 
Foreign Office had been clearly stated by Cromer in an 
interview with a fiend of Dicey* ”There is no need for any
1« It was claimed by British writers that they had done the 
following for Bgypti
i. Increase in revenue, 
ii. Increase in export and import, 
iii. Check against famines, 
iv. Building of barrages and dams.V. Abolition of Corvee and kurbash and the use 
of tortures, 
vi. Itoduction im taxes, 
vii. Betterment of fellaheen, 
viii. Construction of roads railways.
IX. Purity of administration of justice.
X. Opening of hospitals and lunatic asylums, 
xi. Abolition of Bakhshish, 
xii. Raising and regularising the payment of 
salaries. ( Sladen, pp. 18-20 )
2. "We have not only done nothing to render Egypt more fit 
for independence than she was previously to our military 
occupation, but on the contrary we have done much to weake 
such small capacity for self-fovernment as she possessed 
at the time when our troops entered Cairo and took 
possession of the Citedal....” (Dicey, "The Egypt of the 
Fhiture”, published in 1907., p. 34; See also de (Kierville* 
summing up of the situation in 190o.
"Each Englishman constitutes himself a legislator, and 
attempts to modify the law as it suits him. He submits 
his work to the Ministen£^ Co\mcil, which, as every one 
knows, is an assembly of mutes, who sign whatever is put 
before them. The only control exercised is by the 
Legislative Council. But this assembly has only a consul­
tative power, and the members of it who are upto their 
work are very few....
”An Egyptian moudir in a province is assisted by an 
English inspector. Normally, the moudir In-a-^ve should 
administer, and the inspector control his work. But it is 
not so. The moudir takes no responsibility; he sulimits 
everything,however inslsignifleant, to the inspector and 
awaits his orders, which he is ready to carry out."(A.B.De
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fonaal declaration; we have got to go on as we are already 
doing now, and some fine day the world will discover that 
we have established a Protectorate without anyhddy knowing 
that we have do^e so."
People in the villages used to believe that
2"the Khedive is under Lord Cromer; Lord Cromer is king •**
However, the new middle class leadership, filled with a
sense of national responsibility, never bowed down before
Cromer. Even such a staunch Buperi&list as Dicey could
not help confess that the fictitious belief in British
circles that the natives looked towards them with grateful
3eyes, was absolutely erroneous •
1.2.
3.
Dicey, op.cit,, p. 192 
Wood, p, 201
Dicey, in 1907* "The Bgjrpt of the Future", p. 211i 




"la ny tlm« I rem«ml3«r, that 
evexyoMy from th« h\rabl«st 
to th« greatest, d«aand«d a 
Constitutlozi. •! Dsstour*
was th« rallying cry, th« 
password of liberty,"
____  Abbas (Hllai) IIj
” A f«v words on Anglv-Egyptiaa 
Sattlsmant." p* 87
ar« not popular la Egypt• 
F«ar«d w« may b« by som«{ 
rcsp«ct«d I doubt not by many 
othars. but raally lik«d I am 
sur«, by v«ry faw."
w
____  Sldnay L^w
" Egypt in Transition", p. 261 
Publlshsd In 191^.
About th« ysar 1908 and sines, sobs of ths Eastern 
lands wars undsrgolng a drastic changs. Persia had a 
rsYolutlon. Indian nationalism was struggling hard against 
British Liperlallsm. Japan, raised to eminence after the 
vlctorji over Russia in 1905, was a source of inspiration to
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other Eastern countries as also to the Bgjrptlans^ . The most
important of this series of revolutions was the Turkish
Revolution of July 1908 brought about by the Young Turks,
which ended the corrupt and despotic era of absolute monarchy.
Niaturally, it had its repercussions in Egypt also, as, legally
2speaking, Egypt was still a province of the Ottoman Empire • 
The Egyptian nationalists now more passionately inclined 
towards the Constitutionalist Turkey, and $6iany of them 
were prepared to welcome a Turksih intervention or even
3Turkish rule, as their main desire was to oust the infidels • 
There was a general belief that but for Turkey, Britain 
would have annexed Egypt, Many of the nationalists had 
come in ftlose contact with the Young Turks. Some of the 
members of the Comsiittee of Union and Progress, settled in 
Cairo, were in close touch with variofls groups of educated 
young Egyptians who were opposed to the autocratic rule of 
the Khedive and were against foreign dcMnination^ .
After the success of the Young Turks, a Young 
Egjrptian Party was founded in Egypt by Idris Raghib? The 
Young Turks movement continued to exercise its influence in 
Egypt throughout the period preceding the First World War.
1. "The Sg3rptians are fond of comparing themselves to the 
Japanese, as an example of an Oriental people ready to 
take its place among the Western nations.** (Sladent 
"Egjrpt and the English", pp. 6-7). Douglas Sladen is 
an eye-witness of the period. His account of Egjrpt was
published in 1908.
2. Sladen, dp.cit., p. 136; Lutfi as-Sayyidt "Safhat Matwiyya'
pp. 36, 240-41} Annual Register, 1911, p. 411.
3. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 1-2;
4. Ibid., p. 136; Rafi»i, «lftihamraad Farid«, p. 451
5. Low, op.cit., pp. 23-^; Landau, op.cit., p. 146. Idris
was editing a paper "L'Egypte** in 1910 which seemed to be 
quite in conformity with the policies of the Rational Part]
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Ev«n as lat« as July 1912, th«r« was a tarrorist group
•xlsting In Cairo and having Intiiaata relations witti tha
Young Turics^ .
Lord Cromer was recallad in April 1907 and was
replaced by Sir Eldon Qorst as tha n«w British Agant. "Tha
dapartura of Lord Cromar was rightly intarpratad by tha
2Nationalists as tha dapositlAn of Cromarism In 1906,
Libarals had captured powar in England, and tha naw Agent
seanad to have been influenced by Liberal ideas and traditions,
and, as such, was in the early stages, in sympathy with
the interests of the Egyptian people; but, later, he proved
3to be nore a diplora&t than Liberal •
In this first public statement, Ck>rst reiterated 
the old promise of Evacuation after the Egyptians were 
trained in self-government. In his announcement, he 
promised to reexamine the Anglo-Egyptian relations, to 
enlarge the Powers of the Council of Ministers and to give
4more authority to local self-government bodies • In the 
early mon^s of 1908, a draft with a view to enact these 
measures was placed for discussion in the Legislative 
Council. It was postponed because of lack of interest, they
1. Low, op«cit., pp. 23-24; laitfi, op.cit., pp. 240-44
2. Toung, op.cit., p. 185
3. Fyfe, “The new Spirit in Egypt**, p. 125} Elgood, op.cit., 
p. 183
4. Pyfe, op.cit., pp. 165-66; Elgood, op.cit., pp. 184-85; 
Chirol, **The Egyptian Problem", pp. 109-110
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s*y, show* by the Legislators, and was aot passed uatll
April 1909^. However, It fell too short of the nation's
deaands. Before the close of the year 1908, resolutions
demanding a Constitution had 'beea passed hy the Legislative
2Council and the General Assembly • If the reforms
promulgated by the new Agent were in response to those
resolutions, they were utterly disappointing.
The new movement, a mt\iral continuation of the
Cromerian period, was still being led by lawyers and journalist
3amd was 'followed by the educated youths • It was now
acquiring a positive form and character. Contemporary
4
wi'itars U80 the word *Caf^^ Itotioialists *, a very
appropriate word for the leaders of the movement, Tarbush
4
as against hat became the anti-British symbol • The
anti-British character of the national movement was rapidly
turning into an anti-Christian one. !Ehe Egyptian Muslims
felt that it was against their religion to bs ruled by the
5Christians « This religious animosity was not restricted
to the educated middle class« It influenced the majority
of the Muslim peasantry as well, who were grieved to see
their coxmtpy governed by the 'infidelsi "He thinks less
of reforms than of the grievances under which he suffers or
6believes to suffer**, remarked a contemporary observer •
1. Lloy#d* "Egypt since Cromer", vol. I, p. 90
2. Ibidv, p. 91
3. Low, op.cit., p. 266j Hafi*i, op.cit., pp. 189-90;
Pyfe, op.cit., p. 175
4. Sladen, op.cit., p. 36; also, Touag, p. 192
5. Sladen, op.cit., p. 36
6. Low, op.cit., p. 269
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Qa March 27, 1909, Gorst reported to his Gov«nia®at
that "the only course open is to wait patiently iintil the
present excitable and iindisciplined fra«e of mind which seems
to have influenced a considerable portion of the upper class,
has passed away,**^  Towards this end, the British Agent
devised the old Ijaperialist formula of ‘divide et ]aperia*,
2for which he had vast field of work ♦ He had been serving
in Egypt in different risponsible positions since 1886, and
3he knew the Egyptians too well . He was a model diplomat 
and was more successful in breaking up the nationalists* 
unity and force than was the autocrat and straightforward 
Crc»aer*
The first thing that Qorst did was to win over the
Khedive aj»l detach him completely Traa the nationalists. In
this, he was helped by favourable circumstances. Kamil and
his Party had already estranged their relations with the
Khedive after the final ruptiire in 1904. Furthermore,
Abbas also feared the repecussions of the Turksih revolution.
According to an account of 1908, : **The latest opinion is that
the Khedive is anxious in any case to retain the army of
Occupation lest the forces awakened by the reformers should
4
go out of hands.** Even as early as May 1907, the first
1. cit., Lloyd, op.cit., p. 91
2. 7oung, p. 186
3. Elgood, op.cit., pp. 183«84
4. Sladen, op.cit., p. 114
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■onth of the new regime, Gorst had the courage to express
the Idea that there was no use opposing the Occupation, and
that tiie British occupation was better than any other^• As
for the Constitutiin, the poet-laureate, Ahaad Shawqi, obviousl
writing at the initiative of the Khedive himself, said*  ^The
Khedive is personally in favour of granting the Constitution,
but the Constitution cannot be granted unless the Occup^ tying
2Power takes an active part in the proaulgation.*..** Either
the Khedive was too timid, or he tried to befool the people.
Oorst was able to create ccmmunal dissension among
the nationalists themselves. Here again, he was helped by
circumstances. The death of Kamil had created a vacum in
the Movement. His successors were neither as popular as he
was, nor were they so farsighted. Hiaj were mc»e Islamists
then nationalists. Dicey had observed in 1907 that the
Egyptian Muslims did not regard the Egyptian Christians as
3their compatriots and fellow countrymen . They doubted their
sincerity towards national aspirations because of their
affinity in creed to the Occupying Power. Besides, the
pro-British Christian papess of Egypt, like al-Mmrattam  ^had
less sense of responsibility and added fuel to fire by their
4
pro-Occupation writings • Moreover, Crorst'« policy of an 
ostentatious favouritism towards the Muslims had also
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•■blttered the Copts^. The aatioBallsts begaa to piirge
their parties of the Christian element, a»3 the Copts began
to thiak that nationalisB aeant a political struggle for
2Muslia sprenacy •
In November 1908, Butrus (Hiali, who was a Copt, was
3appointed Premier to succeed the loyal Mostapha Fehai • Then
in 1909, the question of the extension of the period of the
Canal Concession was raised. It was moved and supported by
the Egyptian Ctovernment, The resolution stipulated the
extension of the Concession upto December 31, 2008 in return
4of some remuseration to Bg]rpt • It was publicly criticized
5by the nationalists • In October 1909, the members of the
Legislative Council auad the General Assembly, th« Provincial
Councils and Local Self-Government bodies, met informally
and unanlliously resolved to send a telegram to the Egyptian
Government asking them not to take any decision on the
measure before the session of the General Assembly. The
fleneral Assembly met the following year, debated the issue
from February to April and almost unanimously voted against
6the adoption of the measures •
1- MikhXl, ''Muslims and Copts under British rule", pp* 12,20,j
2. Ibld«, Preface, vill; Elgood, op«elt«, p. 194
3. Zaldan, op.cit*, vol. II, p. 171
4. Rotzentin '♦Tarlkh al-Mas»alat al-Mlsrlyya", pp, 376«77j 
Rafi»l, p. 131
5. Rafl»l, op.cit., pp. 134-35J Al-Hllal, May ^  1910
6. Al-Hilal, fiay 1, 1910$ Landau, op.cit., p. 51; also,
Pyfe, op.cit., p. 135
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The issue caused widespread Indlgnatioa aaong the
■asses particularly against the Copt Premier, who, as President
of the Council of Ministers, had moved and supported the
issue. The discussion was still continuing la the Assenhly,
when, on February 10, 1910, Butrus was shot dead hy an
Egyptian youth, al-Wardani • This B»irked the culnination of
the cc»uiiunal trend in the national movement* It also gave
rise to a new cult in the movement, namely, the cult of
terrorism. Actually, as the assaslnator himself insisted,
the murder of Butrus was motivated frcna a political end
2rather than a communal one . It would have taken place even
if the victim were a Muslim. But entire communal atnosphere
of the time gave it a communal colour easily because a Copt
was m\irdered by a Muslim.
There is no doubt that after Kamil, the basic
character of the Movement had bec(»ie that of 'Islamic
nationalismNinetenth of the population of the coiintry
was Muslim, and even the poor uneducated Fellah knew this
much that the English belonged to an alien religion and that
the followers of Muhammad should not be d(»ilnated by the
3followers of the Christ . Sladen remarked in 1908i "When 
they use the word Niaitional or Bgjrptian, they mean Moslem.
4I am obliged to think l^at Nationalism is Islamisa.** A
considerable sectldn of the Muslla Press had turned fanatic,
and even the pure nationalist papers were affected by the
general trend. Al»Llwa. the organ of the ch|Stf nationalist
party, i/violently attacked the Copts. "They should be kicked
5to death", the editor of al-Llwa wrote in an article in 1908 .
Tl Lloyd, op.clt., p. 97; Rafi*l,op.clt.,pp.l54-55
2. BailAl,op.clt.,p.41j Lloyd, op.clt.,p.97{Rafi*l,op.clt..
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It seemstf that the murder of Butrus took place as a result
of the continuous Instigatiom of al»Llwa itself.
The asslsin, Ibrahjja lasif al*Wardani, a Cheaist
by profession, vho was educated In France, belonged to a
secret group of terrftrlst^ i The murder was preplanned
beforehand. With him eight other persons were also arrested
as being accomplices in the murder^. In the trial, al-Wardani
readily confessed the murder. The charges he made against his
victim were, from his point of view, a sufficient justificatioi
for his act of murder. He accused the victim in the following
termsX **As minister of foreing affairs he had signed away,
in January, 1899, Egypt's sovereign rights over the Sudan; as
minister of justice, in 1906, he had presided over the
Dinshawai trial; as prime minister, he had revived the press
2law , and advocated acceptance of the Suez Canal C(»ii)any*s
3offer.” During the trial, al-Wardani had become a popular 
national hero. People sang in the streets of Cairot ”Wardani,
4Wardani_____________ who killed the Nasrani. ” A number of
papers and 'seditious* pamphlets began to be circulated, but
1. Rafi'i,op.cit.,pp. 154-555Baikal,op.cit.,p. 41; Llo3rd,op.ci 
p.97s Other canrades of al-Wardeu&i were, Ali Murad, AMul 
Aziz Rifat and Muhammad Anis, the engineers: Shafiq Mansur 
aiaed Muhammad Kamil al-Barquqi. the students (Shafiq Mansur, 
later came into full limelight in connection with the 
assissination of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, thejbommander- 
in-ch#ilf of the Bgyptiem army, in 1924); Abdti Khaliq Atiyy 
a fikil, and Hsibib Hasan, a Professor.
2. Press Law of 1881 was revived in March 1909. It provided
for a compulsory registration, deposit of security and
suppression of any paper after a due warning. (Lloyd,op* 
cit., p. 94; aafi'i, pp. 101-104)
3. Elgood, op.cit., p. 193
4. Ibid., p. 194, f.n.
t 212 -
th«7 v«re soon suppressed^, Ob May 18, 1910, al<-¥ardaBl,
pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, and was hanged on
2June 28 . Fr<aa the day of the murder of Butrus and more 
so sluee the execution of al-Wardani, the Muslla-Copt 
relations becaae estranged and a bitter feeling between the
two coanunities prevailed. Ms^ nationalists belonging
3to the Coptic eonmunity deserted the Movement • Muslins
themselves were in a mood of revenge and insplte of the
4best efforts of the sober-minded nationalists , little was
acheived towards easing the tension. On the contrary, later
events further deteriorated the situation.
In March 1911, a Coptic Congress was held at
Assiut. It demanded equality of rights and opportunities
for the Copts and the Muslims. It demanded equal chances
in the adrainistratioil, facilities for seperate Coptic education
5and a fa4r electoral systitfem for a fair Coptic representation • 
In the following month, a Muslim Congress, patronised and 
spons^ by the Egyptian authorities, met in Cairo^. It was 
presided over by a Minister, Riaz Pasha, and strangely enough, 
not a single word was uttered against the Occupation. The
1. Lloyd, op.cit., p. 101
2. Rafi’i, op.cit., p. 155; Lloyd, op.cit., p. 97
3. Hafi*i, op.cit., p. 156
4. Mikhail,op.cit., pp. 28*29
5. HafiSi, op.cit., p. 244 quoting Muhasimad Farid
6. Mikhail, pp. 31, 34, 35
Continued from p. 210.
pp. 154-55
3. Sladen, op.cit., p. 110
4. Ibid., p. 56
5. cit., Sladen, op.cit., pp. xxi-xxxiii
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Congress, i>assing a resolution condaaniag the Copts, declared
that Isla* should he declared the official religion of Egypt,
It also passed resolutions opposing, point by point, the
demands of the Coptic Congress. The Congress was held in a1rash atmosphere and violent speeches were delivered . Its
aftereffects were much worse. The Press took up the issue.
Al*Alaa. the Organ of al-Hizb al-Watani, and Misr al-Fatat
2abuse'iaad ridiculed the Copts . "Down with the Christians'*
and **let the Christians go" were the cosimon slogans raised
3in the street disturbances in Cairo •
ii
Apart fl*(»B the corHrounal cleavage, the nationalists
were divided into several groups and factions even on matters
of policy. There were those who liked to have a supervision
of Britain in the administration and goyeroaient of the countrj
whereas others were deadly opposed to the Occupation. A third
group was that of go-betweens. They quarrelled aaongst
4theaselves and abused each other •
1. Ibid., p. 35
2. Elgood, op.cit.y p. 197; also, the Tlaes  ^March, 1911; 
Pyfe, op.cit., p. 1253. F^ rfe, op,cit., p. 155
4. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 105,116
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With the detachaent of the Khedive, Baany half-hearted
nationallats turned avray fron nationalism and rallied /rouad
the Kliedive, Such, for ejcample, were those who founded the
Party of the Nobles^* Among other political groups which
developed round soae important figure, mostly an editor or
proprietor of a paper, weret the pro-British al>?fttaattaie group^
then the al-Muatataf group organised under the m»o of “The
Free Tiational Party” (al-Hlzb al-¥atani al-Hurr)^  and some
other minor groups led by Akhnukh Fanus, Idris Raghib and
2
Hafiz Awad . The religious group, i.e. t)d al-Azhar party,
3rallied round al-Manar . All these groups wore satisfied to 
a large extent with the Occupation and demanded at the most 
a liberal Constitution and sane internal administrative 
reforms^.
The hegemony of the Movement was, however, in the
hands of three larfe groups centring round the most popular
papers of Egypt, al-Muawad. al-Llwa. and al-Jar Ida. These
groups fulfilled, to a considerable extent, the essentials
of a political party and were the pioneer political parties
5in Egypt • Al-Muayyad group, called the Constitutional 
Reformers, was led by Sheikh All Yusuf and \fa.s moderate in
1* Landau, op.cit,, p« 144
2. Sladen, op*dt«, pp* 138—43s ^^fe, op.cftt., p« 125
3. Al-Manar group was represented by the editor of al-Ifaaar^ 
Muhammad Rashid R#aa, himself.
4. Sladen, op.cit., pp* 138-143; Landau, op.cit., pp.l42--43 
5* I havQ been using the word ‘group* Instead of parties,
for most of the political organisation of Egypt. This is because, as S! have already mentioned above, these were 
loose organisations centred round some important figures 
and had little of the essentials of a real political party.
- 21S -
its attitude towards the Occupation regime. This Party was
fotinded on December 15, 1907. In its general policy, it was
1opposed both to al^Liva group as well as to al-Jarida group » 
It campaigned through its organs, al^Muawad and al-Ml»bar^
for a Parliament and the people’s right to legislate and
2administer their country • As for the withdrawal of the 
Occupation, they favoured Evacuation by stages. Occasionally, 
the Reformers turned somewhat extremists, but their basic
3approach to political problem was that of a moderate party • 
Ali Yusuf led the Parjy till his death in October
41913 , after whom little was heard offany significance 
regarding its political activities.
The People's Party, »*al-Hizb al«.Pmma**y was founded
in October 1907 and centred round the paper al-Jarida^. It
was led by Hasan Abd ar-Raziq, and after his death, by Mahmud
6Sulaiman • Among its outstanding members weres S*<ui Zaghlul, 
Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, and Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid. In its early 
phases, it demanded improvements and reforms in gradual stages. 
But later, it stood for c<»iplete independence, whereupon 
certain of its members left the Party. The extremists of 
the dissidents Joined the National Party and the moderated?
1. Sladen, op.cit., p. 114
2. Haikal, op.cit., p. 31s Landau, op.cit., p. 14
3. Sladen, op.cit., pp« 134«>35, 137
4. Al^Manar. October 30, 1913 s Landau gives his death year
as 1911, which is incorrect. Landau, op.cit., p. 142
5. Haikal, op.cit., p. 30; Lloyd, op.cit., p. 50; Landau, 
op.cit., p. 137
6. Mahmud Sulaiman ( d. 1929 ) was a thorough-educated and 
liberal-minded patriot, see, Haikal, op.cit., p. 198
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went to the fold of Constitutional Refonaers^,
Ahnad Zutfl was the ruling spirit of the Party,
2He edited al~Jarlda. the organ of the Party • Al-Jarlda did 
a lot in educating public opinion. At the same time it 
represented the noblest example of a balanced Arable Press.
Ahmad Lutfi was held in high estera amongst his coxmtryaea.
He was one of the two advocates who represented the case of
3
the Dlnshawai victims • His paper was also very popular. But 
the Rational Party and the Oonstitutlonal Reformers continued
4to ridicule his policy •
His policy in itself, was neither pro-British nor
pro-Khedive, nor even pro-Turkish. It was simply pro-Egyptian.
He strongly supported the demand for an Independent Constitution
"We have formed the Peoples Party to arouse public opinion
5which is the strongest force" , he stressed. "The English are, 
after all, English, and. Sir Bld6n Oorst, with all his 
Cooperation (Ittifaa) with the legal ruler of Egypt, is a
6greater danger for us than his predecessor**, he explained .
In.various articles, contributed to al-Jarida^ he analysed 
the situation of the country and made suggestions on the 
following linest
1. Baikal, op.cit., pp. 200-20^ landau, op.cit., p. 138
2. Mohd. Husain, op.cit., pp. 77-78, first issue of al-Jarida 
on March 9, 1907
3. Baikal, op.cit., p. 30
4. Baikal, "Muzakkarat”, p. 31
5. Lutfi, op.cit., p. 31
6. Ibid., p. 9
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**Sar govariment is autocratic*•• aivi^  like any other 
autocracy, looks after the interests of the goveraors rather 
the governed** • Then: **The Ministry wavers between the people
n 2thajb demand a Constitution and the Condorainium that oppose it •
Ve do not wish a change in the personnel; instead, we want a
change in policy, whereas, there se^s to be little factiial
change, one Ministry falling while another prototype returning
3to power . We only denand our Ministry to be that of *Sherif
4Pasha* and not that of * Asquith* • As for the question of the
capability of the people for representative institutions, this
idea ( of considering the natives unqualified ) was invented
by the Engl;^^ in India long ago and now they have transferred
it to Egypt, **It is incumbsat upon us not to depaad upok
Sfrone else for help save ourselves, as did the Ottowans
upon themselves . s^ d^uld bep'^ ae un^ed qH 'BgjrptJxfiisa*.^ .^
We should become united on 'Egyptlanism* •••• No doxii»t, unity
of faith is an Important factor, but not the sole factor
(for national unity), or the German and the English nations
would be one (because both professed Christanity), Hone
Cwould dare say that there is a single (Sopt who prefers 
Abyssinian interests to those of Egyptians, or that there is
1« Ibid., pp. 250-51
2. Ibid., p. 263
3. Ibid., p. 257
4. Ibid., p. 248
5. Ibid., p. 22
6. Ibid., p. 32
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a single Muslim who would prefer the interest of Turkey to
that of Egypt^. There is no doubt that the British Occupation
is solely responsible for creating had feeling between the
2Muslims and the Copts- •
Lutfi had a very clear-cut conception of ’nation* 
and ♦nationalisiB*, He did not adhere to paa-Tslaciisa in 
whatever for« it misht come. He was totally a^inst extra­
territorial loyalties. To be Egyptian and nothing but the
3Egjrptian, was his raotto , and it was for the Egyptian people
4that he demanded a self-governing Constitution, To achieve 
this objective, he scrupulously adhered to means that were 
coapletely peacefuii.. Formulating aisd arousing public opinion 
and explaining peoples* demands to the Occupation regime aod 
to the Khedive were the «ain lines on which he and his Party 
worked.
Al-Liwa group represented the extreae-wing of the
Niational Moveaent. It had organised itself into the NiEitioBal
Party in the lifetia* of Mustafa Kaail, and was still the
leading natiosAlist party as far as the adherence and
5popularity was concerned • Dwaaading immediate withdraw! of
1* Xbiday p* 34
2. cit.. Ntnteeatii Century, 1910 and quoted by Mikhail, 
op.cit., p. 86
3. cit«, MBA, Angustj-September, 1951, p. 280 Quoting 
Slaaa Musa from **TOrbiyat Salam Musa**,
4« cit., Hamza, op.cit,, pp. 151-52
5. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 37, 49
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the Occupation army, aiid promulgation of a liberal Constitution, 
the Natloaal Party, after Kasil's death, had turned aore 
•Islaalc nationalist* than Egyptian nationalist* Dissensions 
occurred frequently. Many of the Coptic colleagues of Ka»il 
deserted the Party and with them a number of sober-ninded 
Muslins also left it. Ahnad Hilmi, one of the sub-editors 
of al-Liwa, Joined another Paper, al^Akhbar. whence he launched 
a campaign against al-Liwa. accused that the Paper no 
longer followed the policy of its illustrious founder. It was 
claimed in the columms of al-Akhbar  ^that Ahmad Hilrai was the 
man who made Kamil such a popular leader among the masses^.
However, inapite of dissensions, Muhammad Farid, the
new leader of the Party, continued to struggle hard for
maintaining the old traditions of the Kirty* %  himself stood
for communal imity fr<ai the very begi^ng. With unity, he
stressed, everything could be ahh/i^ed, ”a Constitution, and
Parliament, the effective control over the Government", and
2finally even the Evacuation •
When Piarid took charge of the Party, the Khedive 
had already been won over by the new British Agent, and 
British Foreign Office had announced that before granting 
any Constitution, the Khedive will have to consult the British
1. Ibid., pp. 147-48
2. Xbid., p. 110
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authorities beforehaai. Parld denounced this declaration in
his first speech as the leader of the National Party, He
advised the Khedive not to pay attention to it, prophesying
that “the English would not be able to offer any opposition
or else they would appear in the eyes of Europe as despots
aJKi tyrants”^ . He advised the people that "the Egyptians
aust on no account submit to SnglaM the question of Egypt
having a Constitution...• This would be an irreparable error,
for it would be tantanount to an official acknowledgeaent of
2the Occupation ••••
Al-Llwa  ^the organ of the Party, was being edited
by Sheikh Abdul Aziz ash-Shawish. It bitterly criticized the
way the British engineered a v^l^ed Protectorate over Egypt*
In an article, reveiwlng Cromer's aonoglsaph on Modern Egypt,
ash-Shawish accused Britian of crushing the native IMustrles
and handicrafts and using Egyptian cotton as raw^aaterlal for
3Lanc^ iashire • In another article, he enuaerated the *blessimga 
of the Occupatlon-regime as follcwss
** 1. The x*uln of the educational organisation of 
the country, the killing of the Arabic l a nguage.(2) 
strugglAng against Egyptian patriotic spirit and the pxmishaent 
of whoever shows any love of liberty and indepei^encej
1. Ibid., p. 11
2« clt«, SladenX op.cit., p. 112
3, Aj-Llwa. 190$, cit. Sladen, op.cit., p. 129
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(3) playing fast aad loose with the laws ai^ institutions 
of the coimtry, until the judicial aad adainistrativo affairs 
becaae proverbial for anarchy everywhere; (4) the fjfacilities 
,,, afforded to foreign countries which robbed Egypt’s great 
blessings and left her in stringent crisis •••; (5) the 
failure to prepare Egypt, by every possible aeans, for 
self-governiaent •
An editorial of 1909, probably written by ash-Shawish 
hinself, reads as follows:
"This land was polluted by the Engl^ish, putrified 
with their atrocities as they suppressed our beloved destour. 
tied our tongues, buried our people alive and hanged our 
innocent relations, and perpetrated other horrors at which 
heavens are about to tremble •••• Let us take a new step*
Let our3^ 1ives be cheap while we seek independence* Death is
2far better than life if you remain in your present condition".
With its forceful agitating language axid harsh
criticism of the Occupation, al-Liwa produced a commotion in
the younger generation, who started thinking in teras of
using force, if possible, for the attainment of their national
goal. Even the murder of Butrus, as has already been referred
3to, is said to have taken place at the instance of al-Liwa *
"It is to the Liwa principally that the Young Egypt has been
I* cit*, Sladen, p. 130
2* eit*, Stoddard, op.cit., p. 118
3. ?yfe, op.cit., p. 120
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accustoned to took for guidance”, Fyte nvamed up the 
sltmtlon as he witnessed it^ .
4
4
As a result of the influence of these "Born agitators' 
terrorist groups were formed* Other papers, suck as al«»Qutr
3
al~Misri. also used the sane language • In its issue of
January 1910, after citing soiae examples of bad rulers who
desaved assassination at the hands of their subjects, and
emphasising that the rulers wore the cause of the misfortune
or the good fortune of a country, the paper concludedi
"Par un Cureux hasard et arrive que si un tel
souverain ne faste meurt, est arrive a sa out, a Charles I
d*Anglettre, a Louis X7I de Prance l*etat du peuple cliange du
malheur, dela pan verte a richosse de la nisere a la prosperetei
4cela par pavient pas a paneterar,**
Al~Iiiwa (and later on the successor of al~Liwa nasie^  
a l e t c . ,  when bocause of some disputes with the relations
g
of Kamil, the Natiojsal party had to leave away al-Liwa)
1« Tbid*, p« 118 
2» Sladen, op.cit», p. 117
3, Al-ffenar, May 1908: iAxf. Sladen, op.cit,, pp. 147--48
4. cit., Lloyd, p. IlOs see also, Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 118.
Soon after it was stopped.
5* jM.-Liwa was replaced, in the beginning, by al-Alam  ^and lately, by ash-Sh*ab. The English and French organs of 
the Party were closed in the beginning of 1910 due to 
financial difficulties. The editor of the Bngl;iish organ, 
Theodore Rotzentine, busied himself in writing a book 
which was pub^ JLshed under the title "Egypt’s Ruia" in 1910. 
It introduced^a wider scale the Egyptian problem to the 
European readers at large. Afterwards the author joined 
the staff of Egypt issued by Blunt from London. The Egypt
was however banned by the Egyptian authorities. After the 
October Revolution, Rotzentine became Lenin’s P^ersonal 
Assistant. See Preface to the Arabic translation of “Egypt 
Ruin’* done by Ahi»d Shukri".
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continued to lead the nationalist forces constantly agitating 
for the cause and educating public opinion. The bitterness 
of the Inperialists against al-Liwa is nanifested in a cosimaat
by the staunch laperlalist, Sladon, oa the alleged chargeter
of the Paperi ”It sticks to no lie, no calumny, no baseaess ^
of any kind. It is deiaasogue in the worst sense of the word,"
Vhen Koail died, ffiahammad P^id, an eminent lawyer,
a reputed scholar and a well-known patriot and trusted
friend of Kasil, was elected the President of the National
Party, Farid had come in contact with Kamil in Paris in
1895, and had since then remained a close associate and
advisor to Kaail, He had accompanied his in his various
trips to Burope and in 1907 Imd also acted in his absence as
the cheif Editor of the Party’s Organ, He was the first
Secretary af the Party and Kamil wanted him to beccwe his
8successor*
P^rld was born in 1868 and was the son of a Pasha^  
Ahmad Farid, He obtained his law degree at the age of ninteen, 
and since then held several responsible posts in the Egyptian 
administrative service. From 1877, he started contributing
1, Sladen, o?*cit,, p, 135
2, R%fi*l, op,cit,, pp, 7, 8, 13, 22, 24
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articles to All Yusuf’s journal al^Adab. and at tha age of
twenty-four wrote a monograph al«Bah.1at at-Tauflolyyah fl
garlkh Mu*assls al«.»A»llat al.lfcthaamadlyyah. Three year later,
1he completed another book on the hlatroy of the OttCHKia Eaplre
In the meanwhile he had cowe In close touch with the liatlonal-
Ists, and slovrly the scholar, loyal to the Khedive and the
Sultan, changed Into an esttreme nationalist. Even as late
as 1902, he was busy with his scholarly pursuits and was
writing a history of the Boaaan Bap ire. But very sooa the ^
scholar redirected all his Intellectual energies and acumen
2towards the cause of the Bgyotlan people •
In February 19C^, Rarid had to shoulder the 
responsibilities of leading the Ifetlonallsts. He became the 
President of the National Party, while All Kamil Pehai,
brother of the deceased leader, w^s entrusted with the
3 4Secretaryship of the Party • Sheikh Abd al-Azlz ash-^awish
became the ch^ff Editor of al-Llwa, Other prominent members
5of the Party were: Amin ar-Hafl’i , Ismail Labih, Abd ar-Hahnaa
6ar-Rafl*l , Hafiz Ramadan and Muhammad Zaki All, Bxtra-ordlaary
1« Ibid*a pp* 7«Bal8,22,24
2, Ibid., p, 25
3« Xbld», p, 4c5
4, Ash-Shawish, the "unofficial successor of Kamil", as Fyfe
calls him, was an ex-Professor of Arabic at Oxford. Hi 
reraalned edittlng the paper till February 1912 whem he 
migrated to the Porte, (Pyfe.op.cit., p, 164j Rafi‘i,
op.cit,, p, 55t Lloyd, op.cit,, p, 89)
5. Born in 1886. Atnin got hid degree in law in 1909, and then
joined the staff of the organ of the National Party, On 
Septenber,14,1909, the anniversary of Tel-al-Kablr was 
celebarated on his instigation, and the Party's paper of 
that date was published with balck margins, abusing the 
Occupation regime and Instigating people for a national 
revolt. In 1909-10,he continued writing against the 
extension of the Canal concession and against the new black
Continued,.....
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■•etings of th« Party wore held oa oecasioas of Batloaal
importance such as the birthday of the Prophet, death
anniversary of Kamil, Celeberations of Hijra new year’s day,
anniversary of Tel al-Rabir. etc. la Europe, the Bgyptlaa
students held congresses, which were attended by the leaders
of the National Party. European Press was also used for
nationalist propaganda^.
Towards the end of 1908, Farid proceeded to England.
There he published in the • Manchester Guardian*, a prograaae
of his Party. It demanded jjuediate Evacuation, restoration
of the Egyptian Constitution of 1882, and reorganisation of
educational system; Egypt in turn would honour its internat«
ional obligations as well as the privileges already enjoyed
2by the European residents in Egypt .
In Egypt, F^rid led a powerful agitation for the
Destour and endeavoured to maintain national harmony. "Beleive
me**, he wrote, "that there is no power oa earth to stand
against the public opinion when it is united, and against a
3nation whea it is one, indivisible one** . Oa another occasion
1. Baikal, op.cit., p. 43s Landau, op.cit.,op.eit.,124-28
2. Landau, op.cit., pp. l^-25t Hafi*i, op.cit., 110-15
3. Rafi*i, op.cit., p. 260
Continued from p. 224
Act of Press. In 1910-11, he was struggling for a more 
liberal Parlisuaent. In 1912, he succeeded to ash-Shawish 
as the cheif editor of the Party-4rgan. He died in 1927.
( Anbart **Dhikra Paqid al-^tan”, 
pp. 1,2,8,15,16,20,21,33,103. }
6. Abddrrahmaa ar-Rafi*i, the famous historian of the 
national movement of Egypt, alive to tdiis date.
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k« saidI "Leave aside these cleavages, disputes aad religious
differences, and be all of you brethren, the sons of one
■otherland. B« Bgyptian before anything else.”^  Agains
"Would that we were one hand, one heart, one soul in naaerous
bodies and left aside our differences.••, we would have
aeheived the Constitution, the Parliament, self-GovernaeRt
2and even the BvacuatioM.•• of our beloved country".
During this period, Croaer*s successor, Gorst,
adopted several repressive aaasures and passed several decrees
to that effect* The Press Law of 1909 was one, the Exile law
•nother. The Exile Law passed in July 1909, stipulated that
any 'dangerous person' could be arrested and exiled at any
time. The passage of these decrees was followed by
demonstrations on fihe part of the people, and the leaders
of the National Party led strong protests against the adoption
3of these despotic steasures •
In Msireh 1910, while the heated discussion on the
Canal Issue was still continued. President Roosevelt of the
United States visited Egypt smd addressing a gathering of
4students of the Bgyjitian University told them that the 
Eg3rptians were not yet mature for independence and Self- 
Government. His speech was bitterly criticised in the native
1. Ibid., p. 449i also, Sladen, op.cit., p. 110
2. Ibid., pp. 101-104
3. Ibid., pp. 117-18
4. The movement for establishing a national University initia.
ted by Kamil and then led by Qasim Amin, S*ad Zaghlul and 
others, aeheived its goal in embryo form to a certain 
extent in 1908,when the Egyptian people on their own 
initiative, started a Universiry.
- 227 -
Press and student demonstrators desanded the v lthd rav l of 
those words, A general wave of injured pride swayed the 
p o litlca lly -co n sc io u s middle c la s s i  Again, on June 28 of 
the sa>e year, al-Wardani was executed and h is  death was 
■ourned throughout the country* *'Nu»bers of students and
schoolboys were mourning fo r the murderer, "Fjrfe, a contemporary
2
w rite r ,  observed •
In the early  days of 1910, there appeared a 
n a tio n a lis t  book e n title d  **Wataniyyati"« I t  was the divan 
of Sheikh A li al-.(2iayati, aoi i t s  introductions were w ritten  
by Muhammad Farid and Abd al«Aziz ash-Shawish. The Bgjrptian 
a u th o r itie s  declared the book *seditious* and the author 
and P reface-w riters were sentenced to  various terns of 
imprisonment, the author fo r  one year, Farid fo r s ix  months
3
and ash-Shawish fo r three months • On h is  re lease , ^%rrote an
•  A
a r t ic l e  e n title d  "Min as-5irf.1n Ila»s-3i.1a**» th a t i s ,  *from 
one prison to  another*. In th is  a r t ic le  he saids **I passed 
s ix  months of imprisonment and I  never f e l t  suffocated except 
a t  the time o f my re lea se , when I  came to)^know th a t  I  was 
coming out of 6ne prison only to  en ter another one, namely, 
the prison of the Egyptian nation  where one sing le  individual
4
ru le s  over the whole country supervized by the Occupation" •
1 , R afi* i, o p .c i t . ,  pp. I 6O-6I 5 pyfe, o p .o i t . , p. 175 
2« Fyfe, op«cit«, p« 175
3« R afiH . o p .c i t . ,  pp. 239<-40, see a lso  Ilohd. Husaint 
" a l - l t t i j a h a t  al-W ataniyya",pp, 68-69 
4« Ib id .,  p. 420
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la March 1911« Abd ar*>!lah»iiA ar«R afi*i published 
h is  "Huoug ash«»3h*ab»* ! • • •  ’the r l ^ t s  of the people*. I t  
alaed at "the rev iva l of the n a tio n a lis t  s p i r i t * * I t  supporte 
the C oostitu tiooal noveneat and urged the people to seek 
th e i r  leg itim ate  righ ts*  Explaitting the system of the trox^ias 
o f a C onstitutioB al covem sent, the bocdc dwelt a t  leagth  
upon the vays and aeans o f aoheiving an independent C oastitatio*
There was a popular deaand fo r a Destour. aad
peoples* deDonstrations and student a g ita tio n s  had beoose 
o
very e<Mnion • 13iis year^ hmrever, the lftislia>Copt re la tio n s  
had a lso  reaohed tiie ir  worst s tage . The n a tio n a lis ts , in sp ite  
o f th e ir  hard s tru g g le , were not ab le  to  aeheive anything 
s ig n if ic a n t, except l ^ t  soae degree of general p o li t ic a l  
coasciousness w ^  d isce rn ib le  aaong the masses. The B ritish  
policy  o f ’d iv ide and rule* was successful aad the coBs^at 
th a t  **the k i l l ia g  o f the na tional movMent was S ir  Bldoa
3
Qorst*s" ,  had proved to  be tru e .
i U
Qorst had gone to  Bngland early  in  1911. Be died 
there  ia  Jialy o f  the same yoar'^. His suecessor,Lord Kitehner,
Ib id .,  p . 259
2 . B aikal, p. 32; R afi* i. pp. 189-90
3 . rouag. o p .c i t . ,  p. 194, quoting from al-Ahram
4 . Anmai R egister, 1911, p . 194
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arrived in Cairo la September. Kitchner was returnlag to
Egypt after aa absence of twelve years • He had served Egypt
for about twenty years in different capacities, and held
the coBiaand of the Egyptian anay. As a coamander-itt-<;heif
of the Egyptian aray, he had quarrelled with the Khedive in
his early years of Khediviate. Now the same ®illtary-»aa,
with a strong bias against the iChedive, had coae to Egjrpt
as the Baster of its destiny. As a ■ilitary nan, he wanted
2to change Egyptian politics into a Bilitary affair • In his
first speech before the Khedive, he explained that he had
3cone for "watching over.*, the prosperity of Egypt** • Hitherto 
no British authority had spoken in so blunt a way about the 
British x>oXsition in Egypt. His speech aroused public 
iodignatidn. The Egjrptiaa Press renarked that a new era of
4Anglo-Egyptiaa relations had begun •
Ihe day Kitchner arrived in Egypt, Italy ^ d  seat 
an ultinatuBi to Turkey and it was a question of honoix^
5before the war between the two countries was to break out .
The event caused a general resentaent in Egypt against Europe,
and strong sympathies were expressed for the Turks. The
Egyptiaas were, however, helpless andi were unable to offer
any assistance to their ’brethren* ia their fight agaiast
6the ♦infidels* . With a view to check the rising nationalist
1. Elgood, op.cit., p. 194
2s Baikal, op.cit., p. 38
3. cit, Sidney, "With Kitchner in Cairo”, p. 34
4. Ibid•, pp. 34»35
5. Ibid., p. 38: Al-Hilal, October 1, 1911
6. Sidney, op.cit., p. 33; Haiikal, op.cit., p. 49; Touag,
op.cit., pp. 192-93
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upsurge, the administration of Kitchaer adopted soms more
repressive measures* Besides the Press Censorship Act, the
Criminal Conscription Act, Cafe Act, Theatre Laws, and School
discipline Act were passed^, llationalist^ were interned, aid
2in large numbers tried under the Bxile Law • The new British
Agent had now beccaae the master of the situation* Every
3decree was named in the Press as that of Kitchner • He had 
overshadowed the Khedive completely* The Khedive had already
surrendered on the question of relinquishiag the charfce of
4the Awaaf , However, along with these repressive measures,
several enac)^ tments for the amelioration of the plif^t of 
the people were also made®* But the nationalist were not 
satisfied with any amelioration without self-governaeat* 
Within a few months of KitchaerSs Agency, five 
Arabic papers were stopped. They weret Misr al-Fia,tat.
Wadi an-Nll. al^ Aichbar, al-Liwa. asd a_l>Alam^ * Blunt*s
7"Egypt" was banned in the country * New papers were not
pallowed to be issued * Farid who was accused of endangering 
the peace and tranquillity of the country and was sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment, had left Egypt towards the end
9of 1911, never to return again • He continued his struggle
1* Baikal, op.cit*, pp* 57-59 
2* Young, op.eit*, p. 190 
3* Ibid*, op*oit*, p* 194 
4* Sidney, op.cit*, p. 80
5* Ibid*, p. 32-63; Five Feddan law was passed by virtue of
which every peasant was under obligation not to sell or 
mortagage his land if it was below or equal to five feddans, 
Saving Banks for the peasants were also established*
6* Sidney, op.cit*, pp. 11, 18, 92
7* Ibid*, pp. ^^ 9 92—3 
8* Rafi'i, op*cic., p* 268 
9* Ibid., p* 111
- 231 -
in Europe and at the Porte^. Ash-Shawish had also loft Egypt 
for the Porte, where, he was appointed the editor of **al-Hilal 
al-TJftiiai'*^ , Aain ar-3afi*i had succeeded him as the editor
A
of the organ of the Party (al^ Ala]»). which was stopped ia
1914. It seemed as though tho natiorialist forces were
dissipated and there vraa no force left behind the aovesient.
In such anji atmosphere, underjrouiid activities seene^
to have been the only choice left to the people* In July 1912,
a plot to raurder the Khedive, the Premier and the British Ageni
was discovered* Three nationalists while dis)fcussing the plan
were arrested red-handed in a cafe* These were Ifuhanaaad Isaa
Waqid, Muhanraad Abd as-Salam and Muhaaread Tahir al-Arabi*
They were tried and, in August of the sane year, were sentence<!
3to fifteen years imprisonment • ^
In August of the saae year, a book entitled al-Math- 
urat ath-Thauriwa" appeared in Alexendria. It was written
1* Early in 1912, he visited the Porte, where he was given 
a hearty welcome by the Egyptian students and ash-Shawisk 
who was already their* While Farid was staying there, 
the govermient at the Porte changed and the pro-British 
Baail Pasha cane to power. Farid, with his f/riend, 
labib, left the Porte for Paris in the aonth of July* In 
September, ash-Shawish was arrested and was sent to Egypt. 
Farid renained in Europe, and continued his struggle 
against the Occupation, voicing the cause of his country 
in the International Conferences and other Conventions 
held in Europe. In November 1914. after the outbreak of 
VTar, Xbbas, the Khedive, now staying at the Porte, Joined 
with F&rid and proclaimed ’Destour* for Egypt. Farid 
died in Berlin in 1919. ( Rafi’i, op.cit., pp. 277-78, 
282-85 ).
2. Ash-Shawish was deported and remained out of picture till 
he died in 1929, after cc»iing back to Egypt a few years 
before his death: Muslim QazetteCUrdu) Oct., 30, 1912t 
al-Hilal (Urdu), Jtily 13,1912
3, Rafi'i, pp. 286-87; see also, al-Hilal (urdu) August 14,191
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by Ah»ad Mukhtar, a student of Military Collage at the Porte,
It was suspected that some organised revolutionary party was
working behind it, Ifence several arrests were made in this
connection^. It is quite probable that this book appeared
as a consequence of the trial ef and iaprisozuaent of the
three nationalists, which had caused a af'idespread resentnent
in the country* However 'seditious* propaganda started
■ong the people, and on October 31, a furious riot broke 
2out in Bulaq • There was general unrest and indignation
against the coercive laeasures adopted by the new Agent. Even
the welfare laaasures adopted for the uplift and amelioration
3of the peasantry were suspected and resented .
However, the report of the British Agent for the/t)«o
year 191^ after the Ikperialist fashion, ccmplascent and
optimistic. Concluding his Report, Kitchner said that within
the national party there was a growing feeling of confidence
in the Government ^^ particularly aaong the sober mass of the
4people" •
The Turco-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan X'far of 
1912 had roused the pan-IslaJ*ic sentiments of the Egyptians^,
1. Ifafi»i, op.clt., p, 297
2. Annual Register, 1912, pp. 433-34
3. Elgood, pp. 204-205; Hafi*l, pp. 300-301
4. Annual Register, 1912, p. 435
5. Rafi»l, pp.451-52; Al-Hilal (Urdu), Vol. 3, Ko.l, p. 12; 
Divan of Hafiz, vol. II, pp. 61-64
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and Althou^ there vas no capable leader to lead the national 
■oveiaent| the aasses had become fully politically conscious.
The younger generation bred on the slogans, *al-Jila wa*d» 
Dastur* I.e. Evacuation and Constitution, thou|^ keeping 
Bvacuation as the ultiamite goal, desired the iomediate promul­
gation of a liberal Constitution as their first step. In 
its session of March 1912, the General Assembly pressed for 
the iauaediate promulgation of a nev Constitution; it vas 
only in this manner that the spread of terrorism and extremism 
could be checked^.
In July, 1913, Kitchner announced the new
Constitution in the name of the Khedive. It closely followed
2the Indian Reform Act of 1909 , as every successful 'experiment 
in India was also applied to Egypt. This Constitution 
stipulated a one-Chamber Legislative Assembly of 66 members 
elected by an electoral college, and 17 members nominated 
by the Government so as to give representation to professional 
and religious minorities. The President and one of the 
senior viee-Presidents of the Assembly were to be nc»inated 
by the Qovernnent. The term of the Assembly was six years, 
and one-third of its membership was to be replaced every two 
years. It was a consultative and debating body, and its 
function was only to discuss, suggest or c^rit^ize and not to
1. Rafi^i, op.cit., p. 456
2. Chirol, op.cit., p. Ill; 7oung, op.cit., p. 197
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legislate op to control the Executive, It could, at best,
check the increase in taxation and debate foreign affairs.
It could also introduce a bill, but here the final authority
to pass a bill Vlay with the Govern«ant. The Ctovemaent had
powers to dissolve the Assembly in case of differnces
between the Legislators and the Government. The Assembly
could delay some legislation and could ask the Ministers to
justify their insistence on certain measiires. However, the
final authority remained with the Ministers as the spokesmen
of the Grovernment, Provincial and local self-government
bodies were given more powers than previouly enjoyed usier1the Organic law of 1883 , But the thing that counted was
the affairs at the centre, and here nothing was done towards
self-government or promulgation of a liberal Constitution,
Elections were held in the month of December, and
2very little interest was shown on the part of the people .
S*ad Zaghlul was the leader of the Constitutional movement
at this time. He also enjoyed the support of the National
Party. Sa*ad was elected and became the vice-President of
the Assembly. Mazlum Pasha was nominated as President of
3the Assembly, and S*a*id Pasha as the Prime Minister ,
In his political ideology, S'ad was anti-Khedive and 
a moderate Constitutionalist. At this stage he was not so 
much anti-British as he became later on, after the First 
World War. He had taken an active part in the Arabi Revolt 
and was arrested with other revolutionaries, but was later 
set free. Since then, coming in good books of the Khedive
■Ujl
:coElectoral Law; also, Sidney, op.cit., p. 66 
op.cit., p. 130
Continued,
1. State Papers, 1913: pp. 417-927; The Texts of/C nstitution 
‘ a * 5' ' “ --------
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aiid the Occupation regime, he had served In several
administrative and ministerial capacities. But now ke had
become CMipletely disappointed with the Occupation regime
and had decided to come out openly against the dual Government
All the sixty-six members along with S'ad were
opposed to the Ministry* At last, the pro-Khedive, or rather,
pro-British, Prime Minister, 3a*id Pasha, had to resign in
2August 1914, ar»i was succeeded by Rushdi Pasha • The session 
of the newly created Assembly lasted trcm January to June, 
and, in most cases, the Government accepted the advice of
3the Assembly . Tbis session of the Legislative Assembly was 
the first awell as the last, as it remained suspended 
dtiriag the War.
The Assembly aade no significant contribution im 
the develoiment of nationalism. However, one positive 
acheivement was that the various nationalist elements that
were dispersed so far had now gathered together in one place
4in the form of the Assembly • Here the delegates debated 
various questions of national importance and had the opportunit 
of voicing peoples' demands freely and fearlessly, at times
RafiSi
Continued from p. 234
2, Pyfe, op.cit., p. 130
3, Chirol, op.cit., p. 114; Hafi*i, op.cit.. pp. 313-16; 
Young, op.cit., pp. 197-98; Landau, op.cit., pp. 55-5
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expecting a favo'urable response from the authorities. It 
was here ia the Asseably that Isaa'il Al>a2sa had sunoarised 
the 'blessings* of the Occupation and presented in 
consolidated the essence of British rule in Bg/pt*
"I take the British Ageht to ask for Press Laws", he 
protested, ”••• for treating Journalists as brigands and 
for attacking the authority of the Legislative Council, •«»We 
are progressing in brutality, loquacity, drink and debts.,.. 
What is the renedy? Self-governaent; and for the last ^
thirty years we have not Moved an inch towards self-goveranent 
It was an excellant appraisal of the period 1883-1914.
In August 1914, hostilities broke out between
OL<ir>
Germany on the one hand and Allies led by British on the
other. Turkey Joined hands with Qemany and declared war
in November. "Recognising the respect and veneration with
which the Sultan is regarded by the Mohammedans of Egypt",
Britain announced not to call upon the Egyptians to assist
2the Allies in War operations . But inspite of these 
announcements, Egypt was treated as an appendage of the 
British Empire, and therefore, indirectly at war with Germany. 
In August 1914, on the pretext that with the presence of 
British forces in Egypt, Egypt was liable to be attached,the
1. Ibid., pp. 56—57
2. Cit., Chirol, op.cit., p. 130
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ilBelo-Bc7ptla> authorities declared Ger«am ships in the Egyptian 
waters as belligerent^* Finally, on Decenber 18, Britain declared 
Egypt a British Protectorate. The following day, Ahbas Hil»l was
deposed in absentia and Husain Kaail, his cousin, was proelaiaed
2the new ruler with the title of the Sultan • The last tie with
Turkey had been severed*
The nationalists were pained to see their country
bec(»e an appendage of the British Eftpire* Their intentions were
apprehended beforehand and ash»Sh*ab. the new organ of the
National Party, protested against the policy followed by Britain.
As a result it was stopped in November. A Manifesto, appearing
on behalf of al-Azhar. boldly denounced the declaration by which
Egypt was made a Protectorate, and endorsed all deaands of the
Nationalists. But these protests, declarations, and announceaenti
were of no avail* Instead, stringent aeans\ires were adopted to
crush down what aeagre natioi^list forces were still alive. The
nationalists and specially the aeabers and adherents of the
National Party were at their worst. Arrests, inquisitions and
deportations followed the declaration of the British Protectorate
3over Egypt *
Bie national noveaent was suppressed during the war 
period. But within a decade after the War, it once again acquired i 
the s^ae force and raoaentuffl, and under the leadership of S*ad 
ZaghlTil, a aass aovement was started, deaanding complete independ( 
nee. Within a few years of this movement, Egypt became free and 
acquired its cherished goal of political independence, 
iT Ibid., p. 122; Rafi^i, op.cit., p. 346
2. Since the advent of Kitchner,Abbas had turned pro-Turkish and
was said to have been acting under the orders of the Porte.In
Jl^ is announcement on November 5, *14, of ad-DSstour al-Kamil  ^t 
war-declaration with Britain was also enjoined. Consequently 
he was deposed, (Rafi*i, op.cit., pp. 344-45)
3. Al-Hilal (Urdu) September-Noveaber, 1914
To sum up ray analysis of the development of 
nationalism In Egypt brougjit upto the year 1914* The 
origin may be traced to Its early stages In the closing 
years of the eighteenth century when the miserable conditions 
of the masses gave birth to a vague desire for a change 
In the existing state of affairs. At this stage, concepts 
of ‘nation* or ’nationhood* were not yet formed. But the 
discontentment had resulted In resentment which In turn 
had taken the form of an undercurrent. In which all the 
pre-requlsltes of a national movement were discernible. It 
Is In this wide-spread misery of the people that an lndeg#noua 
and natural genesis of the Egyptian nationalism Is found.
The Impact of Napoleonic Invasion; the 'pan-Arabism' 
of Muhammad All, and the political autonomy he brought to 
Egyp^; the Westernizing measures adopted by Muhammad All 
and his grandson Isma*il) all t^ese nourished the crude desire 
for-a-change. It was towards the end of this period of 
Egyptian history that the crude nationalists forces 
accum\ilating in the form of a militant movement joined hands 
with the educated intelligensla against native despotism
(as well as the increasing hoc^ of Britain and France,
8 u M I ILa,..,P-E
-  239 -
Finally, it was the British Occupation which
served as a catalytic agent in the entire process of
evolution of nationalism from its early immature form to
its more developed and Westernized form.
The post-Occupation period of about three decades
is totally different from the pre-Occupation days in so far
as the national movement was now corapletly modelled on
European lines, !Bie leadership came into the hands of the
middle class,/lawyers and the Journalists, who fused in it 
the up«>to<>date concepts of Western nationalism.
It was only the beginnings of the neo-nationalism 
that the War interve/ned and abrrfuptly closed the pre-War 
chapter of the national movement in Egypt, But, it was the 
continuation of the movement of this very period that emerged 
in the form of the mass upsurge of 1919, which hastened 
the end of the British Protectorate aiid finally resulted 
in the declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Eg3rpt,
The post-War developments in the Egyptian national 
movement are the subject of yet another study which may 
ri^tly be brought upto the Nasser-revolution of July 1952,
N?y work, as such, provides an appropriate background to 
this second phase of the development of nationalism in 
Egypt.
APPENDIX I.
BRITISH POLICY ON EGYPT 
16 October 1879 
(Great Britain, Public Record Office, P,0« 78/2997)
As you will shortly proceed to Egypt to take up 
the appointment of Her Ifejesty’s Agent and Consul-General 
in that country, I think it right to address to you soae 
observations as to the principles by which your conduct should 
be guided.
The leading aim of our policy in Eg3rpt is the 
■aintenance of the neutrality of that country, that is to 
say, the aaintenance of such a state of things that no great 
Power shall be more powerful there than England.
This purpose night, of course, be secured by the 
predominance of England itself, or even by the establish«ent 
of the Queen’s authority in the country. Circumstances »ay 
be conceived in which this would be the only way of attaining 
the object; but it would not be the best method. It would 
not in the present state of affairs confer any other 
advantages than opportunities of ««ploying English people 
and introducing English capitalj and these would be outweighed 
by the responsibilities, military and financial, it would 
entail. The only justification of such a policy would consist 
in its being the only available mode of assuring the neutralitj 
of Egypt towards us.
Vith this object in view it is obvious that we can 
have no jealousy of Tfetive rule in itself. On the contrary, 
its continuance is, for us, the easiest solution of the 
problem. But it must not degenerate into anarchy, orSerpetuate the oppression of recent years. Egypt is too much li view of the whole world, and there are too many interests 
attaching to it, to be suffered to relapse into the barbarous 
administration which in Persia and Burmah has resulted in 
misery so acute as to produce depopulation. An opinion would 
grow up in Europe in favour of intervention, which, in this 
case, would mean occupation; and if England could not satisfy 
it. she would not be able to prevent some other Power from 
doing so.
For this reason there is a value in the present 
relations between Egypt and the Porte, however anomalous they 
may appear to be. In case of extreme misgovernment, they 
furnish a machinery for changing the ruler, without any 
violation of Treaties or breach of diplomatic comity. They 
enable us to exercise a general control without taking over 
the governon\e.-At.
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We have no present reason, therefore, for wishing 
any foraal change In the position or institutions of Egypt; 
and the only change in the present, or rather the recent, 
practice which we desire is, that these institutions shall 
h« worked with tolerable honesty, and with economy and huoanit
Thus worked, they furnish what we want-- an Egyptian neutralit
which has a fair chance of perxaanence. Our Representatives 
in Egypt should, therefore, do all in their power to sustain 
the Native Government in its efforts to govern the country 
weilj and this, for the present, oust be an object with which 
no other should be allowed to interfere. So long as the 
country is formally independent, the Natives only can govern 
it. If they cannot do it, no one else can do it —  without 
military occupation. It has been sufficiently proved that 
the MussulBsans will not willingly obey a Oovernaent which is 
nominally European, or of which the prevailing and most 
conspicuous elements arc European, Their reluctance can only 
be overccane by force; and force the Europeans do not possess 
without military occupation.
It becomes, therefore, matter of great moment to 
make the Native Government succeed. For this purpose it should 
in its own interest, employ Europeans largely, and should be 
pressed to do so, if insensible to its own interest in that 
respect; but they must be kept as much in the background as 
possible. They should not be used in sufficient numbers to 
dustroy the apparent authority of the Native Governmentt and 
the employments to which they are named should be selected 
rather with a view to the effective exercise of power, than 
to the possession of conspicuous official rank. The posts 
which confer the greatest influence and excite the least / 
jealousy, are the posts which should be sought for Europeans,
In the performance of their duty as coimsellors 
of the Egyptian Government, the Representatives of Her Majesty 
will be distinguished by one peculiar mark fr<M those of any 
other Power, The policy they counsel will not be shaped by 
the interests of any particular class of creditors. It is thei 
duty to do what they properly can to secure an#" rights 
Englishmen wfy possess in the country they wHl ^ot exclude 
English creditors from the benefit of this rule; and, for 
the sake of Egypt herself, they will wish that she should 
pay her debts. If, therefore, 1C shall appear that any 
particular claim, or class of claims in which Englishmen 
are largely interested, is being unfairly treated by reason 
of the diplomatic support given to competing creditors of 
other nationalities, the English Agent oannot refuse to 
interfere. But the protection of the private interests of 
creditors or others will be an object of a merely secondary 
kind, and will not compete with the important political aims 
which it is their chief duty to secure.
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This singularity of their attitude in regard to 
the Egyptian debts is likely to he brought speedily into view. 
One of the questions which will be the most hotly debated 
in the ensuing winter at Cairo will be the proportion in 
which the various classes of creditors are to be paid*
Al>ost all must forego so»e portion of their claiii) and the 
sacrifices demanded aay be larger than any of the« expect*
It will of course be the duty of the English Agent to 
interpose if any English clainant should be subjected to 
manifest injustice. But, save in such a contingency, whieh 
is iaprobable. ttie controversy will not affect English 
interests; and the English Agent will do wisely to be sparing 
of his advice in respect to it so long as it concerns the 
interests of the creditors alone.
It cannot, however, be long restricted within these 
liaits. It Must either at first, or in the end, take the 
form of an issue between the interests of the creditors and 
the interests of the Egyptian Administration. The amount 
of the assets which will remain for the creditors to divide 
will depend on the amount which is first taken out of the 
revenue to pay the costs of Gtovernment. It will be for the 
interest of the creditors to put this sum at as Icnif a 
figure as they can, and their zeal to do so may possibly 
lead them to proposals incompatible with the efficiency of 
the Administration. The present attitude of the Governments 
of Austria, Prance, Germany, and Italy. favo\ir the 
conjecture that in this dispute they will lean rather to the 
side of the creditors than to that of the Government.
In such a policy, if they pursue it. Her Majesty's 
Government cannot follow them. To England the efficiency of 
the Administration is of paramount importance; in comparison 
with it the interests of the creditors must take an inferior 
place. On this poiht Her Majesty’s Representative will 
be forced to separate himself very decidedly frdm his 
colleagues, if they take the course I have anticipated. 
Without favouring extravagance, he must urge on the Khedive 
the reservation of a sufficient sum to emsiire the preservation 
of order, the due administration of justice, and the efficient 
maintenance of the public works on which the prosperity 
of the country depends.
What I have said refers to the present order of 
things; it serves the interest of England better than any 
that apparently could be substituted for it, and the efforts 
of Her Majesty's Agent must be chiefly directed to insure 
that it shall work efficiently, and thus continue to exist.
But the contingency of a failure in these efforts 
must be contemplated. The character of the present Khedive 
gives ground for hope; on the other hand, the character and 
capacity of the men by whom he is surrouiKied, and from whom
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his Ministers aust be chosen, jxistify apprehension as to the 
future. It «ay be that the causes of decay which at present 
threaten all the Mihonoiedan countries of the world will prove 
incurable in Bgypt also. Such an issue is, however, in ai^ 
case, probably distant, and the conditions under which it 
■ay take place cannot be foreseen now. But the possibility 
of it must be borne in uisA, Vfhen it cones, if it is to 
cone, it Bust fiM England as strons as any other country 
im substantial influence.
If ai^ tendency betrays itself so to arrange the 
European appointaents that a preponderance either in 
iaportance or nuner is assigned to other European nations, 
a state of things* is being created which/ia the case of a 
collapse of Egypt would be dangerous to English interests.
Her Majesty’s Agent should, therefore, watch these appointmenti 
with vigilance, and interpose on any sjmptoa of a hostile 
inclination on the part of the Govemaent in this respect.
I should be disposed to attach less iaportance to the 
distribution of Native appointaents. In all Oriental countriei 
where Eabassies are powerful, the Native casipetitors for 
place are veyy ready to enrol theaselves as clients of one 
Power or the other. But their friendship is not trustworthy, 
and their success of little real value to the Power of wh(» 
they are noainally partisans. Foreign Representatives in 
supporting thea are apt to allow their exertions to 
degenerate into a race for snail diploaatic victories, and 
in the struggle the object of appointing the best nan is 
entirely forgotten. To us, whose chief interest in Egsrpt is 
that the Qovernneat should last and work well, it is nuch 
■ore laportant tbat the best aea should be eaployed than that 
the partisans of England should be proaoted. This principle, 
however, aust not be stretched so far as to sanction the 
abandonment of Ibitive statesaen or officials who, by listening 
to the advice of England, had exposed themselves to the 
resentaent either of soae other Agency, or of the Native 
authorities.
It should further be borne in mind that if the 
Ottoaan Empire were to fall to pieces, and Egypt become 
independei^. the part of Egypt which interests England is 
the sea<>cqst, including the railway anfl other communications 
across the Isthmus. If it should happen that Egypt were 
divided, and the sea-coast and cOTimunications remained under 
the dominant influence of England, while the interior were 
to be otherwise disposed of —  supposing the stability of 
such an arrangement co\P.d be guaranteed-»-England would have 
no reason to be dissatisfied with it.
In the disposal, therefore, of European appointaents 
it is of primary iaportance to keep in English hands, as far a;
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may be possible, the harbours. evistoBsis, llghhouses, and 
the coBBunlcations by land and water from sea to sea. It 
Is onl7 of course to a limited extent that this can be 
done; and the necessity Is not sufficiently urgent at 
present to justify steps which would awaken the jealousy 
of other Powers. But the extension and consolidation of 
Bngllsh influence upon these points is the object which, 
as regards the future, must be kept in view. Whether it 
shall be pursued slowly or energetically must depend upon 
the circuBstances of the moment.
Hurewltzs
"Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East** 
vol. I, pp. 191-194
FOREIGN SECRETARY GRANVILLE'S CIRCULAR 
OUTLINING BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT
3 January 1883
(Gr* Britain, Parllamantary Papers, 1883, vol.83, pp* 38-40)
APPENDIX II,
The course of events has thrown upoa Her Majesty's 
Governaent the task, which they would willingly have shared 
with other Powers, of suppressing the military rebellion in 
Egypt, and restoring peace and order in that country. The 
object has happily been accomplished; and although for the 
present a British force reaains in Egypt for the preservation 
of public tranquillity. Her Majesty's Government are desirous 
of withdrawing it as soon as tlie state of the country, and 
the organization of proper means for the Kiintenance of the 
Khedive's authority, will admit of it. In the meanwhile, 
the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed 
towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving 
advice with the object of securing that the order of things 
to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and 
possess the elements of stability and progress.
The subjects to be treated may be divided into 
two categories* those which concern other cotintries, and are 
matters for the consent or concurrence of the European Powersj 
and those which are matters of internal administration.
To begin with the former classt one result of 
recent occurrences has been to call special attention to the 
Suez Canal, firstly, on account of the danger with which 
it was threatened during the first brief success of the 
insurrection; secondly, in consequence of its occupation 
by the British forces in the name of the Khedive, and their 
use of it as a base of the operations carried on in His 
Highness* behalf, and in support of his authority: and 
thirdly, because of the attitude assumed by the Direction 
and officers of toe Canal Co«pany at a critical period 
of the campaign.
As regards the first two of these points. Her 
Majesty's Government believe that the free and unimpeded 
navigation of the Canal at all times, and its freedom from 
obstruction or damage by acts of war, are matters of
. 24^ -
Importance to all nations. It has been generally admitted 
that the neasiires taken by them for protecting the navigation, 
and the use of the Canal on behalf of the territorial Ruler 
for the purpose of restoring his authority, were in no way 
infringements of this general principle.
But to put upon a clearer footing the position 
of the Canal for the future, and to provide against possible 
dangers, they are of opinion that an agreement to the 
following effect might with advantage be come to between the 
Great Powers, to which other nations would subsequently 
be invited to accede* —
1* That the Canal should be free for the passage of 
all ships, in any circumstances.
2, That in time of war a limitation of times as to 
ships of war of a belligerent remaining in the Canal should 
be fixed, and no troops or munitions of war should be 
disembarked in the Canal,
3, That no hostilities should take place in the 
Canal or its approaches, or elsewhere in the territorial 
waters of Egypt, even in the event of Turkey being one of 
the belligerents,
4, That neither of the two immediately foregoing 
conditions shall apply to measures which may be necessary 
for the defence of Egypt,
5, That any Power whose vessels of war happen to do 
any damage to the Canal should be bound to bear the cost 
of its immediate repair,
6, That Egypt should take all measures within its 
power to enforce the conditions imposed on the transit of 
belligerent vessels through the Canal in time of war,
7, That no fortifications should be erected on the 
Canal or in its vicinity,
8, That nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to 
abridge or affect the territorial rights of the Qovernment 
of Egypt further than is therein expressly provided.
Passing to the financial arrangements which have 
been the subject of agreement wittt all the Powers in connectioi 
with the Law of Liquidation, Her Majesty's Government are 
induced to believe that greater economy and simplicity a»y 
be attained in regard to the management of the Daira Estates 
and some other Administrations by certain changes of detail 
which would not diminish the security of the creditors. They
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trust shortly to be in a position to lay before the Powers 
definite proposals for this j»2rpose*
question in which all tlw Po^ars are interested, 
and which connects itself with the general subject of 
finance, is that of the equal taxation of foreigners and 
natives. Iter Majesty’s Governaent feel convinced that the 
Powers will be prepared to join thoa in accepting any 
equitable proposals of ^e Egyptian Qoverraient for the 
purpose of placing foreigners on the sane footing as natives 
in regard to taxes fron which they are at present exeapt*
4s regards the Mixed Tribunals which have been 
established in Egypt by intornational agreeoent for the 
decision of civil suits between natives and foreigners, you 
are aware that the prolongation of the present systeai, 
which was agre^ to in January last, would natusally expire 
on the 1st February next* Her ?^ aje3ty*s Oovemoent have 
advised the Egyptian Ministry to propose a further prolongatioi 
of a year, in order to givo ti»e for the discussion of 
asendnents in the Codes and procedure which w s  interrupted 
by the events of the present year*
This concludes the list of questions which are 
■atters of direct international arrangeaent with tlM Powers*
Her Majesty’s Governnent comsunlcate t^is outline 
of their views, as the initiative seras. after what has 
occurred, to fall on th«i, ani subnit it for ^e ccnislderatioa 
of the Powers, in the hope that it will aeet with their 
approval.
With reference to the second class of questions, 
the first and noat pressing of the Beasures of interrtfil 
adninistnition is the organization of a force for the 
naintenance of public security against exte^ l^al or iatemial 
attack. Both on grounds of econ<my and of safety. Her 
Majesty *3 Qovem»ent thiidc it desirable that the sgsrptian 
amy should be a snail one, anti that the duty of maintaining 
order within the country should be discharged., as far as 
possible, by a separate force of gendamerie and of pdtioe.
The Kh^ive and his I4inister3 have expressed a strong wish 
that British officers should be lent, to fill certain posts 
in the amy, under the Oowiander-in-ehief of the Khedive, 
and to this Her Majesty’s Goveranont have expressed their 
willingness to agree for a tiae, azad on a syatfiaa which 
would give Bgyptiaa officers access to scxae of the hl^er 
eosnands. 13te details of the schesM are still under 
consideration, but the general principles are sufficiently 
indicated In what X have stated.
- 24d -
Among the administrative arrangements of recent 
years, one of great iaportance was the institution of the 
English and French Controllers-General, with certain attribut­
ions in relation to the revenue airf expenditrure of the State, 
to which the French Government, and more recently that of 
England, became parties.
Upon this subject I inclose, for your informatioa, 
and for communication to the Grovernraent to which you ar<3 
accredited, a copy of a note officially delivered by the 
Egyptian Govermient to the British and French Agents in Egypt 
on the 7th November, containing a proposal for the abolition 
of the Control, and a statement of the grounds on which that 
course is advocated, I. also inclose a copy of the instructions 
which Her Ifejesty's Government have addressed to the Earl of 
Dufferin in reply to this communication, from which it will 
b© seen that, for the reasons therein stated, and subject to 
a reservation as to the appointment for the present of an 
European official as financial adviser to the Khedive.
Her Jfejesty’s Governaent are prepared to accede to the 
proposal of the Egyptian Government, la this measure they 
earnestly desire the concurrence of Prance.
Her Majesty’s Government have urged strongly upon 
the Khedive the necessity of at once introducing an improved 
system for the administration of justice to natives 
throughout the country, and they trust that in a short time 
effective measures will be taken for this purpose.
The question of the suppression of the Slave IPrade. 
and of the abolition, as far as possible, of slavery in Egyjft, 
is one which Her Msijesty's Government have muck at hearts They 
will lose no favourable opportunity of advising the Khedive 
to take such steps as may be judicious for the attainment 
of these objects.
There remains the question of the development of 
political institutions in Egypt. It is one of great importance 
and ccMiplexity, and requires for its treatment careful study 
of the circuMstances of the country and people. Her !fejesty*s 
Government are of opinion that the prudent introductioa of 
some form of representative institutions may contribute 
greatly to the good government of the country and to the 
safety and regularity of the Kteedive's rule. But they await 
further Reports from the±r Representatives in Egypt before 
ooming to a conclusion as to the shape which would be best 
suited to the present occasion, while affording opportunities 
for future growth.
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Her Majesty's Government have wished to jive full 
Inforaatloa to the Powers on all these natters, vhieh are 
Aasedlately connected with the peace, seourlty, and social 
order of EsTpt. and on whlek, accordinely they have thou^t 
it their duty to advise the Khedive as to the best Bode of 
exercisinc his eoverninc power. They trust that the spirit 
in which they have proceeded will be found to be in 
eonsonance with the views of the other Goverments who take 
an interest in the welfare of tla^ t country.
You will eoBiBunicate a copy of this despatch to 
the Government to which you are accredited.
Hurewitzi
**DiploBiacy in the Hear and Middle East" 
vol. I, pp* 197-199
TEXT OF THE EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION OF FEBRUARY 7th,
1882
APPENDIX III
Art, 1. The Members of the Chamber of Deputies 
are elected. An ulterior and special Law will make known 
the conditions of electorabillty and of eligibility for 
election, and at the sane time the mode of elect14n to the 
Chamber of Deputies* avt etistiJ.
Art# 2, The Members of the Chamber of Deputies / 
for a period of five years. They receive an annual payment 
of £ E.IOO.
Art, 3, The Deputies are free in the exercise 
of their mandates. They cannot be bound either by promises 
or by ( government ) instructions, or by an ( administrative 
order, or by menaces of a nature to interfere with the 
free expression of their opinions.
Art. 4, The Deputies are inviolable. In case of 
crime or misdemeanour committed during the course of the 
Session, they cannot be put under arrest except with the 
leave of the Chamber.
Art. 5. The Chamber may also, after its convocatioi 
• demand, provisionally and for the duration of the Session, 
that any one its Members who has been imprisoned shall
be set at liberty, or that all action directed against him 
shall be suspended during the Chamber's recess, if for a 
criminal matter, where no judgement has yet been pronounced.
Art, 6, Each Deputy represents not only the 
interests of the constituency which has elected him, but 
also the interests of the Egyptian people in general.
Art. 7, The Chamber of Deputies shall sit at 
Cairo, It is convoked each year by Decree of the Khedive, 
and according to the advice of the Council of Ministers,
Art, 8, The ordinary annual Session of the Chamber 
of Deputies shall be for three months, viz,, from the 1st 
November to the 31st January, But if the work of the Chamber
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is not flnlsJkSby the 31st January, it may then demand a 
prolongation of fifteen to thirty days. This prolongation 
will be accorded by Decree of the Khedive,
Art, 8. In case of necessity the Chamber will 
be convoked in Extraordinary Session by the Khedive, The 
duration of the Extraordinary Session will be fixed by 
the Decree convoking it,
Art,10, The Sessions of the Chamber shall be 
opened in the presence of the Ministers either by the 
Khedive or by the President of the Council of Ministers, 
acting by delegation of the Khedive,
Art,11, At the first sitting of each annual
Session an opening Speech shall be pronounced by the Khedive,
or in his name by the ^^ resident of the Council of Ministers,
It shall have for its object to make known to the Chamber
the principal questOns to be presented to it in the course 
of the session. After the reading of the opening speech 
the sitting shall be ad.lourned.
Art,12, During the three following days, the 
Chamber, having named a Committee for the purpose of 
preparing a reply to the opening speech, shall vote its 
reji^ ply, which shall be presented to the Khedive by a 
deputation chosen from amongst its members.
Art,13, The reply to the opening speech may not 
treat of any question in a decisive sense, nor contain any 
opinion which has been the object of previous deliberations.
Art,14, The Chamber shall submit to the Khedive 
a list containing the names of three Members whom it may 
propose for the office of President, Bie Khedive shall 
name by Decree one of the Members, thus designated. President 
of the Chamber of Deputies, The office of President shall 
continue for five jraars,
Art,15, The Chamber shall elect two Vice-Presidents 
»^lch it shall choose from among its Members, and shall 
name the Secretaries of its Bureau,
Art,16, An official renort of the sittings of 
the Chaunber shall be drawn up under the direction of the 
Bureau of the Chamber, composed of its President, 
Vice-Presidents, and Secretaries,
Art,17, The official language for the Chamber shall 
be Arabic, The proceedings and reports of the Chamber shall 
be drawn up in the official language.
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Art,18. The Ministers shall have the right of 
being present at the sittings of the Chamber, and of speaking 
there, when they shall think fit. They may cause themselves 
to be represented there by high state officials,
Art,19, If the Chamber decides that there is 
reason for summoning one of the Ministers to appear before 
it to give explanations on any questionf- the Minister shall 
appear in person or cause himself to be represented by 
another official to give the required explanations*
Art.20, The Deputies shall have the right to 
supervise the acts of all public functionaries during the 
Session, and through the President of the Chamber they may 
report to the Minister concerned all abuses, irregularities, 
or negligences charged against a public official, in the 
entercise of his functions.
Art,21* The Ministers are Jointly and severally 
responsible to the Chamber for every measure taken in 
Council, which may violate existing rules and regulations.
Art,22* Each Minister is individually responsible, 
in the cases foreseen in the preceding article, for his acts 
occuring in the exercise of his functions.
Art.23, In case of persistent disagreement between 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministry; when repeated 
interchanges of views and motives shall have taken place 
between them, if then the Ministry does not withdraw, the 
Khedive shall dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and decree 
that new elections shall be proceeded with, within a period 
of time not exceeding three months, counted from the day of 
dissolution to that of re-assembly. All Deputies thus 
dismissed shall be eligible for re-election.
Art,24, If the new Chamber confirms by its vote 
that of the preceding Chamber which had provoked the dis­
agreement, this vote shall be accepted as final.
Art,25, The Bills and Regulations emanating from 
the initiative of the Gtovernment shall be bought into the 
Chamber of Deputies by the Ministers, to be" examined, 
discussed and voted. No Law shall become valid until it 
has been read before the Chamber of Deputies, Article by 
Article, voted clause by clause, and consented to by the 
Khedive, Each Bill shall be read three times and between 
each reading there shall have been an interval of fifteen 
days. In case of urgency a single reading shall, by a special 
vote of the Chamber, be declared sufficient. If the Chamber 
judges it necessary to demand the introduction of a Bill 
from the Council of Ministers, it shall make the demand 
through the intermediary of the President of the Chamber, 
and in case of the approval of the Government, the Bill 
shall be prepared by the Ministry and introduced to the 
Chamber according to the forms fixed by this Article,
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Art.26, The Chamber shall chosse from amongst 
its Members a Committee, charged to examine all Bills and 
Regulations submitted to it. This Committee may propose 
to the Government amendments of such bills as it has been 
charged to examine| in which case, the bill and the amendment 
proposed shall be sent back, before any general discussion, 
by the President of the Chamber, to the President of the 
Council of Ministers,
Art,27, If the Committee does not propose any 
fiunendments or^ ifthal t^t or if those proposed are not 
adopted by the Government, the original text of the Bill 
shall be placed for discussion before theChamber, If the 
amendments prpposed by the Committee are accepted by the 
Government, then the text thus amended shall be placed for 
discussion before the Chamber, In case the Government 
should not accept the amendments proposed by the Committee, 
then the latter shall have the right of submitting its 
opinion and observations to the Chamber,
Art,28, The Chamber of Deputies may adopt or 
reject all Bills submitted to it by the Committee, It may 
also return them to the Committee to be examined a second 
time.
Art.29, The President of the Chamber shall convey 
to the President of the Council of Ministers the Laws and 
Regulations voted by the Chamber,
Art,30, No fresh tax direct or indirect— on 
movable, immovable or personal property may be imposed in 
Egypt without a Law voted by the Chamber, It is therefore 
formally forbidden that any new tax shall be levied, under 
whatever title or denomination it may be, without having been 
previously voted by the Chamber of Deputies, under penalty, 
against the authority which shall have ordered it, against 
the employes who shall have drawn up the schedules and 
tariffs and against those who shall have effected the 
recovery of the amounts, of being prosecuted as peculators. 
All contributions thus unduly levied shall be returned to 
those who have paid them.
Art.31, The Annual Budget of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of the State shall be communicated to the 
Chamber of Deputies not later than the 5th November of 
each year.
Art,32, The General Budget of Receipts shall be 
presented to the Ch«unber, accompanied by notes explanatory 
of the nature of each receipt.
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Art.33, The Budget of Expenditure shall be divided
Department by Department, and shall be subdivided into 
sections and chapters, corresoonding to the various branches 
of the public service depending upon each Ministry.
Art,34. The following cannot on any account be 
objects of discussion in the Chamber:
The service of the Tribute due to the sublime Porte,
The servi'‘e of the Public Debt.
Also all matters relating to the Debt and resulting from
the Law of Liquidation, or Conventions existing between the 
Foreign Powers and the Egyptian Government.
Art.35. The Budget shall be sent to the Chamber, 
to be examined and discussed there (under reserve of the 
preceding Article),
A Committee composed of as many Deputies, and 
having the same num' er of votes as the Members of the Council 
of Ministers and its President, shall be named by the 
Chamber to discuss, in common with the Council of Ministers, 
the Budget Estimates, and to vote them either unanimously 
or according to the majority.
Art,36, In case of an exact division of votes 
between the Commission of the Chamber and the Council of 
Ministers, the Budget shall be returned to the Chamber and. 
should the Chamber confirm (by its vote) that of the Council 
of Ministers, this vote shall become executory (executoire). 
But if the Chamber should maintain the vote of its Committee, 
then the procedure shall be according to the Articles 23 
and 24 of the present Law, In this case, the credits of the 
Budget Estimates which shall have caused the division of 
votes, if they figured in the Budget of the preceding year, 
and if they are not affected to any new object of expenditure, 
such as public works or others, shall be employed provisional] 
and until the meeting of the new Chamber, according to 
Article 23.
Art,37, If the new Chamber confirms the vote of 
the preceding Chamber, on the Budget, this vote shall becme 
definitely executory, in conformity with Article 23,
Art,38, No Treaty or contract between the 
Government and third parties and no flfQming concession shall 
acquire a final character without having been first apporved 
by a vote of the Chamber, provided that such Treaty, contract 
or concession does not relate to an object for which a sun 
has already figured in the approved Budged, corresponding 
to the year for which the Treaty, contract or concession 
shall have been proposed. Likewise no concession for public 
works, the execution of which shall not have been foreseen 
by the Budget, and no sale, or gratuitous alienation of the 
State domains, nor concession of privilege of any kind shall 
become d4flnitive until it Kshall have been approved by the 
Chamber,
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Art.39. All Egyptians may address a petition to 
the Chamber of Deputies, The petitions shall be seht to a 
Committee chosen by the Chamber from among its Members,
Upon the report of this Committee the Chamber shall take 
into consideration or reject the petitions. The petitions 
taken into consideration shall be sent back to the Minister 
concerned,
Art,40, All petitions relative to personal rights 
or interests shall be rejected if they are outside the 
competence of the Administrative and Civil Tribunals, or 
if they have not been previously addressed to the competent 
administrative authority,
Art,41, If during the recess of the Chamber grave 
circumstances shall demadd that urgent measures be taken 
to avoid a danger menacing the State, or to assure public 
order, the Council of Ministers may, then, upon its own 
responsibility and with the sanction of the ^edive, order 
those measures to be taken, even if they should be within 
the competence of the Chamber, supposing the time to be 
too short for the convocation of the latter. Nevertheless, 
the affair should be submitted for examination, at its 
next sitting, to the Chamber,
Art,42, No one may be admitted to explain or 
discuss questions or to take part in the deliberations of the 
Chamber other than its Members, with the exception of the 
Ministers or of those who are assisting or representing them.
Art,43* The votes of the Chamber shall be given 
by the holding up of hands or by the calling over of names 
or by ballot.
A«v. Art.44, The vote by calling over of names shall 
only/the demand of at least ten Members of the Chamber of 
Deputies. All wotes which may affect the provisions of 
Article 47 shall be made openly,
Art,45. The naAing of the three candidates for the 
Presidency of the Chamber, as well as the election of the 
two Vice-Presidents and the nomination of the first and 
second Secretaries to the Chamber shall be made by ballot,
Art,46, The Chamber of Deputies may not validly 
deliberate unless at least two-thirds of its Members are 
present at the deliberation. All decisions shall be taken 
absolutely according to the majority of votes.
Art,47, No vote entailing Ministeraijfal 
responsibility shall be given without a majority of at le§*t 
three-quarters of the Members present. .
YArt,48, No opinion shall be given/proxy.
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Art,49, The Chamber of Deputies shall elaborate 
Its own internal Regiialations, These shall be made executory 
by Decree of the Khedive.
Art,50, The present Organic Law may be amended 
after agreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Council of Ministers.
Art.51. The interpretation of all Articles and 
phrases of the present law which it may be necessary to 
make clear shall be made on agreement between the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Council of Ministers.
Art.52. All the provisions of Laws, Decrees, 
Superior Orders, Regulations, or Usages contrary to the 
present Law are and shall remain revoked.
Art.53. Our Ministers are charged, each in what 
concerns him, with the execution of the present Law,
Bluntt
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